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Abstract
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are being used in numerous applications
such as transportation ticketing, animal tracking, supply chain management, medical
records, electronic passports and identity cards. These systems consist of three main
components, namely: server, reader and tag. A tag is a small microchip with antenna
attached to an item which needs identification. A reader scans a tag(s) and collects
the identification information. This information is then passed on to a server by the
reader for further operations.
Providing security and preserving privacy of these systems come with a cost. In
sensitive applications such as e-passports, the embedded tags are resourceful enough to
accommodate standard cryptographic functionality. These resourceful tags are high-
cost. However in the most widely deployed RFID systems, such as in supply chain
management of daily consumer goods, it is not feasible to use such high-cost tags.
Therefore the tags used in these applications are low-cost tags which are constrained
in their resources. Since these tags cannot afford the luxury of conventional crypto-
graphic primitives, low-cost RFID systems are prone to both passive as well as active
adversaries. Some of the typical threats related to an RFID system include tag cloning,
impersonation, replay, relay, de-synchronization, DoS, content privacy leakage, tracing
and tracking attacks, etc. Therefore it is imperative to think out of the box to provide
security and privacy to these low-cost RFID systems.
This thesis makes six contributions in this regard. In the first and second con-
tribution, very basic low-cost tags are considered. These tags are very constrained
with respect to their resources. To secure such tags, researchers have proposed ultra-
lightweight mutual authentication protocols (UMAPs). First we demonstrate multiple
attacks in detail on two of such UMAPs. Then we carry out analysis of existing UMAPs
and highlight weaknesses. We also propose a new UMAP which overcomes the weak-
nesses of existing discussed schemes.
The next three contributions focus on the most widely used application of RFID
systems, supply chain management. This application generally uses a standard EPC-
global Class-1 Gen-2 (EPCC1G2). We contribute by first proposing a scheme which
provides security and privacy to tagged items throughout a supply chain cycle with
online as well as oﬄine readers. Then we focus our work on the counterfeit problem
in supply chain management, which causes huge losses to businesses. We propose a
hierarchical anti-counterfeit mechanism to counter the problem of counterfeiting during
the supply chain cycle. Finally we devise a framework to provide an anti-counterfeiting
feature to individual customers who cannot afford the luxury of standard readers and
access to a back-end database server.
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Lastly we discuss the problem of ownership transfer in RFID systems. Since tags
travel to different geographic locations, there is a need of ownership transfer, where
an owner is an entity which can interact with the tag using a shared secret key. A
simple ownership transfer involves transfer of a shared secret key from old owner to
new owner. This raises concerns where an old owner would retain a copy of the key and
can still interact with the tag even after its ownership is revoked. Similarly, if the key is
not changed before transfer, a new owner can trace past transactions of an old owner.
We propose a secure ownership transfer scheme which meets certain requirements.
We further elaborate on additional properties required to achieve a robust ownership
transfer process.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter outlines this thesis. Section 1.1 gives an overview of technol-
ogy, application and challenges which form the basis for this research. The
focus of this research is given in Section 1.2. The structure of the thesis is
presented in Section 1.3.
1.1 Overview
A Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system is used to identify an object remotely
using radio waves and is made up of tags, readers and a back-end server.
A small transponder is attached to the object which needs identification. This small
transponder is called a tag, which is a small chip with antenna. The chip has memory
that stores the identification information of a particular object. This chip may also
have a small processor to perform some computations if required. The antenna is used
to transmit and receive information. A tag is classified according to its power source.
A passive tag does not have its own power source whereas an active tag has one.
A compatible reader is a device which can scan/read a tag in its vicinity. Compared
to a tag, a reader is a resourceful entity with antenna, modem, processor, storage and
its own power supply. It transmits signals at a prescribed frequency, power and format
to not only query a tag, but also to power up a passive tag.
A back-end server is connected to multiple readers. This gathers identification in-
formation from tags using these readers as intermediary devices. It then stores/verifies
this information in its database for further processing.
RFID systems have been deployed in numerous applications. Some examples in-
clude access control, transportation ticketing, animal tracking, patient medical history,
toll payments, vehicle identification, library administration, electronic passport control,
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inventory and supply chain management [146]. RFID systems are also diversified in
their standardization. Some systems are proprietary while others follow application-
specific standards [151]. RFID system are used in these applications to achieve the
following objectives [63]:
1. Unique Identification. Each tagged object is identified uniquely, including
objects within a homogeneous collection. For example, a tagged biscuit pack can
be uniquely identified in a crate of other biscuit packs of the same manufacturer
and brand.
2. Automation. Tags are identified automatically without any requirement for
a line-of-sight or physical connection. This allows RFID tags to be identified
anywhere within scan range.
Although there are many benefits of using this technology, RFID systems have
associated security and privacy concerns which arise due to the following reasons [63]:
• Communication between a reader and a tag is wireless and hence can be eaves-
dropped.
• Tags can be read by any compatible reader promiscuously.
• A rogue reader may emit a stronger signal than prescribed to scan tags at longer
distances.
• Tags are not only inconspicuous, but a tag holder does not know when a tag is
transmitting information or to whom.
Therefore there is a clear need to address security and privacy concerns in RFID sys-
tems.
1.2 Focus
While considering security and privacy of RFID systems, it is imperative to keep the
following questions in mind:
• In which application will the RFID system be deployed and what are the desired
security properties?
• Does the RFID system under consideration has to comply with any standards?
• What resources are available to the RFID tag?
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Providing security and privacy for RFID systems is a challenge because of the resource
constraints of the tag. Basic cryptographic primitives require considerable amounts of
storage, computation, power consumption and communication overheads. These ad-
ditional resources increase the overall cost of the system. Therefore, while designing
security for RFID systems, it is imperative to make a trade-off between cost, perfor-
mance and level of security.
The main security and privacy requirements vary depending on the application of
an RFID system. For example, in an e-passport system cost is not an issue but the
level of security is important. Therefore RFID tags employed in such an application are
expensive and resourceful. Whereas, in a supply chain management system of consumer
goods, the level of security can often be degraded in order to keep the cost of the RFID
tags low. There is no standard criterion but generally a low-cost tag should cost a few
pence whereas a high-cost tag can cost as much as several pounds sterling.
In [22], a tag classification based on the operations supported on-chip is proposed.
High-cost tags are divided into two classes: full-fledged and simple. Likewise, there are
two classes for low-cost RFID tags: lightweight and ultra-lightweight.
1. Full-fledged. These tags support on-board conventional cryptography like sym-
metric encryption, cryptographic one-way functions and even public key cryptog-
raphy.
2. Simple. The chip on these tags can support random number generators and
one-way hash functions.
3. Lightweight. These tags are those whose chip supports a random number gen-
eration and simple functions like a Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) checksum,
but not a cryptographic hash function.
4. Ultra-lightweight. These tags can only compute simple bitwise operations like
XOR, AND, OR, etc.
Low-cost tags (lightweight and ultra-lightweight) pose the biggest challenge in terms of
security and privacy. These tags are in widespread use and have very limited resources
to accommodate security primitives. The focus of this thesis will be to address security
and privacy requirements in low-cost tags. A comparison, between low and high-cost
tags, is shown in the Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Comparison between Low-cost and High-cost RFID Tags.
Specifications Low-cost Tags High-cost Tags
Cost Few pence Several pounds
Standards EPC Class-1 Generation-2 ISO/IEC 14443 A/B
ISO/IEC 18000-6C
Storage 64 bits - 1 kilobytes up to 128 kilobytes
Power Source Passive Passive and Active
Computation 250-4000 gates simple ALU Fully capable microprocessor
1.3 Structure
This thesis focuses on analyzing schemes for addressing security and privacy issues in
low-cost RFID systems. The thesis is divided into the following parts:
Part 1: Setting the Scene
This part consists of Chapter 2, which provides a fundamental background to RFID
systems. This includes a detailed discussion of the main components of an RFID
system, its interface, regulations, standardization and various applications. Finally it
explains why security and privacy risks arise in these system and how security solutions
are classified.
Part 2: Ultra-lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (UMAPs) :
Weaknesses and Countermeasures
This part consists of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Here we will examine secure solutions
appropriate for ultra-lightweight tags.
• Chapter 3. We analyze weaknesses found in two ultra-lightweight mutual au-
thentication protocols (SIDRFID and DIDRFID) presented in [80] and discuss
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multiple attacks on both protocols. This work has been accepted for publica-
tion [12].
• Chapter 4. This chapter generalizes weaknesses in a number of existing UMAPs.
We then suggest countermeasures to overcome the highlighted weaknesses. The
countermeasures are presented in the form of a new UMAP which builds on the
strengths of the existing schemes. This work has been published in [9].
Part 3: RFID Systems in Supply Chain Management
This part consists of Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. One of the most researched
applications of RFID systems is their use in supply chain management. While RFID
systems for supply chain management can provide high performance, there are many
outstanding security and privacy issues which need to be addressed.
• Chapter 5. In supply chain management, a tagged item travels from manufac-
turer to end-user/customer. The tag starts its journey in a secure environment
where readers share secrets with corresponding tags (online readers) and moves
to insecure environment where readers are positioned at different geographic lo-
cations and do not possess secrets corresponding to the tags (oﬄine readers). A
tag’s user privacy can be easily compromised in insecure environment if appro-
priate measures are not taken. This chapter presents an online/oﬄine adaptive
approach to achieve desired security and privacy goals throughout a supply chain
management system. The suggested scheme is designed for EPCglobal Class-1
Gen-2 (EPCC1G2) standard compliant tags [48] but can be modified in order
to be suitable for similar resource-constraint environments. This work has been
published [11].
• Chapter 6. Detecting a counterfeit in supply chain management is a laborious
and time consuming task. Though RFID systems can speed up the process of
identification, these systems are vulnerable to a genuine tag being cloned and
attached to a counterfeit item. Tagged items travel in groups in supply chain
management depending on their type, lot number and expiry date, etc. In this
chapter, a hierarchical anti-counterfeit mechanism is designed that can detect
both counterfeit and missing items. This mechanism also helps to identify dis-
honest middle parties. The proposal is suitable for EPCC1G2 standard compliant
tags [48] and can be extended to other standards. This work has been published
in [10].
21
1.3. Structure 1. Introduction
• Chapter 7. Since ultra-high frequency (UHF) readers are not available to indi-
vidual customers, it is not feasible to verify the authenticity of tagged items at a
customer level. We design a customer level anti-counterfeit framework that uses
near field communication (NFC) technology in smart phones to detect counter-
feits. A valuable item is linked to two tags (one EPC compliant and one NFC
compliant). The tagged item is processed in the supply chain using the EPC tag
until the item reaches the end-user/customer. The customer then uses their NFC
enabled device to determine the legitimacy of the item by running an authenti-
cation protocol with the NFC tag. This work has been published in [125].
Part 4: Ownership Transfer in RFID Systems
This part consists of Chapter 8 which deals with the scenario where a tagged item
changes its ownership. The ownership is associated with the possession of a secret key.
Thus only an owner of a tag can interact with it using its respective shared secret key.
However when a particular tag is transferred/sold, the new owner needs this secret so
that it can also interact with the tag. This transfer should be secure, where the secret
key of old owner should not be exposed to new owner and vice versa. We propose a
robust ownership transfer process which is not only secure but also achieves additional
properties.
Part 5: Conclusions and Future Work
The conclusions of this research are drawn in Chapter 9. Future research directions are
also discussed.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides a background to RFID systems. Section 2.1 defines
the main components of an RFID system, the type of interface used is dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, and regulations and standardizations governing RFID
systems are listed in Section 2.3. Different applications of RFID systems
are given in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 explains some of the reasons why risks
arise relating to RFID systems. An introduction to formal analysis methods
is given in Section 2.6.
2.1 Components of RFID Systems
RFID is a wireless technology that enables identification of tags attached to items over
a radio link. A short history of RFID is given in Appendix A. RFID systems can
support a larger set of identifiers than bar codes [144]. They can also handle additional
information such as manufacturer, product type and even monitor environmental fac-
tors such as temperature, humidity, etc. In this section, the main components of RFID
system are discussed.
2.1.1 RFID Tags
An RFID tag consists of a microchip with logic gates for computation, memory for
storage, and a coupling interface, such as an antenna coil for communication. Cost is
a major concern when designing different components of a tag. A diagram of an RFID
tag is as shown in Figure 2.1.
• Power Source. Tags can be classified as either active tags having their own
power supply (some tags are classified as semi-active as their batteries are only
activated in the presence of a reader) or passive tags drawing power from the
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Memory BlockControl LogicTx Modulator
Power Supply
Rx Modulator
Antenna
Figure 2.1: Block Diagram of a Tag.
signal received from the reader. The battery, on active tags, adds sensory and
data logging capabilities, supports larger memories and increases the scan range.
Passive tags receive power from the reader in order to perform computations and
transmit data. Low-cost tags tend only to be passive.
• Transmitter and Receiver Modulators. These modulators are used for cod-
ing bit-streams into radio waves and decoding radio waves into bit-streams be-
tween readers and tags.
• Control Logic. Depending on the functionality and cost of an RFID tag, it can
have different computational capabilities. Low-cost tags generally have a simple
arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) consisting of 250-4000 logic gates. High-cost
tags can afford the luxury of a fully capable microprocessor. Depending on the
tag category, its programming can be done at the manufacturing level or at the
application level.
• Memory Block. Each tag has read only memory (ROM) and random access
memory (RAM) depending on its application. These memory blocks can be
read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable. Typically passive tags have
a range of 64 bits to 1 kilobyte of non-volatile memory. These passive tags
normally use electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM).
Some passive tags are laser programmed at the manufacturing process. Active
tags have memories as high as 128 kilobytes and use battery-supported static
random access memory (SRAM).
• Antenna. The antenna is used for transmitting/receiving the signals between
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reader and tag. More details about its coupling with the communication is given
in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 RFID Readers
RFID readers have a radio frequency module, a control unit, and a coupling element in
order to interrogate tags using radio frequency communication. RFID readers are not
considered to have issues with regard to internal storage and processing capabilities.
Therefore, any costly cryptographic operations such as random number generation tend
to be handled by RFID readers rather than tags. These readers are connected to a
back-end server through a secure communication channel such as SSL/TLS.
2.1.3 Back-end Server
Since tags can store, process and communicate relatively few bits of information due to
resource limitations, tag data tends to be transmitted to a back-end server and used as
an index (pointers, randomized identifiers, etc.) to a database for retrieval of detailed
information associated with a particular tag. The reader acts as an intermediary be-
tween tag and server to exchange this information. It is assumed that the connection
between readers and the back-end server is secure.
2.2 RFID System Interface
Active tags generally have different transmitter and receiver functionalities supported
by a power source. Therefore active tags may respond at a different frequency than
the reader’s interrogation signal. These tags normally operate at 433MHz ultra high
frequency (UHF) in military applications, at microwave and ultra-wide band ranges.
Passive tags receive power from readers for computation and communication. En-
ergy is transferred using coupling via electromagnetic fields [47]. RFID tags use either
electric field or magnetic field (or both) to receive power from a reader. The signal
sent from reader to tag must be used simultaneously to transmit both information and
energy. Most RFID systems operate in ISM bands [149] which are designated by the
International Union of Telecommunications. The most commonly used ISM frequencies
for RFID systems are 13.56 MHz and 860-960 MHz. Each band has its own radiation
power and bandwidth regulations.
There are various methods of transferring the data to a reader. Passive tags usually
use passive backscatter or inductive coupling (see Figure 2.2). In passive backscatter,
reader transfers energy to the tag by emitting electromagnetic waves through the air.
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The tag uses RF energy to charge up, receives command/data signals and responds
accordingly. Inductive coupling is used by low frequency (LF) and high frequency (HF)
band RFID devices. The reader’s antenna uses a current to generate the magnetic
field. The antenna on the tag, when exposed to this magnetic field, generates a current
in the tag that powers up its circuitry. Circuitry on the tag switches the impedance
load of the tag’s antenna according to the data stream, causing modulation of the
magnetic field joining reader and tag. This is demodulated by the reader to extract
useful information.
RFID Reader RFID Tag
Passive Backscatter
RFID Reader RFID TagInductive Coupling
Figure 2.2: RFID System Interface for Passive Communication.
2.2.1 Coding and Modulation.
The exchange of data between reader and tag, and vice versa, must be produced effi-
ciently; so both coding and modulation are used. The coding/modulation are defined
according to the existing limitations in the forward (reader to tag) and the backward
(tag to reader) channels. Readers are able to transmit greater power, but have band-
width limitations. Tags have power limitations. The power source classification of an
RFID system is as shown in Table 2.1.
The modulation scheme determines how the bit-stream is transmitted between read-
ers and tags, and vice versa. Some solutions include: amplitude shift keying (ASK),
frequency shift keying (FSK) and phase shift keying (PSK). The choice of modulation
type is based on power consumption, reliability and bandwidth requirements. In the
forward channel, either manchester or non-return-to-zero (NRZ) is used. Whereas in
the backward channel, either pulse-position modulation (PPM) or pulse-width modula-
tion (PWM) coding techniques are preferred.
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Table 2.1: Power Source Classification
Type of Tags Internal Circuitry Types of Communication
Passive Power from Reader Passive backscatter or inductive coupling
Semi-active Internal Power Passive backscatter or inductive coupling
Active Internal Power Transmits and receives RF signal
2.2.2 Collisions in RFID System
Collisions between tags happen when multiple tags simultaneously answer a reader
signal. The anti-collision algorithms used in RFID systems are quite similar to those
applied in networks, but they take into account that RFID tags are generally more
limited than the average network device. Both probabilistic or deterministic approaches
are used. In practice, however, a combination of both is often deployed.
In the case of collision between readers, several readers interrogate the same tag
at the same time. The tag in such a case may not respond. One possible solution to
this problem consists of allocating frequencies over time to a set of readers by either a
distributed or a centralized approach.
2.3 Regulation and Standardization of RFID System
Companies were mainly using proprietary systems before RFID standards began to
evolve. Organizations including the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), ASTM International,
DASH7 Alliance, and EPCglobal have set standards for RFID systems. Depending on
the availability of frequency bands, the regulations for RFID systems [18, 40] can be
categorized as follows:
• Low Frequency (LF). These use 125-134.2 kHz and 140-148.5 kHz. LF tags
can be read at a distance up to 10 cm. Applications include animal identification,
car key-locks and data collection, etc.
• High Frequency (HF). This uses the ISM band at 13.56 MHz. HF tags have a
scan range from 10 cm to 1 m. These tags are used in smart cards, library books
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and clothing identification, etc.
• Ultra High Frequency (UHF). This frequency range is 860-960 MHz. UHF
tags are read at a distance from 1 to 12 m. The main application is inventory
and supply chain management and most wide deployments follow the EPCglobal
standardization framework.
• Microwave. This transmits at 2.45 GHz and has a read range of up to 30 meters
approximately. Applications of microwave tags are highway toll collection and
vehicle fleet identification, etc.
The main standard of interest to us is the EPCC1G2 standard [48] since it forms
the basis of the work in Part 3 of the thesis (details of other standards can be found
in Appendix A).
2.3.1 EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 (EPCC1G2) Standard.
The Auto-ID Center, founded in the late 1990s at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), started working on a standard that would put RFID technology into various
applications across the globe, notably supply chain management. In 2003, the work on
this standard was taken over by another organization, EPCglobal, which was a joint
venture between the European Article Numbering (EAN) and Uniform Code Council
(UCC).
The aim of EPCglobal is to establish an international standard for identification of
tagged products in supply chains across the globe using passive RFID tags, each having
a unique electronic product code (EPC). Class-0 and Class-1 were the two protocols used
in commercial applications between 2003 and 2005. These protocols specified how to
exchange information between a tag and a reader and are known as the Air Interface
Protocols. The EPCC1G2 Version 1.2.0 standard [48] specifies low-cost UHF tags which
operate in the frequency range of 860-960 MHz and have a read range of 2-10 meters.
Each tag is identified with its unique EPC, which is a 96-bit long string (see Fig-
ure 2.3). The first 8 bits represent the version number. The next 28 bits are for the
organization number as assigned by the EPCglobal consortium. This is followed by
24 bits of product class identification. The last 36 bits carry the unique serial num-
ber of the tagged product. Rather like a URL, EPC can be used as an identifier in a
global database to uniquely identify a particular product. Further details are given in
Chapter 5.
The new version of this standard, Version 2.0.0 [49] was released in November,
2013. The new standard proposes an optional cryptographic suite to be implemented
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Version Organization Info. Object Class Unique Serial Number
8 bits 28 bits 24 bits 36 bits
Figure 2.3: Electronic Product Code (EPC) Format.
in RFID tags. It also supports new optional security commands includingAuthenticate,
AuthComm, SecureComm, KeyUpdate and TagPrivilege. A Tag may support zero,
one, or more than one, cryptographic suites. A cryptographic suite defines how a tag
and a reader implement a cryptographic algorithm and its functions. A reader selects
one from among the implemented cryptographic suites using the Cryptographic Suit
Indicator (CSI) field in the Challenge and Authenticate commands. A tag may support
up to 256 keys, numbered Key0 to Key255. The tag manufacturer chooses the number
and type of cryptographic suite and number of available keys, and assigns them to
the cryptographic suite(s); this assignment is not be alterable in the field. No two
keys have the same number, even if used for different cryptographic suites. A tag does
not indicate where in memory it stores its keys, nor does it allow a reader to read
this memory location. This new version of the standard does not affect the UHF Air
Interface Protocol and also supports our work carried out on previous version with
regard to cryptographic implementations.
2.4 Applications of the RFID Systems
RFID systems can be used in a variety of applications. Low-cost tags are considered
to have widespread potential in future applications [40, 63, 76, 93]. According to a
report in 2012 [152], the global RFID market is expected to grow at a compound
annual growth rate of around 18% through 2014 to reach approximately USD 19.3
billion. This phenomenal growth surpasses other identification technologies including
bar codes. A few of the many applications of RFID system are as follows (see [146] for
further examples):
• Access Control. Contactless proximity cards (with embedded tags) are used
for controlled access to buildings [21]. Car ignition keys are fitted with tags to
counter theft and access to vehicles.
• Automated Payments. A toll is paid automatically using tags attached to the
windscreen of vehicles. The SpeedPass token for petrol station payments, con-
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tactless credit-cards, like American Express ExpressPay and Mastercard PayPass
are a few examples.
• Animal Tracking. Tags embedded in animals are a way to identify and track
animal habitat, medication and extract other useful information [138]. Millions
of pets have tags for tracking and returning to their owners in case of loss.
• Public Transport. RFID systems have led to considerable improvements in the
public transportation sector [128]. Tagged tickets/cards are re-usable and can be
pre-paid. Losses due to customers not paying and manual checking has reduced
considerably.
• Smart Appliances. Smart appliances [142] can interact with tags used in the
consumer products such as medicine, food and garments. A smart cabinet can
set reminders for medicines, a smart fridge can send notifications about expiry
dates and, similarly, a smart washing machine can set cycles depending on the
nature of a garment. These smart devices can later interact with the web to pass
a shopping list on to a home delivery service.
• Automated Shopping. Customers can shop in a retail store and all the items in
their trolley will be read automatically while passing through exit doors installed
with compatible readers. Items will be indexed in the database for their prices.
Even the cost can be automatically deducted from the customer’s contactless
payment card and an e-bill could be sent to their phone.
• Interactive Objects. Smart posters enable someone to use an NFC-enabled
phone [103] to obtain information, for example show timings, reviews and cast for
a movie poster. Similarly a customer can use a smart phone to read a promotional
leaflet to obtain detailed information about a product.
• Supply Chain Management. One of the biggest impact of RFID systems is
considered to be in supply chain management, which also involves logistics and
assets tracking. This application will be discussed in detail in Part 3 of this thesis.
2.5 Risks to an RFID System
RFID systems suffer risks just like any other types of system. A research survey on
RFID security and privacy issues is given in [63]. The following are the aspects of an
RFID system that give rise to security risks, and we indicate how to counter those
risks.
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• Resource Constraints. Since the cost has to be kept low, a tag, particularly
in low-cost RFID systems, has constraints on its resources. This in turn lowers
the level of security that can be supported. Therefore researchers have to discuss
lightweight secure solutions for RFID systems.
• Wireless Channel. The communication between a tag and a reader uses radio
waves transmitted through the air. This communication can be eavesdropped by
any adversary and can be used to carry out different attacks. This channel thus
should be encrypted to ensure security of transmitted information.
• Promiscuous Technology. Any compatible reader can scan a particular tag
and obtain useful information. An authentication mechanism is thus required to
restrict access so only legitimate and authorized readers can scan a particular
tag.
• Remote Reading. Tags can be read at a distance through materials like card-
board, cloth, and plastic. A compatible reader can scan in its wireless range to
look for tags. Different scan ranges can be identified as follows [63]:
– Nominal Read Range. The maximum distance at which a normally operating
reader can reliably scan tags.
– Rogue Scanning Range. A rogue reader can normally emit a stronger signal
and read tags from a larger distance than the nominal range.
– Tag-to-Reader Eavesdropping Range. Read range limitations result from the
requirement that the reader powers a passive tag. However, one reader can
power up the tag, while another one can monitor its emission (eavesdrop at
a longer read range).
– Reader-to-Tag Eavesdropping Range. Readers transmit at much higher power
than tags. Reader’s transmissions can be eavesdropped from much further.
One approach is to cover a tag with shielding against scanning. Another approach
is to program a tag to reject a stronger signal than prescribed. Distance bounding
protocols [35,73,78] determine whether a reader querying a tag is inside nominal
range or not. These protocols make decision based on the time that a message is
sent and when its response is received.
• Stealthy Scanning. Tags are not only inconspicuous, a tag holder often does
not even know when they are transmitting information or to whom. Therefore
an entity authentication mechanism should be incorporated which ensures that
only authorized readers can read a tag.
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This thesis considers lightweight solutions to provide security and preserve privacy in
RFID deployments. These lightweight solutions involve mutual authentication proto-
cols, anti-counterfeit mechanisms and an ownership transfer scheme. We also carry out
the formal analysis of different protocols suggested in this thesis as described in next
section.
2.6 Formal Analysis
We formally analyze the protocols and schemes proposed in our thesis using Casper
and FDR tools. First we describe a security protocol in simple and abstract language
understandable by Casper [90]. Casper is a program that will compile this descrip-
tion and produce a communicating sequential processes (CSP) description of the same
protocol [55]. The CSP description is then checked using another program known as
failures-divergence refinement (FDR) [45]. FDR uses the assumptions of the Dolev-
Yao model [30] to find attacks upon protocols, or to show that no such attack exists.
The Dolev-Yao model assumes that the intruder may overhear or intercept messages,
decrypt and encrypt messages with keys that he knows, and fake messages, but not
perform any cryptological attacks.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed RFID technology in detail. The various components
which form an RFID system and their roles are explained. Regulations and standard-
izations of RFID systems are discussed. Various risks related to using this technology
are presented. We also carry out formal analysis of the suggested protocols in our thesis
using Casper and FDR tools.
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Chapter 3
Weaknesses in Existing UMAPs
This chapter reviews how design flaws can be exploited in existing propos-
als for a family of mutual authentication protocols belonging to the ultra-
lightweight class, which are designed for low-cost RFID systems. Section 3.1
introduces this family and security analysis of two authentication protocols,
SIDRFID and DIDRFID belonging to the same family. Section 3.2 de-
fines both these protocols in detail. These protocols are considered to em-
ploy ultra-lightweight functions and are very efficient. However, Section 3.3
demonstrate design flaws in SIDRFID while Section 3.4 analyzes DIDRFID
resulting in full secret disclosure and other attacks in both protocols. These
disclosure attacks undermine the security of both protocols. Further analysis
highlights additional attacks including traceability and reader impersonation.
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 2.1, RFID systems consist of three main components: tag, reader
and server. The communication channel between server and reader is assumed to be
secured while the channel between reader and tag is wireless and can be eavesdropped.
The wide deployment of RFID systems is being constrained due to many security and
privacy issues, as shown in Section 2.5, concerning the eavesdropping of the channel
between reader and tag.
To secure the communication on this channel researchers have proposed various
cryptographic solutions, including mutual authentication protocols between the two
communicating parties. Based on the computational cost and operations supported
by the tags, these authentication protocols are divided into four classes: full-fledged,
simple, lightweight and ultra-lightweight, as discussed earlier in Section 1.2. In the
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ultra-lightweight class, UMAPs are proposed for the low-cost RFID systems that are
most widely deployed [22] and most likely to replace bar-codes. The main limiting
factor in these tags is the strict resource constraints. Since cost has to be kept low,
these tags cannot afford a state-of-the-art CPU, large memory, or transmit large data.
Generally, low-cost RFID tags consist of a few thousand gates, a simple ALU performing
simple operations, and no active power source, as explained in Section 2.1. Therefore
UMAPs proposed for these low-cost RFID tags should consist of extremely lightweight
and efficient functions. However, it is easy to propose a weak UMAP if not carefully
designed. We analyze UMAP proposals to illustrate what can go wrong while suggesting
such ultra-lightweight schemes.
Yung-Cheng Lee proposed two such ultra-lightweight authentication protocols [80].
In one of the protocols, the tag and reader do not share any secrets and use their
respective identities as shared secrets. These identities are, therefore, not transmitted
in the clear. Moreover, these identities do not update and are static. This protocol
is called ultra-lightweight RFID protocol with static identity (SIDRFID). In the other
protocol, tag and reader share a secret key K. After authenticating the reader, the
tag sends its unique secret identity IDT . Both K and IDT are updated in each
authentication round, hence this protocol is called ultra-lightweight RFID protocol with
dynamic identity (DIDRFID). Both protocols claim to provide mutual authentication
and implement very efficient and extremely lightweight functions. We discuss these
protocols in greater depth in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Our Contribution
We focus our work on highlighting weaknesses in existing proposals belonging to the
ultra-lightweight class. These proposals outline mutual authentication protocols to pro-
vide security and privacy properties to low-cost RFID systems. We carry out multiple
attacks on a couple of UMAPs proposed in [80]. Avoine et al. [3] have also carried out
a security analysis of both protocols. They observe that using a single master key in
SIDRFID is a single point of failure if compromised. However, they do not elaborate
on any specific technique to recover the master key. Our work shows how to recover
this single master key and break the entire SIDRFID system. This part of the work
as shown in Section 3.3.2 is a joint work. Further, Avoine et al. [3] highlight an attack
on the secret key used in DIDRFID. This attack involves eavesdropping two rounds
of authentication session and L2 possible guesses (where L is the length of key). Our
work demonstrates a passive full disclosure attack that determines the correct key af-
ter eavesdropping approximately
√
piL rounds. This work has been accepted to get
published [12].
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Table 3.1: Notation used in Chapter 3
Notation Description
IDT Tag’s static identity.
DIDTi Tag’s dynamic identity used in i
th authentication round.
IDR Reader’s static identity.
Ki Secret key shared between tag and reader in i
th authentica-
tion round.
Ri Random number generated by reader in i
th authentication
round.
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation.
∨ Bitwise OR operation.
∧ Bitwise AND operation.
A→ B : M A sends to B, message M.
X A 96-bit string x95 · · ·x0, where x0 and x95 are the least
significant and most significant bits respectively.
HW (X) Hamming weight of bit string X.
Rot(X,Y ) Left rotation of argument X by HW(Y) bits.
3.2 Two Ultra-lightweight Protocols
In this section, the two protocols proposed in [80] are presented. These protocols
belong to the ultra-lightweight class designed for low-cost RFID tags and claim to
provide mutual authentication. Additionally, these protocols claim to resist attacks
including traceability, replay, de-synchronization and impersonation. Importantly, the
computation cost is kept low by incorporating lightweight functions. In the proposed
protocols, the pseudo-random number generator is only installed in the reader (which
is a resourceful entity when compared to the tag). The low-cost tag only performs
simple bit-wise operations (XOR, AND, OR) and left rotation of bits Rot(A,B). The
notation used in this chapter are given in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Protocol with Static Identity (SIDRFID)
This protocol assumes that tag and reader each have identities IDT and IDR, respec-
tively. Both these identities are secret values shared by both entities (it is assumed
that tag and reader have these pre-installed prior to activation of the scheme). The ith
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Reader Tag
Si = Ri ⊕ IDR
Pi = IDT ⊕Rot(Ri, IDR), Qi = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(Ri, Ri)
Zi = Rot(IDT, IDR⊕Ri)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT ⊕Ri)
Figure 3.1: Protocol with Static Identity SIDRFID.
round of authentication is shown in Figure 3.1 and consists of the following steps:
• Step 1.
– Reader generates Ri.
– Reader computes:
Si = Ri ⊕ IDR.
– Reader → Tag : Si.
• Step 2.
– Tag computes:
Ri = Si ⊕ IDR,
Pi = IDT ⊕Rot(Ri, IDR),
Qi = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(Ri, Ri).
– Tag → Reader : (Pi, Qi).
• Step 3.
– Reader computes:
IDT = Pi ⊕Rot(Ri, IDR),
Q
′
i = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(Ri, Ri).
– Reader authenticates tag as follows:
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if Q
′
i = Qi then
Tag is authenticated,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
• Step 4.
– In case of successful tag authentication, the reader computes:
Zi = Rot(IDT, IDR⊕Ri)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT ⊕Ri).
– Reader → Tag : Zi.
• Step 5.
– Tag computes:
Z
′
i = Rot(IDT, IDR⊕Ri)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT ⊕Ri).
– Tag authenticates reader as follows:
if Z
′
i = Zi then
Reader is authenticated,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
3.2.2 Protocol with Dynamic Identity (DIDRFID)
This protocol assumes that tag and reader share a secret key K (it is assumed that tag
and reader have this pre-installed prior to activation of the scheme). The ith round of
authentication is as shown in Figure 3.2 and consists of the following steps:
• Step 1.
– Tag → Reader : DIDTi.
• Step 2.
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Reader Tag
DIDTi
Ai = Ki ⊕Ri, Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri)
Ci = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki)
Figure 3.2: Protocol with Dynamic Identity DIDRFID.
– Reader uses DIDTi as index to extract the corresponding secret key Ki from
the database.
– Reader generates a random number Ri.
– Reader computes:
Ai = Ki ⊕Ri,
Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri).
– Reader → Tag : (Ai, Bi).
• Step 3.
– Tag computes:
Ri = Ai ⊕Ki,
B
′
i = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri).
– Tag authenticates reader as follows:
if B
′
i = Bi then
Reader is authenticated,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
• Step 4.
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– In case of successful reader authentication, the tag computes:
Ci = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki).
– Tag → Reader : Ci.
• Step 5.
– Reader computes:
C
′
i = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki).
– Reader authenticates tag as follows:
if C
′
i = Ci then
Tag is authenticated,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
• Key Updating Step. After successful mutual authentication, tag and reader
update their values:
– Tag and Reader compute:
DIDTi+1 = Rot(Ri, Ri ∨Ki)⊕Rot(Ki, Ri ∧Ki),
Ki+1 = Rot(Ri, Ri ∧Ki)⊕Rot(Ki, Ri ∨Ki).
– Tag and Reader both keep (DIDTi,Ki) and (DIDTi+1,Ki+1) in their re-
spective memory locations.
3.3 Security Analysis of SIDRFID
In this section, we carry out a security analysis of SIDRFID as presented in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. Avoine et al. [3] have suggested that SIDRFID is a weak protocol because it
uses a single master key which in many situations is considered unacceptable. However,
there may be applications, such as issuing temporary RFID tags for access control to
a team visiting an organization, where use of a single master key may be justified. In
such scenarios, we do not need to generate new keys on every access attempt and thus
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avoid the need for secure distribution of these secret keys to each tag. Nonetheless we
show that, even in situations where a fixed master key is justified, the secret entities
can easily be recovered thus demonstrating that SIDRFID is a very weak protocol. A
formal analysis of this protocol is presented in Appendix B.
3.3.1 Passive Hamming Weight Disclosure (PHWD) Attack
We first present a passive attack which reveals HW (IDR). We make the realistic as-
sumption that the channel between tag and reader is wireless and can be eavesdropped.
The attacker simply needs to eavesdrop any two rounds of authentication. Moreover,
the resources available to the attacker are also limited so it cannot perform complex
computations (a realistic assumption in lightweight cryptography). The attack executes
as follows:
• Step 1. Attacker eavesdrops two legitimate authentication rounds to obtain
S1, P1 and S2, P2.
• Step 2. The attacker computes:
A = S1 ⊕ S2,
= (R1 ⊕ IDR)⊕ (R2 ⊕ IDR),
= R1 ⊕R2.
(3.1)
B = P1 ⊕ P2,
= (IDT ⊕Rot(R1, IDR))⊕ (IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR)),
= Rot(R1, IDR)⊕Rot(R2, IDR),
= Rot(R1 ⊕R2, IDR).
(3.2)
From (3.1) and (3.2), we get:
B = Rot(A, IDR). (3.3)
Since A and B are known from (3.1) and (3.2), HW (IDR) can easily be obtained
from (3.3).
After disclosing HW (IDR), an attacker can carry out a selective brute force attack to
find the exact value, where each value has correctness probability (considering L as the
length of bit string IDR):
42
3.3. Security Analysis of SIDRFID 3. Weaknesses in Existing UMAPs
prob =
1(
L
HW (IDR)
) .
This value is much higher than 2−L, which is the probability of brute force attack
success against an L-bit value. If we assume that IDR is similar to those assigned
as EPC values (96-bit [48]), IDR consists of only 36 random bits (which we denote
IDR∗) and the remaining 60 bits are publicly known (these determine the header,
manufacturer and type of item details). This further raises the correctness probability
prob′ of a guess to:
prob′ =
1(
36
HW (IDR∗)
) ,
which is substantially fewer trials to conduct.
3.3.2 Full Disclosure Active (FDA) Attack
We now present a full disclosure active attack against SIDRFID. We assume that
either the attacker is in possession of the tag or there is no restriction on accessing the
tag. This attack involves eavesdropping one round of legitimate communication and
95 chosen public messages sent to the tag (considering the length of variables to be 96
bits as in the EPCC1G2 standard [48]).
The FDA attack is explained as follows:
• Step 1. The attacker eavesdrops a legitimate authentication round and records
S1, P1, Q1 and Z1 (described in Section 3.2.1), where the labels of individuals bits
in each of these strings is as for string X in Table 3.1.
• Step 2. The attacker impersonates a legitimate reader and sends S2, which is
a manipulated version of S1 with the two least significant bits flipped as s
′
0 and
s
′
1 (the subscript of S represents the round number and subscript of s represents
the bit position).
• Step 3. Tag computes R2 as follows:
R2 = S2 ⊕ IDR. (3.4)
Since IDR is fixed, R2 is the same as R1 except that the least significant two
bits are flipped as r
′
0 and r
′
1 as follows:
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R1 = r95r94r93 · · · r2r1r0,
R2 = r95r94r93 · · · r2r′1r
′
0,
M = R1 ⊕R2,
= 00 · · · 011.
(3.5)
The tag now computes P2 and Q2 where:
P2 = IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR),
Q2 = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R2, R2).
and sends them to the attacker.
• Step 4. After receiving P2 and Q2, the attacker computes:
N = P1 ⊕ P2,
= (IDT ⊕Rot(R1, IDR))⊕ (IDT ⊕Rot(R2, IDR)),
= Rot(R1, IDR)⊕Rot(R2, IDR),
= Rot(R1 ⊕R2, IDR),
= Rot(M, IDR).
(3.6)
Since N and M are known in (3.6), HW(IDR) can be calculated.
• Step 5. The attacker now computes:
T = Q1 ⊕Q2,
= (Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R1, R1))⊕ (Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R2, R2)),
= Rot(R1, R1)⊕Rot(R2, R2).
(3.7)
• Step 6. R2 is the same as R1 except that the least two bits are flipped as r′0 and
r
′
1, as discussed before when deriving (3.5). The two least significant bits of R1
will either be the same or different with probability one half. The attacker thus
analyzes (3.7) according to two conditions as follows:
– Case 1. The two flipped bits of R1 are different, which results in:
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HW (R1) = HW (R2).
This simplifies (3.7) as follows:
W = Rot(R1 ⊕R2, R1),
= Rot(M,R1).
(3.8)
Since M is a string of all 0’s except for two consecutive 1’s in the least
significant positions (as described for (3.5)), W will also consist of all 0’s
except for two 1’s at two consecutive positions in the string. The position of
the first 1 starting with the least significant bit as zero determines HW(R1).
The attacker marks the least significant bit of R1 as x and the next bit as
x
′
(in this case the first two LSBs are inverses of each other).
– Case 2. The two flipped bits of R1 are the same which results in either:
HW (R1) = HW (R2) + 2,
or
HW (R1) = HW (R2)− 2.
Since HW(R1) 6= HW(R2), this does not simplify (3.7). In this case the
string T will be a random string of 0’s and 1’s without any pattern. The
attacker marks the least significant bit of R1 as x and the next bit as x,
since both bits are either 0 or 1.
• Step 7. The attacker continues sending the next chosen plaintext S3 by flipping
(s0, s2). The resultant string T in this case will reveal whether r2 is the same as
r0.
if r2 = r0 then
r2 = x,
else
r2 = x
′
.
end if
In general, the attacker continues sending chosen plaintexts by flipping two bits
(s0, sk) where k = 1 · · · 95 as shown in Figure 3.3. For the kth round of authenti-
cation, the string T in (3.7) reveals two bits of R1, (r0, rk), to be either the same
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or otherwise.
• Step 8. At the end of this attack, R1 is represented as a string of x and x′ with
known HW(R1) from (3.8). The attacker now replaces x’s with 1’s and x
′
’s with
0’s, or vice versa according to HW(R1).
• Step 9. The only non-trivial value will be when HW(R1) = 48. In this case, x
can either be a 1 or a 0, thus R1 has two possible values. In this case, the at-
tacker uses the eavesdropped legitimate round of Step 1 and checks which of the
two possible values of R1 satisfies the values of the public messages S1, P1 and Q1.
• Step 10. Once we get the value of R1, we can easily determine IDR and IDT
from any of the public messages. It now becomes very easy to launch multiple
attacks on a tag including tag cloning, tag tracking and inventorying [63].
3.3.3 Other Attacks
We have just shown a full disclosure attack which completely disrupts the authentica-
tion process in SIDRFID. We now highlight further weaknesses in the design of this
protocol which can be exploited to launch multiple attacks.
• Traceability Attack. We assume that a low-cost RFID tag is unable to keep
track of the current status in an authentication round. It thus replies to every
query sent by a compatible reader. In SIDRFID, the public messages P and Q
are different in every authentication round because of the different random R
generated by the reader. The attacker thus eavesdrops one round of authentica-
tion and keeps on sending the same S, thus forcing the tag to calculate similar
public messages. This will facilitate tracking of a particular tag.
• Reader Impersonation. The order of authentication is important in SIDRFID
protocol and can counter active attacks. The reader should be authenticated
first so the tag may transmit its secret information only to a legitimate reader.
The wrong order of authentication leads to a reader impersonation attack. An
attacker can eavesdrop a legitimate authentication round. The attacker can then
impersonate a legitimate reader and replay the eavesdropped response as legiti-
mate and get itself authenticated. This attack is possible because secret values
are not updated in each fresh round of authentication.
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Figure 3.3: Full Disclosure Attack.
• Identification of Reader. SIDRFID does not specify how the tag determines
which IDR is to be used to generate the public values. Therefore, a further
limitation of this protocol is that it can only be implemented in scenarios where
there is only one particular reader (or many readers with the same IDR value).
3.4 Security Analysis of DIDRFID
In this section, we carry out a security analysis of DIDRFID as given in Section 3.2.2.
Avoine et al. [3] presented a key guessing attack against DIDRFID. This attack requires
eavesdropping two authentication session and a total of L2 possible guesses, where L is
the length of the secret key. Whilst this is a serious attack, we present another variant
of full disclosure attack which uniquely determines the key. This further demonstrates
that DIDRFID is a very weak protocol. A formal analysis of this protocol is presented
in Appendix B.
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3.4.1 Passive Weight Disclosure (PWD) Attack
We assume that the channel between the tag and reader is wireless and can be eaves-
dropped. This attack first obtains HW (K) which we will then show allows us to
uniquely determine the correct secret K.
The details of this protocol are given in Section 3.2.2 and our attack, which extracts
the secret key K, is as follows:
• Step 1. Attacker scans the communication channel until he observes that the
message Bi in (3.9) sent by reader to tag (forward channel) is equal to the message
Ci in (3.10) sent by tag to reader (backward channel):
Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ri, Ri), (3.9)
Ci = Rot(Ki, Ri)⊕Rot(Ri,Ki). (3.10)
It is evident from (3.9) and (3.10) that Bi = Ci when:
HW (Ki) = HW (Ri). (3.11)
• Step 2. The probability prob of meeting the condition in (3.11) for two random
L bits values is as follows:
prob =
L∑
i=0
(
L
i
)2
(2L)2
. (3.12)
• Step 3. Once the condition in (3.11) is satisfied, the attacker re-writes (3.9)
and (3.10) as follows:
Bi = Rot(Ki ⊕Ri,Ki), (3.13)
Ci = Rot(Ki ⊕Ri,Ki). (3.14)
• Step 4. Since message A is:
Ai = Ki ⊕Ri, (3.15)
as described in Section 3.2.2, (3.13) and (3.14) can be written as:
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Bi = Ci = Rot(Ai,Ki). (3.16)
Since Ai, Bi and Ci are known, HW(Ki) can be computed from (3.16) and thus
HW(Ri) from (3.11).
• Step 5. Since message Ai, HW(Ki) and HW(Ri) are known, the attacker
uses (3.15) to infer the following information:
HW (Ai) = HW (Ri) +HW (Ki)− 2j, (3.17)
where j determines the number of 1’s in Ki overlapping with Ri at the same bit
positions.
• Step 6. The attacker determines j using (3.17) to infer the following information:
HW (Ri ∨Ki) = HW (Ai) + j, (3.18)
HW (Ri ∧Ki) = j. (3.19)
• Step 7. We now XOR the update equations as given in Section 3.2.2 as follows:
DIDTi+1 ⊕Ki+1 = Rot(Ri ⊕Ki, Ri ∨Ki)⊕Rot(Ri ⊕Ki, Ri ∧Ki),
= Rot(Ai, Ri ∧Ki)⊕Rot(Ai, Ri ∨Ki).
(3.20)
Since DIDi+1 and Ai are public values and we use (3.18) and (3.19) to deduce
the correct Ki+1.
3.4.2 Comparison between Our Attack and Avoine’s Attack
The complexity of revealing the secret K for both attacks depends on the number
of bits of K. The number of operations in Avoine’s attack corresponds to the
number of guesses before revealing the correct K. Avoine’s attack thus requires a
total of L2 guesses using (3.20) and eavesdropping a second round of a DIDRFID
authentication session for testing.
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Our attack requires a small number of rounds to be eavesdropped, but once this
is done there is no further “guesswork” required since the key K is then revealed.
We now show that the number of rounds required can be approximated as
√
piL.
This number corresponds to 1prob , which from (3.12) is given by:
rounds =
L∑
i=0
(2L)2(
L
i
)2 . (3.21)
Putting m = n = p = L in Vandermondes convolution formula (also called the
ChuVandermonde formula, see [50,132]) we see that:
L∑
i=0
(
L
i
)2
≈
(
2L
L
)
. (3.22)
From Stirling’s approximation [38]:
(
2L
L
)
≈ 4
L
√
piL
. (3.23)
Hence it follows that:
rounds ≈
√
piL. (3.24)
We note that for the case of an EPCglobal tag, L = 96 and hence rounds = 17.
Since eavesdropping the tag-reader channel is easy, our attack can be very effective
in dense reader environments where tags can be read multiple times. In other
cases an ongoing authentication round can be interrupted and repeated until Bi
= Ci. The relationship between these two attacks is summarized in Table 3.2.
3.4.3 Traceability Attack
We note an additional weakness of DIDRFID. If the final message Ci sent by the tag
does not reach the reader due to a transmission error, or the attacker disrupts it, the
reader does not recognize the updated value DIDTi+1. The reader in this case asks for
older values of DIDTi (this is not mentioned in [80]). In such a scenario, the attacker
can track the tag by eavesdropping DIDTi, Ai, Bi and then disrupting message Ci. The
attacker can then repeatedly ask for an older value DIDTi and send Ai, Bi in response,
thus tracking the tag.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between Our Attack and Avoine Attack.
Type No. of rounds No. of guesses
of to be before
Attack eavesdropped revealing secret key
Avoine Attack [3] 2 L2
Our Attack
√
piL approx. 1
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have highlighted design flaws in two existing UMAPs by carrying
out security analysis of the two RFID authentication protocols proposed in [80]. Earlier
analysis carried out by Avoine et al. [3] on SIDRFID mentions only that the use of a
single master key is a potential weakness. We have shown how to recover this single
master key, thus allowing this weakness to be fully exploited. Similarly, the attack on
DIDRFID presented in [3] can successfully determine the correct key in L2 attempts
(where L is the length of key). We have presented another variant of a full disclosure
attack which only requires the attacker to eavesdrop approximately
√
piL rounds but
requires no further computation in order to disclose the secret key. We conclude that
both SIDRFID and DIDRFID are extremely weak protocols.
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Proposing a new UMAP
In this chapter we propose a new UMAP which builds on the strengths of
existing schemes and overcomes their weaknesses. Section 4.1 summarizes
the weaknesses in existing schemes and our contribution. Our proposed
protocol is explained in detail in Section 4.2. We then carry out a secu-
rity and performance analysis of our proposed scheme in Section 4.3. An
implementation design is also suggested in Section 4.4. Another family of
ultra-lightweight class is introduced in Section 4.5.
4.1 Introduction
Low-cost RFID systems are the most widely deployed RFID systems. Mutual authen-
tication protocols belonging to the ultra-lightweight class (UMAPs) are suggested for
these systems because tags cost a few cents and have severe resource constraints. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, and will be shown in Section 4.2.4, existing proposals for
UMAPs have significant drawbacks such as the use of triangular functions [74] only,
use of a fresh random nonce for updates in every authentication attempt (whether suc-
cessful or not), and notable overheads. In Chapter 3, we saw how multiple attacks can
be launched against existing UMAPs exploiting their vulnerabilities. This raises the
need for proposing new UMAPs, which will not suffer from the same flaws.
4.1.1 Our Contribution
The weaknesses in existing schemes exploit design flaws to carry out secret disclosure
and de-synchronization attacks, whereas most countermeasures use additional over-
heads. We propose a UMAP which overcomes the weaknesses highlighted in these
earlier schemes and builds on their strengths to provide mutual authentication be-
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tween a tag and a reader (connected with a server). Significantly our suggested scheme
also uses fewer resources than other countermeasures proposed for the same class. This
work has been published in [9].
4.2 Proposed UMAP
We now explain our proposed UMAP.
4.2.1 Assumptions
We first make the following assumptions that must hold prior to running our protocol.
• Each tag shares secrets (specifically a key and a static identity) with a server.
• The server holds a database which records details about a particular tag, including
its shared secrets (key and static identity).
• This database is indexed by a dynamic and publicly known index-pseudonym
unique to each tag.
• The reader is an intermediary which relays the messages from the tag (prover) to
the server (verifier).
• The reader, querying the tag, is connected to the server and is legitimate (the
communication channel between the reader and server is secured).
4.2.2 Adversarial Model
We consider that our scheme is vulnerable to both passive and active attackers. The
abilities and limitations of our potential adversary are as follows:
• The adversary is capable of listening to both forward and backward channels (the
reader to the tag and vice versa).
• We assume that our adversary has two options: either to jam (active) or to
eavesdrop (passive) the radio conversation between server and tag. However we
also assume that our adversary cannot function in full duplex mode; i.e., the
adversary cannot transmit and receive on the same frequency slot, at the same
time.
• The adversary cannot take over an ongoing authentication round because, when
the tag detects a collision of readers, it stops responding (we assume the use of a
reader anti-collision algorithm, see Section 2.2.2).
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Table 4.1: Notation used in Chapter 4
Notation Description
T A tag participating in an authentication round.
R A reader participating in an authentication round.
S A server holding the database and authenticating a tag.
Adv Both passive as well as active adversary.
Indexi A dynamic index-pseudonym uniquely associated to each tag
in the ith authentication round.
KSi A dynamic secret key shared between tag and server in the
ith authentication round.
ID A tag’s static and unique identity.
L Length of the secret key and static identity.
ri A random number generated by the server in the ith authen-
tication round.
+ Addition modulo 2L since all values are assumed to be L-bits
long.
A→ B : M A sends to B, message M.
A||B Concatenation of two messages (or values) A and B.
HW (X) Hamming weight of bit string X.
λ(X) Integer value of L-bit string X reduced modulo L.
Rot(X,µ) Left rotation of argument X by µ.
f(X,Y ) A secure lightweight pseudo random function (PRF) which
takes two inputs X, Y and outputs a pseudo-random value
where f(X,Y ) 6= f(Y,X) (such as MixBits, specified
in [111]).
• Defenses against relay attack (man-in-the-middle), physical capture and tamper-
ing are not in the scope of this work.
The notation used in our scheme is summarized in Table 4.1.
4.2.3 Goals
A UMAP should achieve the following goals considering the variety of potential threats
(as discussed in Section 2.5):
• Mutual Authentication: Our scheme should provide mutual (entity) authen-
tication.
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• Tag Content Privacy: The secret static identity of the tag should not be
transmitted in the clear since it is linked to the contents of the item it is attached
to.
• Availability: Authenticating parties should stay synchronized and always be
available to communicate.
• Tag Anonymity: The adversary should not be able to track a target tag by
listening to the communication channel.
• Forward Security: If a tag is compromised at any stage, the adversary should
not be able to compromise any future communication.
• Performance: Since UMAPs are designed for low-cost RFID systems:
– storage space should be as low as possible,
– cryptographic functions should be extremely lightweight in nature and effi-
cient to compute,
– the amount of data communicated should be kept as low as possible.
4.2.4 Literature Review of UMAPs
UMAPs are designed to provide mutual authentication between a tag and a reader
(connected with a back-end server). These schemes are proposed for extremely low-
cost RFID tags costing a few pence approximately. Many UMAPs have been proposed,
but all existing proposals have significant flaws, as we now outline.
Initial proposals were based only on the use of triangular functions (T-Functions) [74]
including XOR, AND, OR and addition modulo 2L (where L is the length of variables
in bits). These schemes [107, 108, 110] are considered very efficient and lightweight in
their design. However, T-functions have very poor diffusion and use of AND and OR
produces biased results. Weaknesses in these proposals were highlighted after publica-
tion [5, 6, 86,87].
SASI [22] is the first UMAP to use a lightweight non-triangular function RotBits
(left rotation of bits) with triangular functions. This protocol was initially acclaimed,
but later weaknesses were highlighted in its design which resulted in de-synchronization
and full-disclosure attacks [16, 17, 134]. A full-disclosure attack on SASI in [17] used
the properties of the RotBits function. The main idea behind the attack was that if
RotBits does not rotate the values, SASI can be treated as a scheme with T-functions
only. As a result, the Gossamer UMAP [111] was proposed, which introduced a new
non-triangular lightweight function known as MixBits. However, the weakness which
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caused de-synchronization in SASI [16,134] was not addressed in Gossamer, resulting
in further de-synchronization attacks [13, 135, 154]. This weakness arises since the
reader generates new random numbers in each authentication round and both reader
and tag use these random numbers to update their values. An adversary can thus use
this property to its advantage by de-synchronizing the authentication process [4].
David et al. [24] and Tagra et al. [135] proposed countermeasures to prevent de-
synchronization attacks. However, these countermeasures require additional valuable
resources at the tag end. Hernandez-Castro et al. [54] presented a passive attack on
the scheme in [24] which can recover a tag’s secret using linear cryptanalysis. Lee et
al. [81] also presented a scheme which requires additional memory and communication
overheads and has some privacy issues [112]. Yeh et al. [154] suggested reducing the
storage overheads on the tag’s memory, however, it becomes very easy to force de-
synchronization [4]. Moreover, a passive adversary can carry out a traceability and a
full-disclosure attack [109] on the Yeh et al. protocol. Similarly a protocol suggested
by Eghdamian et al. [32] is cryptanalyzed by Avoine in [3]. In most UMAPs, the main
vulnerability exploited by an adversary is the stateless nature of a tag. The attacker
runs many incomplete protocols and gathers information from each in order to disclose
secret values.
Most of the existing proposals for UMAPs thus have flaws. The existing coun-
termeasures to overcome these flaws given in [72, 135] have notable overheads. In this
work, we propose a new UMAP which overcomes the flaws and uses strengths of existing
protocols.
4.2.5 Design Features
Our protocol has the following design features, intended to overcome flaws as outlined
in Section 4.2.4:
• Combination of Functions: The protocol uses a combination of lightweight
non-triangular functions and triangular functions. We employ modular addition,
which is not biased like OR and AND functions. We use Rot(X,λ(Y )) as left
rotation of bit string X by λ(Y ) positions, where λ(Y ) is computed by first
converting the L-bit string Y into an integer and then reducing it modulo L.
Some of the existing schemes have used Rot(X,HW (Y )) as left rotation of bit
string X by the hamming weight of bit string Y . Since HW(Y ) does not follow
a uniform distribution, this weakens the security property given by the rotation
function, whereas λ(Y ) follows a uniform distribution. We also use MixBits
function [111], which is defined as follows:
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Z = MixBits(X,Y )
Z = X;
for(i = 0; i < L; i+ +){
Z = (Z << 1) + ((Z + Y ) >> 1); }
Inputs (X and Y ) and output (Z) are L-bits of length and the function has
a loop of L iterations. Addition is carried out modulo 2L, << denotes bitwise
left shift and >> denotes bitwise right shift. This function is also considered
to be efficient as it consists of modular additions and rotation functions. It also
provides good security by resisting common attacks as shown in [114].
• Use of Random Nonce: In our protocol, the server generates a random nonce
for data freshness. In existing schemes random nonces change on every commu-
nication attempt, even in the event of a failed authentication. Avoine et al. [4]
mention this as a potential vulnerability which can lead to de-synchronization at-
tacks. Our scheme overcomes this vulnerability by recording each random nonce
in a database for a particular tag’s Index. It then uses the random value to
calculate internal secret values for updating the tuple (KS, Index). The server
generates a new random nonce only after a successful authentication. This resists
de-synchronization attacks and provides tag anonymity and forward security.
• Provision for Re-synchronization: In the event of a failed authentication
attempt, either due to communication error or intentional interference by an
adversary, both server and tag may become de-synchronized. Our scheme re-
synchronizes, as the tag does not update its values in a failed authentication at-
tempt and the server keeps a copy of older values. In some existing schemes [22,
24,32,72,81,111,135], re-synchronization is attempted using older values of Index
and shared secrets stored in the tag’s memory. This not only places additional
overheads on the tag’s valuable memory but also leads to a potential weakness
which allows the server to ask for older values of Index of the tag if the updated
Index is not recognized. This weakness leads to denial-of-service attacks as men-
tioned in [4, 13]. In our scheme, if the server asks for older values, this will be
an indication of a replay attack carried out by an impersonating server.
• Cost, Performance and Security Trade-offs: Our scheme provides a trade-
off between cost, performance and level of security. It uses lightweight functions
which can easily be incorporated in the simple ALU of low-cost RFID tags. Our
protocol consumes a small amount of storage on these tags and completes the
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protocol using two messages. The schemes mentioned in [24, 32, 72, 81, 135, 155]
require additional messages and memory requirements in order to overcome ex-
isting weaknesses. Moreover, many of these schemes are still vulnerable and have
been analyzed to highlight weaknesses in the design [3, 4, 54,109,112].
4.2.6 The Protocol
We now propose a new UMAP that provides the security goals mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.2.3 and has the design features identified in Section 4.2.5. The ith round of the
authentication protocol is described in the subsequent sections.
Identification Stage
A compatible T in the vicinity of a compatible R is identified as follows:
• Step 1. R→ T : Hello.
• Step 2. T → R : Indexi.
• Step 3. R→ S : Indexi.
• Step 4. S now searches for this Indexi in its database. If it matches an existing
entry, S proceeds to the next stage, otherwise it does not respond to T .
Server Authentication and Update Stage
On successful identification, S is authenticated as follows:
• Step 1. S uses Indexi sent by T to extract KSi associated with this particular
T .
• Step 2. S now generates a random value ri and calculates the internal secret
values ni1,n
i
2 using tuple (KS
i, ri) as follows:
ni1 = f(KS
i, ri),
ni2 = f(r
i,KSi).
(4.1)
• Step 3. S now generates public messageAi using tuple (n1i, n2i, Indexi,KSi, ID)
as follows:
Ai = Rot(Rot(n2i + Indexi +KSi + ID, n1i) + n1i, n2i). (4.2)
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• Step 4. S → R : Ai‖ri.
• Step 5. R→ T : Ai‖ri.
• Step 6. T calculates internal secrets n1i and n2i as in (4.1) and uses these to
calculate a local copy Ai
′
of Ai using (4.2).
• Step 7. T now checks:
if Ai
′
= Ai then
S is authenticated; proceed to next stage,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
• Step 8. S, after sending Ai‖ri, also updates its tuple (Indexi,KSi) as follows:
Indexi+1 = Rot(Rot(n1i + Indexi, n1i) + n2i, n2i),
KSi+1 = Rot(Rot(n2i +KSi, n1i) + n1i, n2i).
(4.3)
• Step 9. In addition, S keeps a copy of tuple (Indexi,KSi, ri) in its memory.
Tag Authentication and Update Stage
Once S is authenticated, T is now authenticated as follows:
• Step 1. T generates the public messageBi using tuple (n1i, n2i, Indexi,KSi, ID)
as follows:
Bi = Rot(Rot(n1i + Indexi +KSi + ID, n2i) + n2i, n1i). (4.4)
• Step 2. T → R : Bi.
• Step 3. R→ S : Bi.
• Step 4. S calculates a local copy Bi′ of Bi using (4.4).
• Step 5. S now checks:
if Bi
′
= Bi then
T is authenticated,
else
Protocol is abandoned.
end if
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• Step 6. T after sending Bi updates its values of tuple (Indexi,KSi) only after
authenticating S using (4.3).
The messageBi can only be verified by a legitimate S. Successful mutual authentication
concludes the protocol and S grants access to T . Both T and S have updated their
values as shown in (4.3). S, after successfully authenticating T , deletes the old values
of the tuple (Indexi,KSi, ri) in its database to avoid tag impersonation. Our proposed
UMAP is summarized in Figure 4.1.
Reader TagServer
Hello
Indexi
Indexi
Ai‖ri
Ai‖ri
Bi
Bi
Figure 4.1: Proposed UMAP.
4.3 Security and Performance Analysis
We now conduct a security analysis to show how our UMAP meets the goals of Sec-
tion 4.2.3, as well as a performance analysis which demonstrates that our scheme uses
fewer resources than schemes given in [72, 135]. A formal analysis of our proposed
scheme is also presented in Appendix C.
4.3.1 Mutual Authentication
We first show that our scheme provides mutual authentication by demonstrating that
only a valid pair of S and T (in possession of KS) can generate public messages A and
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B, respectively, that will be accepted by the other party. The freshness of these public
messages is ensured by the use of a random nonce in every authentication round.
1. Authentication of the server: S is authenticated by checking the authenticity
of public message A. This message is generated using shared secrets known only
to legitimate authenticating parties. Therefore, only a legitimate T can check the
legitimacy of the message. The correctness of public message A thus determines
the authenticity of S.
2. Authentication of the tag: Once T authenticates S successfully, it transmits
its shared secrets in the form of a public message B. S can check the legitimacy
and correctness of this message and hence authenticates T .
We consider whether an adversary Adv without shared secrets can generate the
public messages. To do so, Adv has to take over the authentication round after dis-
rupting message A||r and replaying it later by impersonating a genuine S, or Adv has
to eavesdrop Index and message A||r and then take over the authentication round after
disrupting and eavesdropping message B to replay it for T ’s impersonation. However,
this is infeasible due to the following reasons:
• Adv cannot take over an ongoing authentication round (see Section 4.2.2).
• Adv cannot disrupt and eavesdrop at the same time (see Section 4.2.2).
• Adv has to perform a relay attack (see Section 4.2.2).
So, server and tag impersonation attacks are not feasible.
4.3.2 Tag Content Privacy
Each T has a unique static identity ID and is linked to the content of the particular
tagged item. We want to transmit this ID confidentially so that an adversary is unable
to read, copy or track it. In our scheme, S and T share a secret dynamic KS. Our
scheme uses this KS to calculate two internal secret values n1 and n2 using a secure
PRF f . We then use the tuple of (n1,n2,KS) to generate public messages which are
used for transmitting the secret ID confidentially. Recall from Section 4.2.6 that each
of the two public messages has the following form:
P = Rot(Rot(s2 + p+K + S, s1) + s1, s2), (4.5)
where P and p are public values, s1, s2 are dynamic secret values, K is a shared secret
key and S is a static secret (ID of T ). The goal of the adversary is to disclose S. The
complexity of recovering S is as follows:
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• The outer rotation from (4.5) is undone with complexity O(log2 s2):
Q = Rot−1(P, s2),
= Rot(s2 + p+K + S, s1) + s1.
(4.6)
• It requires complexity O(2s1 × log2 s2) to subtract all possible values of s1 from
the right hand side of (4.6):
R = Q− s1,
= Rot(s2 + p+K + S, s1).
(4.7)
• Further inner rotation is undone from (4.7) from all corresponding 2s1 × log2 s2
values (this doubles the complexity as O(2× 2s1 × log2 s2)):
T = Rot−1(R, s1),
= s2 + p+K + S.
(4.8)
• We now subtract public value p from (4.8) (this doubles the overall complexity
as O(2× 2× 2s1 × log2 s2) = O(22 × 2s1 × log2 s2) ≈ O(2s1 × log2 s2):
U = T − p,
= s2 +K + S.
(4.9)
• Subtracting the corresponding values of s2 from (4.9) requires an overall com-
plexity of O(2s1 × log2 s2× 2
s2
log2 s2
) = O(2s1 × 2s2):
V = U − s2,
= K + S.
(4.10)
Concluding, we have a total of 23K (considering s1, s2 and K are of the same
length) possible values of S. Therefore only a brute force attack is the best available
option to guess the shared secret key, which requires 2K guesses. Since s1, s2 and K
change in every authentication round (and s1, s2 are output by a secure PRF), our
protocol provides privacy of the tag’s content.
4.3.3 Availability
In our scheme, both S and T update their shared secret KS and Index after every
successful authentication round in synchronization with each other. This synchroniza-
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tion is based on the receipt and authenticity of public messages A and B. Since update
only takes place after a successful authentication, and public messages A and B can
only be generated by legitimate parties, we consider the following threats which can
break the synchronization:
1. Adversary disrupts message A||r: Since T does not receive message A||r
sent by S, it will not update its values and keep the tuple (Indexi,KSi) in its
memory. Although S updates to new tuple (Indexi+1,KSi+1), it still has an
entry for the old tuple (Indexi,KSi, ri) in its database. In this case, S identifies
T with Indexi which is still not updated and both remain synchronized.
2. Adversary disrupts message B: Since S does not receive message B, it has
both old and new values as ((Indexi, KSi, ri), (Indexi+1, KSi+1)) stored in its
database. Whereas T , on sending message B, has already updated its tuple to
(Indexi+1, KSi+1). This avoids de-synchronization as T is identified by S using
Indexi+1.
3. Adversary tampers with A||r or B: If an adversary tampers with the public
messages A or random number r, a genuine T will calculate a different value of
A
′
, which indicates that the message has been altered. Similarly, a genuine S can
check the integrity of public message B.
4.3.4 Tag Anonymity
Two of the main privacy concerns in RFID systems are tracking and content pri-
vacy [63]. In our scheme, the Index and public messages (A,B) change in every au-
thentication round. This avoids tracking the location of a tag.
4.3.5 Forward Security
In our UMAP, S generates a random value to calculate internal secrets using f . These
internal secrets are used to update the Index and KS after every successful authenti-
cation round. Therefore, if a tag is compromised, it does not reveal any of its past and
future communications.
4.3.6 Performance Analysis
We now briefly carry out a comparative analysis of performance parameters compared
with the UMAPs given in [72, 135], which are the only existing ones that appear to
meet the security goals detailed in Section 4.2.3.
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• Storage Overhead: S stores the next potential and old values of the tuple
(Index,KS). Since S is considered to have less resource constraints, this lifts
the burden on T ’s memory. Moreover, on successful completion of the protocol,
S deletes the old entry thus saving storage space. Tag T requires 2L bits storage
on RAM for tuple (Index,KS) and L bits of ROM to store its ID, which is less
compared to other protocols of the same family, as shown in Table 4.2.
• Computation Overhead: We have used lightweight functions (modular addi-
tion, left rotation and a lightweight PRF) similar to other related protocols. In
our scheme, T has to verify one public message and calculate another message
using lightweight functions that can be easily implemented in the ALU of T .
Therefore it computes two public messages, which is fewer compared to other
schemes (which use the same functions, i.e., a lightweight PRF to generate inter-
nal secrets and then adding, XOR-ing and left rotating these with other secret
and public values) as shown in Table 4.2. Moreover, we have also reduced the
call to f to two, compared to three in other protocols, and do not require XOR.
• Communication Overhead: Our scheme communicates 2L bits during an au-
thentication round (considering each public message to be L bits) which is less
than the other schemes in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Comparative Analysis of Different Protocols
Protocol Storage Computation Communication
Tagra et al. Protocol [135] 6L 4 4L
SULMA Protocol [72] 6L 4 4L
Our Protocol 2L 2 2L
Chien [22] categorized RFID tags into four classes depending on the resources, cost
and application (see Section 1.2). The ultra-lightweight class is considered to be very
restricted in its resources. We consider that achieving security goals as mentioned in
Section 4.2.3 using fewer resources is important in this class. UMAPs are designed using
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a trade-off between cost, performance and level of security. Thus our protocol reduces
the cost (in terms of storage) and enhances the performance (in terms of computation
and communication) while achieving the desired goals of a UMAP.
4.4 Implementation Design
In this section, we will explain the proposed design architecture for implementing our
proposed UMAP in a tag. First of all we need to consider whether to choose a parallel
or a serial implementation. In parallel, each operation will be carried out on a block
of bits treated as a word. Whereas, in serial, operations are conducted on one bit at
a time. Generally considering the low-power restrictions of RFID tags, the internal
clock frequency is set to 100 KHz [37]. As shown in Figure 4.2, we calculate the basic
requirements of our targeted platform as follows:
• MixBits : Lightweight PRF. This function uses efficient triangular (addition
mod 2L) and non-triangular (left and right bitwise shifts). For L = 32 bits, it
requires a total of 740 gate equivalents (GE) including control logic, 128 clock
cycles per block (32 bits) and thus a throughput of approximately 25 Kbps as
calculated in [114].
• Modular Addition. This function will require 11 GE per bit and L clock cycles
for implementation as shown in [60].
• Rot(X,λ(Y)) : Left Rotation. This requires a maximum of 2L clock cycles
to determine λ(Y ) and then rotating the argument X. If we use an LFSR to
implement the rotation, it requires 8 GE per bit.
• Comparator. We need two L-bit registers each requiring 8 GE per bit and some
control logic. This function uses a maxium of L clock cycles.
4.5 Introduction to HB Protocols
Another family of ultra-lightweight protocols is based on human based identification
and uses the hardness of learning parity with noise (LPN) first proposed by Nicholas
J. Hopper and Manuel Blum [56], hence the name HB. The first proposal based on
the HB protocol for RFID systems was suggested by Ari Juels and Stephen A. Weis
in [68]. The original HB protocol put in RFID settings is shown in Figure 4.3. The
HB protocol requires lightweight functions for implementation. Only bitwise AND and
XOR operations are required to compute the binary inner product a • x. This product
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Figure 4.2: Design of Proposed UMAP.
Reader Tag
a ∈R 0, 1k
z = (a • x)⊕ v where v ∈ {0, 1|Prob[ = 1] = η}
Figure 4.3: HB Protocol setting for RFID.
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can be computed on the fly as each bit of a is received and there is no requirement for a
buffer. The noise bit v can be generated from physical properties like thermal noise, shot
noise, diode breakdown noise, metastability, oscillation jitter, or other methods. Based
on these lightweight properties, several proposals have been published based on the HB
protocols for RFID systems. Some of the recent developments include [27,89,92,121].
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a new UMAP designed for use in RFID devices with limited
resources. We have shown why our protocol overcomes weaknesses in previous UMAP
designs and demonstrated that our protocol involves lower overheads.
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Part III
RFID Systems in Supply Chain
Management
68
Chapter 5
Adaptive Online/Oﬄine RFID
Scheme
This chapter provides a solution to various requirements related to RFID
systems deployed in supply chain management. Section 5.1 provides an
overview of an RFID system’s application in supply chain management.
Section 5.2 comments on existing approaches to preserving privacy of users
of RFID tags in supply chain management. Section 5.3 outlines our pro-
posed scheme. Section 5.4 carries out analysis of our proposal.
5.1 Introduction
RFID systems are extensively used in many applications as shown in Section 2.4. In
this chapter, we discuss their deployment in supply chain management, where an RFID
system is capable of identifying products throughout the supply chain process [79]. As
previously explained in Section 2.1, RFID systems in supply chain management have
three main components: 1) a server (usually centralized), 2) readers (from tens to
hundreds, depending on the application size), and 3) tags (potentially millions).
To better understand RFID system deployment, we reproduce an illustrative ex-
ample of a supply chain management system as given in [65]. Figure 5.1 depicts the
journey of a pack of razor blades from its manufacturer to a consumer. We start with
the manufacturer, where one pallet consists of 90 cases with each case containing 72
packs. Considering the pallet, cases and packs are all tagged, a total of 6571 tags reach
to a distribution center in one large group. This large pallet is then de-palletized and
assembled back into smaller pallets depending on the orders placed by retail stores.
Considering a smaller pallet can hold up to 10 cases, each pallet will now carry 730
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tags stored in the backroom of a retail store. Normally up to two cases are displayed
on the store shelf and a consumer may pick a few packs to purchase. The following is
a typical hierarchy of some of the objects [65]:
• Razor blades: 6571→ 730→ 144→ 5
• DVDs: 5040→ 2520→ 400→ 24
• Pharmaceuticals: 7200→ 1920→ 150→ 6
These hierarchies may differ for various objects and retailers. The important point to
note here is that the number of tags (tagged items) reduces in size from manufacturer to
end-user. The larger group of tags is read by readers in a physically secure environment,
whereas as the smaller number of tags, reaching to store shelf and consumers, is exposed
to adversaries. Considering a typical supply chain process, we divide the lifecycle of a
tag into the following two zones:
1. Secure Zone with Online Readers. This zone is assumed to be secure from
all adversaries. A large number of tags are scanned by a limited number of
known readers in this zone. Since the position of all the readers is known, these
readers either share the database held with the back-end server which stores
shared secrets for each tag, or secrets can be securely transferred to those reader’s
local databases. The main requirement in this zone is fast reading of the large
number of passing tags.
2. Insecure Zone with Oﬄine Readers. This zone is assumed to be insecure
and open to all adversaries. A comparatively smaller number of tags are scanned
by unknown readers in this zone. The position of readers is unknown and their
local servers do not share secrets with the tags. The main requirement in this
zone is to preserve privacy, while it is reasonable to compromise on read speed
since the number of tags is smaller.
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.1, EPCC1G2 standard [48] compliant tags are
typically deployed in supply chain management for automated inventory checks. The
UHF air interface protocol defines the standard of communication between a reader
and a tag. The reader first selects a group of tags to be read in its vicinity. The
reader then initiates an inventory round to read the tag’s credentials until the whole
group is read. Finally the reader enters into an access phase where it can write into a
tag’s memory (if required) using a built-in Access password. This protocol is further
explained in Section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.1: Object’s Journey in RFID-enabled Supply Chain Management.
However, there are risks associated with this class of tags as given in Section 2.5.
Since the standard does not elaborate on any specific authentication mechanism, a
tag will respond to every query sent by a compatible reader. This causes privacy
concerns [63] as follows:
• Content Privacy. An illegitimate reader can learn sensitive information asso-
ciated with a tag’s identifier, such as type, price, expiry, etc. This can further be
used to profile the tag holder such as shopping habits, medical history and other
private information.
• Location Privacy. An attacker can track a tag carrier since the tag’s EPC is
a unique and static identifier.
RFID systems using such tags cannot implement computationally intensive privacy-
preserving protocols due to their limited resources. These tags have limited memory
and computation capabilities. These are passive tags and draw power from a reader in
order to compute and communicate. In addition, the amount of data transmitted be-
tween a tag and a reader should not be excessive, bounded by the available bandwidth.
5.1.1 Our Contribution
RFID tagged objects are read by multiple readers both in known locations (secure zone
with online readers) as well as unknown locations (insecure zone with oﬄine readers).
In the secure zone, the primary requirement is to read a large number of tags with high
speed. In the insecure zone, the primary requirement is to preserve the privacy of a user
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of tagged object. We present an EPCC1G2 standard compliant scheme which allows
RFID tags to be authenticated by readers throughout the supply chain lifecycle while
meeting the requirements of both the secure and insecure zones. Our scheme adapts
between online and oﬄine authentication without requiring user-intervention. In this
work we propose a scheme without involvement of any cryptographic primitive and
using built-in functionalities in a tag. This work has been accepted to get published
in [11].
5.2 Existing Work
Various ideas for addressing privacy issues in supply chain management have been
suggested. Some of these proposals [61–63] are based on shared secrets (online au-
thentication schemes) and do not address the requirements for tags to be scanned by
oﬄine readers. Furthermore, some of these [35, 77] are not EPCC1G2 standard com-
pliant, while some [57,127] require user intervention in order to preserve the privacy of
a tagged object’s user.
5.2.1 Password Protected Online Authentication Schemes.
The scheme given in [63] involves disabling RFID tags at checkouts using the ex-
isting Kill password. However, secure transfer of Kill passwords to oﬄine readers
with unknown locations is not feasible. By disabling tags, after-sales features such as
receipt-less returns, automated warranty claims and recycling are not automatically fa-
cilitated. The scheme in [62] uses built-in Kill and Access passwords in an EPCC1G2
compliant tag for mutual authentication. While this mechanism avoids killing the tags
permanently, a source must know its end destination in order to transfer correspond-
ing passwords. Thus, readers must know all the passwords of potential tags, which
could be millions in number, and thus requires a dedicated database. A small retail
store cannot afford the luxury of a back-end database and an end-user cannot carry IT
equipment in order to transfer all the passwords related to their tags. The proposal
in [61] suggests using pseudonyms instead of the original identifiers of tags. However,
fixed pseudonyms facilitate tracking, whereas cryptographically changing pseudonyms
require readers to possess the same key and stay synchronized. Moreover, a central
repository storing all pseudonyms requires access tokens. All of these schemes thus
only work with online readers.
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5.2.2 Additional Privacy Preserving Devices.
Another scheme proposed in [66] uses appropriate prefixes to EPC and an additional
blocker tag to preserve the privacy of tags. For example, all the tags attached to sold
items are declared to be private (no reader can query the tag) by setting their EPC’s
prefix bit(s) to some predetermined value. If an unauthorized reader queries these tags,
the blocker tag, acting as intermediary, suppresses its queries. As well as requiring an
additional blocker tag, this scheme also requires writing/setting the appropriate prefix
into a tag’s memory (for example at point of sale). This scheme is based on querying
a tag using a binary-tree search algorithm and is not EPCC1G2 compliant.
The proposals given in [41,67,120] use a proxy device to suppress the stealth scan-
ning of a tag’s content. The proxy device acts as an intermediary between reader and
tag. This smart device makes intelligent decisions in determining the legitimacy of
a reader. However in these proxy devices, acquire and release control of tags during
ownership transfer is difficult. It is also difficult to entirely suppress reader’s commands
and tag’s replies.
5.2.3 Distance Bounding Protocols.
There are many proposals for distance bounding protocols [35, 73, 78] which deter-
mine the legitimacy of a reader based on its proximity, typically calculated from signal
strength and query-to-response time measurements. However, since the read ranges
vary considerably depending on the transmitted powers, antenna sensitivities and en-
vironment, the adversary may send a stronger signal than prescribed and read over a
longer distance with a better signal-to-noise ratio. Therefore, these schemes can fail
against such attacks. Moreover these protocols typically require additional circuitry in
low-cost tags and are not EPCC1G2 compliant.
5.2.4 Relabeling and Partial Destruction.
Similarly some proposals suggest partial destruction of important and secret informa-
tion of a tag. Relabeling [127] is one such proposal which requires changing the tag’s
label from secret to some public value in order to preserve the tag’s privacy when the
tag travels in the insecure zone. Partial destruction using splitting [57] requires two
tags (one carrying the private information while the other has public information) on
every item. The tag carrying secret information is removed to preserve the privacy
when in the insecure zone. Both of these schemes require user interaction.
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5.2.5 Bit Throttling and Secret Sharing Schemes.
To deter sporadic reading of a tag’s secret content, the scheme in [77] reveals the secret
content one bit at a time and thus delays the process of promiscuous reading of the tag’s
content. This makes it harder for a sporadic adversary to disclose or track a particular
tag. However the data rate of this scheme is very low and it also requires additional
circuitry to perform this task. Determining the sequence of bits for transmission is also
a problem as sequential transmission (starting from the least significant bit) can reveal
important information through only the first few disclosed bits (for example, the first
four bits of the EPC reveal the commercial code and the next four suggest the size).
The scheme suggested in [65] adopts secret sharing where shares are distributed
amongst different tags across time and space. When individual tags are sold to different
customers, their privacy is preserved as an individual share does not reveal any sensitive
information. However, warranty claims become cumbersome in these scenarios because
an individual customer carries only one share of the secret and also needs to collect other
shares which are distributed amongst other unknown customers. Another potential
problem with this scheme is clandestine tracking as secret shares are static and do not
change.
The proposal in [1] is based on delayed transmission of the secret value using linear
feedback shift register (LFSR). This proposal is suitable in scenarios where the number
of tags is small as it takes time to transmit the complete secret. It therefore does not
address the requirement of high speed reading of a large number of tags in the secure
zone. It also requires additional functionality other than the standard.
5.2.6 Our Scheme.
In this work, we consider taking an EPCC1G2 compliant approach that fulfills the
requirements of both fast read speed, when a large number of tags are read by online
readers in the secure zone, as well as preserving the privacy of a tag when read by oﬄine
readers in the insecure zone. Our unified scheme is based on delaying the disclosure of
the secret (tag’s content) until a certain time threshold is achieved, and adapts between
online and oﬄine authentication without user intervention. We focus our comparative
analysis on the schemes presented in [1, 65, 77] since these are the only other schemes
which use related techniques.
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5.3 Proposed Scheme
We now explain our proposed scheme which provides privacy to EPCC1G2 compliant
RFID systems deployed in supply chain management.
5.3.1 Adversarial Model
We make the following assumptions about the capability of an adversary:
• An adversary can conduct both passive and active attacks. Our scheme protects
against passive attacks (eavesdropping both the forward and backward channels)
and active attacks, except for physical capture and tampering attacks.
• An adversary cannot take over an ongoing authentication round because when
the tag receives queries from multiple readers, it detects a collision and stops
responding as explained in Section 2.2.2 (we assume the use of a reader anti-
collision algorithm, see [48]).
• An adversary cannot learn the update values as only a legitimate reader in pos-
session of the tag can update its memory.
The notation required to describe our scheme is shown in Table 5.1.
5.3.2 Goals
Considering a supply chain process consisting of the two zones identified in Section 5.1,
our scheme is designed to achieve the following goals in the presence of an adversary
as defined in Section 5.3.1.
• Content Privacy. Support privacy of a tag’s content, wherever this is required.
• Location Privacy. Support privacy of the location of a tag in order to prevent
tracing and tracking of the tag, wherever this is required.
• Conformance to Standard. The ownership transfer scheme designed for a
particular RFID standard should conform with the standard’s operations and
functionalities as much as possible.
• Fast Read Speed. Support a fast read speed, particularly required when the
number of tags is large.
• User Transparency. Adapt according to the status of the reader (i.e., online
or oﬄine) without user intervention.
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Table 5.1: Notation used in Chapter 5
Notation Description
Query A command sent by the reader to a tag/group of tags it
wants to read.
QueryRep A command sent by the reader to a tag/group of tags if
it receives no response, or multiple of responses from more
than one tag.
SlotCounter A counter implemented in the tag which loads a random
number and decrements with every Query and QueryRep
command.
RN16 A 16-bit standard random number generated by the tag and
transmitted to the reader once its SlotCounter reaches zero.
ACK A 16-bit acknowledgment sent by the reader to the tag.
PC + EPC + CRC A tag’s content plus its cyclic redundancy check.
Access A built-in 32-bit unique access password in each tag.
r A 16-bit random number generated by the tag.
5.3.3 Overview of Protocol
We use the existing functionality of EPCC1G2 standard tags [48]. The standard defines
the UHF air interface protocol shown in Figure 5.2. We now give an overview of our
proposed protocol. Note that we need to make a couple of very minor changes to the
standard in order to support an authentication mechanism (see Section 5.4.3).
1. Initialization. In the original standard [48], each tag generates a random 16-bit
number RN16 on the fly. We suggest that each tag is initialized using a unique
random RN16 in its local group. It is important to note that this only limits
a group size to 216 tags and does not affect the EPC, which is a 96-bit unique
code. This modification can easily be incorporated into the standard.
2. Unique Allocation of RN16 within a Group. Initially manufacturers can
write this into the tag’s memory and later the back- end server, in possession of
the corresponding Access password, can update the value of RN16 by writing
into the tag’s memory using a compatible reader. Since a server keeps updated
record of groups of tags, the former can ensure unique allocation of the updated
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Reader
Select Query QueryRep Ack
Tag
RN16 PC+EPC+CRC16
T4 T1 T3 T1 T2 T1
Figure 5.2: UHF Air Interface Protocol for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
RN16. Following are the steps to ensure that each tag in a group is allocated
a unique RN16 depending on the number and size (number of items within one
group) of the group:
• A back-end database server has a total of 216 = 65536 values of RN16 which
can be allocated to items uniquely within one group.
• Since the server has knowledge of total number of groups and size of each
group within a certain supply chain cycle, it can create a pool of available
RN16 values for each group.
• A certain group can be identified within a supply chain using different vari-
ables like geographic location, date and time, lot numbers, item classifica-
tion. Additionally, another workaround to identify a certain group can be
ensured by putting an additional tag on the pallet.
We now consider an example to clarify how unique allocation is ensured within
one group. Since a server can trivially identify a certain group, we suppose that
this group Group−X has a total of 20 items where each tag incorporates a 5-bit
identifier. This is depicted in Table 5.2. Now when each tag from Group − X
is read, it is allocated an RN16 from unallocated pool randomly while its older
allocated value of RN16 is added to unallocated value. This ensures that each
tag is allocated a unique RN16 within one group and any RN16 value is not
repeated in succession in order to resist a traceability attack.
3. Initial Identification. The unique random RN16 is used to identify a tag in
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Table 5.2: Unique Allocation of RN16 within Group-X
S/No Allocated Unallocated
1. 00101 00000
2. 00111 00001
3. 01000 00010
4. 01010 00011
5. 01011 00100
6. 01100 00110
7. 01110 01001
8. 01111 01101
9. 10010 10000
10. 10011 10001
11. 10100 10110
12. 10101 11101
13. 10111
14. 11000
15. 11001
16. 11010
17. 11011
18. 11100
19. 11110
20. 11111
the reader’s back-end server.
4. Mutual Authentication. We incorporate a mutual authentication stage inside
the inventory round (see [48]). The standard defines two secret values, Kill and
Access passwords, that are embedded into every EPCC1G2 compliant tag. The
Kill password is used for disabling a tag and the Access password is used for
read/write access to the tag. Both passwords are 32-bits long. We use the Access
password for both mutual authentication and read/write access, while retaining
the Kill functionality where required. We divide the Access password into two
parts consisting of the 16 LSB (used for reader authentication) and the 16 MSB
(used for tag authentication).
5. Standard Protocol. After successful mutual authentication, tags are read as
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per the standard [48], as shown in Figure 5.2.
6. Update. We use the access round (see [48]) to enable a legitimate reader to
update the values of RN16 and the Access password by writing into the tag’s
memory. Note that this update can only be carried out by a back-end server in
possession of the tag’s Access password.
7. Determining Threshold. Our oﬄine authentication stage is based on a time
threshold value (as will be explained in Section 5.3.5). Therefore it is important
to determine a suitable threshold value which prevents an adversary from dis-
closing the contents of the tag or identifying its location. As per the standard,
the reader powers up the tag, sends the select and query commands, receives the
response RN16 from the tag, and then transmits an ACK in response. If the
ACK is valid, the tag answers back by transmitting its content. The reader then
powers down the tag. The whole process, ignoring the proposed mutual authen-
tication messages, takes approximately 35 milliseconds (see [48]). A legitimate
oﬄine reader does not power down and power up the tag until the required time
threshold is achieved. Considering power down time is 1 millisecond, one cycle
of the standard scanning process without powering down the tag will take ap-
proximately 34 milliseconds for the first cycle and then 32.5 milliseconds (since
power up time is 1.5 millisecond) for each subsequent cycle. Consider a realistic
scenario for supply chain management where legitimate oﬄine readers are present
in retail stores and smart home appliances. These readers can scan the tags for
a relatively long time and then change their status to online after obtaining the
shared secret when the time threshold is achieved. The precise time threshold
value can be set by a manufacturer depending on the application.
The overview of the protocol is provided in Figure 5.3. Our scheme starts when a
reader sends the acknowledgment, which is compared with the value of the Access
password stored in the tag. If it matches, our online part of the authentication scheme
takes over, otherwise it switches to oﬄine mode. Since a reader is only an intermediary
device between a server and a tag, each reader is connected to either a back-end server
with stored shared secrets with the tag (online readers) or local servers without any
information about tags. This connection between reader and server is assumed to be
secure, hence we use the term reader to encompass reader, server and their communi-
cating channel in this work. Both the online and the oﬄine mechanisms are explained
in subsequent sections.
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Start
Reader sends ACK
ACK=?
Access
Send EPC+PC+CRC
Yes
ACK=?
Mem RN
No
Abandon protocol
No
Send next RN
Yes
Figure 5.3: Overview of the Proposed Scheme.
5.3.4 Online Authentication Stage
Online authentication is based on shared secrets. Online readers have known locations,
and secret passwords (Kill and Access) for each tag are securely distributed to every
reader in the chain (more precisely all readers share the database storing secret pass-
words of each tag). The main requirement in this stage is to achieve a fast read rate,
since the number of tags is large and the area is considered to be physically secure (see
Section 5.1). Since the UHF Air Interface Protocol does not define any authentication
mechanism [48], we modify the standard functionality by changing the RN16 sent by
the tag and the ACK sent by the reader to achieve mutual authentication. Our online
authentication scheme is motivated by [62] and defined as follows:
1. Initialization. Each tag is initialized with a unique fixed RN16.
2. Initial Identification. Online readers identify a particular tag using RN16 as
an index to a database (held at a back-end server) and extract Access password.
3. Mutual Authentication. A valid ACK is now the 16 LSBs of the Access
password. The tag authenticates the reader by comparing this value sent by the
reader with the value stored in the tag’s memory. If both are equal, then the
reader is considered to be online and legitimate, else either the reader is oﬄine
or not legitimate. In case of successful authentication, the tag now sends the 16
MSBs of its Access password, which the reader uses to authenticate the tag.
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4. Standard Protocol. After successful mutual authentication, the standard as
shown in Figure 5.2 is followed. The reader now sends a standard ACK (which
is the same RN16 sent initially by the tag) and the tag in return sends its infor-
mation to the reader.
5. Update. The legitimate reader updates RN16 and the Access password values
in the tag using existing Access password. The same update is carried out in the
back-end database as well.
The online authentication scheme is summarized in Figure 5.4, assuming the protocol
follows the standard until the slot counter of a particular tag reaches zero.
Online Reader Tag (SlotCounter=0)
(1) Initialized
with RN16.
(2) RN16
(3) Extracts
Access password.
(4) Valid ACK = Access(0 : 15)
(5) Authenti-
cates the reader.
(6) Access(16 : 31)
(7) Authenti-
cates the tag.
(8) Standard ACK = RN16
(9) Follows
EPCC1G2 standard.
(10) PC + EPC + CRC
(11) Updates
tag’s memory.
(12) Update RN16 and Access password (13) Updates
its memory.
Figure 5.4: Online Authentication Scheme for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
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5.3.5 Oﬄine Authentication Stage
Oﬄine readers have unknown locations and it is infeasible to distribute secret passwords
(Kill and Access) for each tag securely to every such reader. The main requirement in
this stage is to preserve privacy, with a willingness to compromise on read speed since
the number of tags is small and the area is considered to be physically insecure (see
Section 5.1). The UHF Air Interface Protocol works as in the standard except that the
RN16 sent by the tag and ACK sent by the reader changes in the proposed scheme
(see Section 5.3.3). The ACK is checked by the tag in order to establish which of the
following three states apply:
1. Valid if ACK is equal to the 16 least significant bits of the Access password.
2. Semi-valid if ACK is equal to the random values generated by tag.
3. Invalid otherwise.
The oﬄine part of our authentication scheme is motivated by [1]. This scheme is defined
as follows:
1. Initialization. Each tag is initialized with a unique fixed RN16.
2. Initial Identification. Oﬄine readers cannot identify a particular tag using
RN16, so it cannot send a valid ACK, which is the 16 LSBs of the Access
password of the corresponding tag.
3. Mutual Authentication. An oﬄine reader sends a semi-valid ACK, which is
equal to the RN16 (as per the existing standard [48]) sent by the tag and stores
a copy of RN16 in its memory. The tag first checks its validity by comparing it
with the 16 LSBs of the built-in Access password. In case of failure, it checks its
semi-validity by comparing this with the RN16 stored in its memory. If the ACK
is semi-valid, the tag switches to oﬄine mode. The tag now generates another
16 bit random number r1, XORs it with the previous RN16, transmits the result
sum1 (sum1 = r1⊕RN16) to the reader, and stores r1 and sum1 in its memory.
The reader, on receiving this new sum1, stores its value and performs the same
operation (r1 = sum1⊕RN16) and sends the result r1 to the tag (see Figure 5.5).
The tag continues checking for a valid, semi-valid or invalid ACK, and responds
accordingly. Once this repeated communication reaches a certain threshold, and
the tag determines (by comparing the rTh−1 sent by the reader with its stored
value) that the reader has spent enough time in pairing up, it performs an XOR
of the previous value of sumTh−1 stored in its memory with the 16 LSBs of its
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Access password and sends the result as sumTh to the reader. On receiving this
16-bit number, the reader also performs the XOR of this new value sumTh with
the previous one sumTh−1 and extracts the 16 LSBs of the Access password.
Once the reader transmits these 16 bits as an ACK, the tag regards it as valid.
On receiving a valid ACK, the tag switches to online mode.
4. Standard Protocol. After successful mutual authentication, the EPCC1G2
standard is followed as shown in Figure 5.2. The reader now sends a standard
ACK (which is the same RN16 sent initially by the tag) and the tag in return
sends its content to the reader.
5. Update. The legitimate reader updates RN16 and the Access password values
in the tag using existing Access password. The same update is carried out in the
reader’s local database as well.
The scheme is summarized in Figure 5.5, assuming the protocol follows the standard
until the slot counter of a particular tag reaches zero.
5.4 Analysis
In this section, we carry out an analysis of our protocol for the desired goals stated
in Section 5.3.2, and compare it to existing proposals [1, 65, 77] which are based on
a similar mechanism as mentioned in Section 5.2. We summarize this comparison in
Table 5.3.
5.4.1 Content Privacy
A common criticism of the use of RFIDs is that the tags reveal content promiscuously
to any compatible reader. Our scheme protects the content of a tag by sending content
to only authorized or trusted readers. In the secure zone with online readers, the tag
sends its content only after successful mutual authentication. Considering the area
is secured, we rule out the possibility of content disclosure to any adversary. In the
insecure zone with oﬄine readers, the tag first sends random information if it does not
trust a reader until a certain trust threshold is achieved, then the content of the tag are
sent after a successful mutual authentication phase. A recent proposal [1] based on the
concept of transmitting a shared secret in parts tends to leak information after every
transmission unless the secret is revealed. Our scheme does not reveal any information
until the trust threshold is achieved. A comparison is shown in Figure 5.6. We analyze
the strength of our scheme by considering the following adversarial behaviour:
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Oﬄine Reader Tag (SlotCounter=0)
(1) Initialized
with RN16.(2) RN16
(3) Stores RN16.
(4) Semi-valid ACK = RN16
(5) Switches to oﬄine
mode, generates and
stores r1 and sum1.
(6) sum1
(7) Calculates r1
and stores sum1. (8) r1
(9) Checks validity,
generates and stores
r2 and sum2.
(10) sum2
(11) Calculates r2
and stores sum2. (12) r2
(13) Checks validity,
generates and stores
r3 and sum3.
(14) sum3
(15) Calculates r3
and stores sum3. (16) r3
(17) Repeat until certain threshold is achieved.
(18) Checks
validity, and
calculates sumTh.
(19) sumTh
(20) Calculates and
stores Access(0 : 15). (21) Valid ACK = Access(0 : 15) (22) Switches
to online mode.
Figure 5.5: Oﬄine Authentication Scheme for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
• Online Adversary: We assume that online readers scan the tag in a secure area
(see Section 5.3.1). Therefore, we rule out the possibility of a passive adversary
listening to communication between an online reader and a tag. However, an
active adversary can act as online (in the insecure area) and the secret Access
password can be retrieved by a brute force attack. Simply, a reader can send a
random ACK to a tag until the tag sends back its content, which means that
the reader has found the correct password. In each guess, the online adversary
has to complete the scanning cycle as mentioned earlier in Section 5.3.3. If
the tag does not answer back with its content, the reader powers down the tag
and repeats the sequence with a different value of the ACK. Considering the
EPCC1G2 specification, each try takes 35 milliseconds and a 16-bit password is
thus exhausted in about 38.23 minutes (19.11 minutes on average). We consider
that an adversary who is not in possession of the tag will generally not have
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Table 5.3: Comparative Analysis of Proposed Scheme vs Existing Schemes
Security Features Marc [77] Juels [65] Amariucai [1] Proposed
Unified Approach No Yes No Yes
EPCC1G2 Compliance No Yes No Yes
Read Speed Slow Fast Slow Fast(secure
zone)
Content Privacy Reveals pat-
tern
Preserved Preserved Preserved
Location Privacy Preserved Not pre-
served
Preserved Preserved
Information leakage Gradual Gradual Linear No Leakage
Information
Time
LFSR-based AP Protocol [1]
Proposed Protocol
Threshold
Full Secret Disclosure
Figure 5.6: Information Leakage Comparison.
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sufficient time to do this before being detected.
• Sporadic Oﬄine Adversary: A more realistic scenario is of a sporadic ad-
versary who is capable only of scanning or eavesdropping some of the random
information exchanged between a reader and a tag. This random information
will not be sufficient to acquire the threshold or disclose the tag’s content. Thus
the adversary has to keep track of all the communication sessions. However, a
sporadic adversary can eavesdrop either the last session, or the second-last session
(see steps after the threshold is achieved in Figure 5.5) by chance. The proba-
bility of success will be 1/n for a threshold of n− 1 random sessions, since each
session is independent. Moreover, the adversary cannot take over an ongoing au-
thentication round (see Section 5.3.1) and has to wait for it to complete. Once an
authentication round is complete, the adversary cannot replay the eavesdropped
values or act as online since these values are updated in the tag (see Section 5.3.3).
• Dedicated Oﬄine Attacker: A dedicated oﬄine adversary is assumed to act
like a legitimate oﬄine reader. This adversary is able to scan the tag until a
threshold is achieved. Therefore, the adversary is able to disclose the Access
password and content of the tag. After achieving the Access password, the ad-
versary will impersonate as an online reader. It can thus downgrade the legitimate
owner to oﬄine by updating the tag to its own values of RN16 and Access pass-
word. However, if the adversary is not in possession of the tag, this success will
be one time only. The adversary will no longer be able to disclose this tag’s con-
tent since the Access password is updated by the legitimate owner (in its next
communication with the tag). The countermeasure for such an adversary is to
set the time threshold value to be sufficiently high that this adversary can be
detected before the tag reveals its secrets.
5.4.2 Location Privacy
Our scheme preserves the location privacy of a tag and hence prevents its tracking.
Since RN16 and the Access password are changed in every authentication round, and
the tag sends different random numbers when queried by an unauthorized reader, its
location cannot be tracked. The tracking depends on the properties of the random
number generator on the tag. The specification in the standard [48] is as follows:
Probability of a single RN16: The probability that any single RN16 drawn from
RNG has value RN16 = j, for any j, shall be bounded by 0.8/216 < P (RN16 = j) <
1.5/216.
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Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a tag population of 10,000
tags, the probability that any two or more tags simultaneously generate the same
sequence of RN16 shall be less than 0.1%, regardless of when tags are energized.
Probability of predicting RN16: An RN16 drawn from a tag’s RNG 10ms after
the end of Tr (rise time of reader power-up waveform) shall not be predictable with
a probability greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of the prior draws from the RNG,
performed under identical conditions, are known.
5.4.3 Conformance to Standard
Many of the earlier proposals cannot be implemented in low-cost environments (see
Section 5.2), particularly EPCC1G2 standard compliant tags, or require considerable
changes to the existing standard. Our scheme can easily be implemented in these tags
with very minor changes to the standard and uses existing functionality as defined in
the standard [48]. The proposed scheme conforms with the standard operations as
follows:
• Select. This operation is used to select a single or a population of many tags.
We use the existing select operation as per the standard.
• Inventory. Once a tag selected for identification, inventory operation is initi-
ated. This operation concludes when the selected tag sends its content to reader.
We incorporate a mutual authentication phase in inventory round for online au-
thentication while a time based threshold pairing phase is included for oﬄine
authentication.
• Access. Access involves read from/write to and other operations requiring to
access the tag’s memory. We use the built-in Access password for updating the
tag’s memory.
Following are the additional overheads in addition to standard functionalities:
• Storage. Our scheme requires the tag to store two additional 16-bit values (8
GE/bit for temporary storage) in addition to storing a random number as in the
standard.
• Computation. The additional mechanism uses the existing functionalities of an
EPCC1G2 compliant tag for generating a 16-bit random nonce and conducting
an XOR computation.
• Communication. There are additional communication overheads to achieve
mutual authentication and a time threshold. In the online authentication scheme,
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there is an additional mutual authentication mechanism which is completed in two
additional messages and authentication is based on the existing built-in Access
password. In the oﬄine authentication scheme, the reader has to acquire a time
threshold in order to read the tag’s content.
5.4.4 Fast Read Speed
EPCC1G2 certified readers have two read modes namely fast and slow. The read
speeds are automatic and depend entirely on the actual read conditions for each tag.
In multi-tag environments, where thousands of tags are passing in front of readers,
speed is of the utmost importance. Fast read speed requirement exists in the secure
zone with online readers. Our proposed scheme reads the tag using the same standard
functionality in the secure zone with online readers. Thus this requirement is fulfilled
using our proposed scheme.
5.4.5 User Transparency
As discussed in Section 5.2, some of the earlier schemes require user intervention to pre-
serve the privacy of the tag. These systems are prone to errors and are labour-intensive.
Our proposal adapts between online and oﬄine authentication modes without any user
intervention.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a scheme that provides a unified approach to tackling
privacy and performance issues in RFID-tagged supply chain management. Unlike any
existing proposal in the literature, it is easy to implement in the existing EPCC1G2
standard, it provides fast read speed in the secure zone, and preserves privacy in the
insecure zone, and it adapts between online and oﬄine authentication without user
intervention.
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Chapter 6
A Hierarchical Anti-counterfeit
Mechanism
In this chapter, we address the counterfeiting threat to supply chain man-
agement using RFIDs. Section 6.1 provides an overview of the counterfeit
problem in RFID systems. The existing solution and their drawbacks are
discussed in Section 6.2. Our proposed anti-counterfeit mechanism is pre-
sented in Section 6.3. The analysis of our scheme is carried out in Sec-
tion 6.4 to determine whether it achieves the desired goals.
6.1 Introduction
RFID technology has replaced barcode mainly because items can be individually iden-
tified without line-of-sight requirements (see Section 1.1). Although RFID systems
face similar challenges to those faced by barcode technologies, such as cloning and
impersonation, RFID systems have the advantage that they are capable of providing
identification as well as authentication. However, counterfeiting, caused by cloning and
impersonation attacks, has been a problem for some RFID systems [63]. The counter-
feiting of products is one of the most serious threats to modern commerce according to
estimates by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC), which claims that counterfeit goods account for up to 5-7%
of world trade [58]. Counterfeits products can be found everywhere starting from low
cost items such as biscuit packs, food tins, DVDs and medicine bottles, to high value
goods such as watches, designer clothes, cars, motorcycles and bicycles.
RFID tags are attached to products for remote identification. Among these, EPCC1G2
compliant tags are the most widely used because of their world-wide standardization.
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The EPCC1G2 standard is used for supply chain management (see Section 5.1) and can
be used as a tool for anti-counterfeiting [130]. A tagged object starts its journey from
manufacturer to customer as part of a large group [65]. During this journey, the object
may be read by multiple readers located from the manufacturing company through to
retail stores. Finally the object is sold to the end-user/customer. To address counter-
feiting, RFID researchers have designed many schemes which trade-off between cost,
security, and performance, however existing approaches all have significant drawbacks
which we outline in Section 6.2. In this chapter, we shall propose a mechanism to
counter counterfeiting in the supply chain management system. However, this mecha-
nism cannot address counterfeits when items reach customer level. In the next chapter,
we shall propose an anti-counterfeit framework for individual customers.
Since a tag will respond to every query sent by any compatible reader, if no au-
thentication mechanism is employed, an adversary can query a genuine tag and learn
the sensitive information associated with the tag’s identifier, which can then be used
to make counterfeit tags (see Section 2.5). When using authentication, a tag will
respond to every query sent by a compatible reader that has been authenticated as le-
gitimate. However, the adversary can still eavesdrop the tag’s identifier and then copy
this information to a counterfeit tag. So there is a need for secure identification with
authentication, in which case a tag will securely provide its information in response
to every query sent by a compatible reader that has been authenticated as legitimate.
Although an adversary cannot learn the sensitive information, if this information is
static then it can be copied or replayed by counterfeit tags to impersonate genuine
tags. Finally the adversary can collude with legitimate but dishonest middle parties
to gain benefits from counterfeiting. Considering these threats and capabilities of the
adversary, there is a need of an anti-counterfeit mechanism to identify dishonest middle
parties involved in both counterfeiting and processing stolen/missing items.
6.1.1 Our Contribution
Counterfeiting is a very serious threat to supply chain management systems. RFID
systems are widely used to automate and speed up the process of remotely identifying
products, however these systems are vulnerable to counterfeiting as shown in Sec-
tion 6.2. In this chapter, we propose a hierarchical anti-counterfeiting mechanism for
EPCC1G2 standard (see Section 2.3 compliant tags. Our mechanism uses three layers
of verification. Our layered approach, based on the use of shared secrets to generate
dynamic verification codes which change in each transaction, offers scalability and is
suitable for different sizes of groups of tagged items, as well as individual tags. Our
scheme not only provides protection against counterfeiting but also identifies dishonest
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middle parties. Additionally, it can detect any missing or stolen items and is sufficiently
scalable to be applicable to the complete lifecycle of a tagged object within a supply
chain management. This work has been published in [10].
6.2 Existing Work
There are several existing approaches to managing RFID counterfeiting (see for exam-
ple [83,84,124]). We briefly review some of these schemes and identify their drawbacks.
6.2.1 Unique Serial Numbers
Every item equipped with an EPCC1G2 compliant tag carries a 96-bit code to uniquely
identify and manage the item in a supply chain. Several proposals [75,136] use unique
serial numbers to identify products. These numbers are used to track the physical
location of a tag and update the results in an online database to check legitimacy and
highlight any missing items. The EPC of a counterfeit product will appear twice (at
least) in the database, assuming the counterfeit product is equipped with a cloned tag.
However, this technique is detection only and does not prevent counterfeiting since
the serial number is transmitted in the clear and any adversary can eavesdrop the
serial number in order to clone or impersonate it. If a genuine tag is removed, and a
counterfeit tag is impersonated as genuine, this scheme cannot detect it.
A number of proposed schemes [75, 106, 130] include a track and trace method
where a counterfeit or missing item can be tracked down and traced back anywhere
in the process. This is done using the complete trail of the exchanges of a cloned tag
which is updated by each shipping and receiving record. The main disadvantage of this
approach is its significant communication and computation overheads. Every reader
has to update records in the online database server in real time. The online server has to
track and trace each code received from the online reader and generate triggers in case
of any abnormality. Thus, this approach is time consuming and creates bottlenecks
if multiple clones are detected at the same time, as each cloned tag is individually
checked using its complete shipping record from the database. In addition to these
overheads, there are also some privacy concerns associated with this approach: for
example, tracking of individuals from the products they carry, or tracking medicines,
etc [2]. Another drawback of this approach is that a genuine but dishonest retailer can
copy a genuine tag and attach this copy to a counterfeit product. They can then sell
the counterfeit to a customer, who verifies it to be legitimate using a track and trace
process that is not updated by the retailer or the middle parties [130]. Since track and
trace process needs an update by each middle party, it is therefore vulnerable to both
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intentional and unintentional errors [84].
6.2.2 Cryptographic Anti-counterfeit Mechanisms
Cryptographic mechanisms can be used to tackle counterfeits. The basic idea is to base
authentication on a secret value possessed by each tag, which is then disclosed to the
verifier as a proof of authenticity in a challenge-response, protocol [140]. Generally, this
uses an encrypted challenge-response protocol, as it may be eavesdropped and the secret
cloned if sent in the clear. This approach may be based on symmetric cryptography or
asymmetric cryptography.
If symmetric cryptography is used [31, 36, 37, 115], the secret is already known to
the verifier who matches it with the secret value received from the tag. To avoid a
single point of failure, each tag is given a unique secret key, hence there will potentially
be millions of such keys. This results in a requirement for a secure and efficient key
distribution mechanism to distribute the tags’ secrets among the readers. One approach
to establishing all these keys is to distribute all keys to each reader in the form of a
local database. However if a reader’s local database is compromised then this approach
results in the breaking of the whole system. A preferred approach is to store all the keys
in an online database which each reader can access. This server is online at all times to
provide the secret values of tags to readers. Assuming millions of tags are deployed in
the supply chain with hundreds of compatible RFID readers, this approach incurs even
more extensive communication, computational and storage overheads than the track
and trace approach [2, 83], and even higher than the unique serial numbers approach.
In addition, the reader needs to be trusted by the supplier since the reader stores or
accesses the secret values of the tags in any system based on symmetric cryptography.
In contrast, asymmetric cryptography can be used [2, 7, 94, 153] to distribute keys.
However, this still requires each tag to have a unique secret key and involves consider-
able computational overheads. Although researchers have proposed some lightweight
public key cryptographic systems such as WIPR [104], it is still unclear whether such
schemes can be deployed in the resource-constrained low-cost RFID systems (EPCC1G2
compliant tags) used in supply chain management.
6.2.3 Unclonable RFID tags
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are tamper-proof, unclonable items of hardware
which produce a unique signature, given an input. In [139] an oﬄine authentication
scheme based on physically printed challenge-response pairs from a certain PUF was
proposed for tag authentication. However, the printout has to be physically read and
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cannot easily be automated. Further, it is relatively easy to program a cloned tag
to give responses to particular challenges instead of using a PUF. These issues were
addressed in another PUF-based scheme [82], but tracking of a tag is possible in this
scheme as the PUF identifier is unique and does not change. Moreover, it is infeasible
to maintain a large number of challenge-response pairs for one tag, potentially resulting
in the few challenge-response entries being eavesdropped and the cloning of the tag.
6.2.4 Built-in Passwords
Juels has suggested a solution based on the tag’s built-in passwords to counter the
threat of cloning [62]. The idea is to use the existing Kill and Access password PINs
to perform mutual authentication between reader and tag in order to avoid cloning.
The reader sends a set of apparently random values except that one is the correct
password PIN. The tag in response has to send the position of the correct PIN to
get its legitimacy verified. However, legitimate but dishonest readers can store the
complete set of PINs with a tag’s responses and can thus clone the tag. Even if the
reader is honest, the challenge set of PINs and responses can be eavesdropped. Juels
also noted that this scheme is not secure against a simple three-step attack [62] based
on skimming a tag identifier, interacting with the reader to obtain the challenge set of
PINs, and then using these to obtain the correct PIN.
6.3 Proposed Anti-counterfeiting Mechanism
We now propose a new approach to prevent counterfeiting in supply chain processes
where tags travel in groups. Our mechanism is based on a hierarchical model which
involves three layers of verification. The three layers can be considered to range from
low to high complexity with respect to trade-offs between cost, performance and level
of security. If an upper layer verification fails, verification drops down to the next layer.
We design new first and second layers, and then use the track and trace approach [75]
for the third layer.
6.3.1 Goals
Our anti-counterfeiting mechanism is designed to achieve the following goals:
• Anti-cloning. Protection against copying the data from a genuine tag attached
to a legitimate product and cloning it onto another tag attached to a counterfeit
(see Section 6.2.1).
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• Anti-spoofing. Protection against replay (impersonation) attacks (see Sec-
tions 6.2.3 and 6.2.4).
• Anti-theft. Detection of stolen or missing items.
• Scalability. Ability to operate efficiently when tags are in large groups as well
as when a tag is attached to a single item.
• Conformance to Standard. Conform with the standard’s operations and func-
tionality as much as possible.
• Efficient Key Management. Supportable using an efficient key management
scheme (see Section 6.2.2).
• Good Throughput. Avoidance of bottlenecks which degrade the overall supply
chain system throughput (see Section 6.2.2).
6.3.2 The Layered Approach
The three hierarchical layers used for the legitimacy verification of a product (see
Figure 6.1) are:
1. Group Verification (GV) Layer. For most of their journey in the supply
chain products travel in groups (based on their type, specification, manufacturer
and lot number, etc.) Our first layer verifies a complete group. In this layer the
reader does not need continuous access to a central repository for verifying each
tag because the complete group is read first and then verified as a whole.
2. Product Verification (PV) Layer. If GV layer verification fails, product ver-
ification is initiated using an individual tag’s verification code. This lowers the
performance and throughput since the reader has to access the database multiple
times. Since the server verifies the legitimacy of a single product, the additional
computational overheads are acceptable since the server is anticipated to be pow-
erful. The PV layer identifies individual products that are either counterfeit or
missing, their values and complete specifications.
3. Track and Trace (TT) Layer. After the PV layer has identified counter-
feit or missing products, track and trace is initiated using the complete ship-
ping/receiving record of the product. This gathers important information that
includes the location of the anomaly and the type of anomaly (dishonest reader,
counterfeit tag, or tag completely missing).
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GV Layer
PV Layer
TT Layer
Figure 6.1: Hierarchical Verification Model.
Each layer of hierarchical verification detects anomalies in the supply chain in the
following order:
• GV Anomaly Detection. GV mainly fails if the reader is not legitimate, a
counterfeit is detected, or a tag is completely missing. When GV fails, this will
generate an alarm in the server. The server will record the location and details of
the reader where the alarm is raised. The server then switches to the PV layer.
• PV Anomaly Detection. PV identifies the exact cause of GV failure. It
highlights the exact tagged product which is either counterfeit or missing. The
server makes a corresponding entry relating to this particular tag.
• TT Anomaly Detection. TT is carried out as a last step which recovers the
complete shipping/receiving record of the tag that was identified in PV anomaly
detection. This further shows whether more clones exist in the supply chain, or
whether the original product is completely missing. The server records the details
of anomalies detected by TT .
6.3.3 Hierarchical Anti-counterfeiting Mechanism
We now explain the detailed operation of our hierarchical anti-counterfeiting mecha-
nism. The notation used is summarized in Table 6.1.
Key Distribution Phase.
In this phase, the supplier who is responsible for shipping the tagged items in groups
(or standalone as explained in Section 6.3.1) to different geographic locations holds a
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Table 6.1: Notation used in Chapter 6
Notation Description
S A server holding the database with shared secrets.
Rh A reader scanning a group of tags with index h.
Gj A group of many tags with index j.
d The number of tags in a particular group.
HV Ti A tag participating in hierarchical verification with index i.
EPCi A tag’s (with index i) static and unique identity.
KStj A group secret key for every tag in a group with index j.
KMr A master key given to each reader in supply chain management.
KDF A key derivation function agreed between server and all readers.
SKhj A session key derived from master key by reader (with index h)
scanning a group (with index j).
rj A 96-bit random challenge generated by server for a group or a
single tag (both with index j).
TV Ci A 96-bit tag verification code used to verify the legitimacy of a
tag with index i.
RV Ch A reader verification code used to verify the legitimacy of a reader
with index h.
GV Cj A group verification code used to verify the legitimacy of a group
of tags with index j.
EGV Cj Encrypted group verification code for group with index j.
tout The maximum time limit of sending a message and receiving its
reply.
FK(X) A lightweight secure PRF such as Hummingbird-2 [34] designed
for EPCC1G2 compliant tags.
EK(X) A secure PRP such as AES.
X ⊕ Y Exclusive-OR of two values X and Y.
database with shared secrets. This database is securely held at a central back-end server
S. The supplier distributes the keys as shown in Figure 6.2. There are n tags grouped
in m groups depending on their type, specification, application, date of manufacture,
lot number, date of expiry and geographic location, etc. Since, n  m, it is easy to
distribute a total of m keys to n tags (the same key KS for each tag belonging to one
group). The number of readers that scan these groups is denoted by s. The supplier
distributes one master key KMr to each reader.
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T1
Td
Td+1
Tj
Tk
Tn
G1
G2
Gm
KSt1
KSt2
KStm
R1
Rs
KMr
Figure 6.2: Key Distribution Phase.
Group Verification Phase.
After the key distribution phase is complete, and the supplier makes corresponding
entries in the database, the groups of tagged items are shipped to their respective
locations. When a group reaches a particular reader in the supply chain process, the
GV phase is initiated. The complete protocol is shown in Figure 6.3 and is as follows:
1. The reader Rh initiates an EPCC1G2 standard UHF protocol.
2. The first tag (whose slot counter is zero, see [48]) HV T1 responds showing that
it is employing hierarchical verification belonging to group Gj .
3. The reader sends this group identifier Gj and its own identifier Rh to server S.
4. The server S generates a random nonce rj and sends it to the reader Rh along
with the total number of tags d in group Gj .
5. The reader Rh then forwards rj + 1, rj + 2, · · · , rj + d to the tags in succession.
6. Each tag computes its verification code depending on which random value it
received and sends it to reader Rh. Tag HV Ti belonging to group Gj computes
its TV Ci as follows:
TV Ci = EPCi ⊕ FKStj (rj + i). (6.1)
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ReaderServer Tag
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16
HV T1, Gj
Gj , Rh
rj , d
rj + 1
TV C1
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16
HV Td, Gj
rj + d
TV Cd
EGV Cj , R
V Ch, d
′
ACK = Pass/Fail
tout
Figure 6.3: Group Verification Protocol.
7. The reader Rh computes a GV C by XOR with the previous TV C every time it
receives a new TV C, until all d tags have responded:
GV Cj = TV Ci ⊕ ...⊕ TV Cd. (6.2)
8. The reader Rh computes a session key as:
SKhj = KDF (KMr, Rh, Gj). (6.3)
9. The reader Rh encrypts rj to compute RV Ch and GV Cj using SKhj , and sends
it as EGV Cj along with the total number of tags d
′
that it read within time tout
to the server S. RV Ch and EGV Cj are computed as follows:
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RV Ch = ESKhj (rj), (6.4)
EGV Cj = ESKhj (GV Cj). (6.5)
10. The use of XOR in calculation of TV C and GV C offers performance efficiency
where the server can calculate GV C oﬄine for comparison with received value
without requiring a continuous input from the reader irrespective of which value
of random number is sent to a particular tag. This also keeps the task of the
reader simple and transparent while sending incremented value of the random
numbers where it does not have to keep a track of these values and their recipient
tags.
11. The server first checks the legitimacy of reader Rh by decrypting RV Ch. The
server S next checks that reader Rh has read all the tags from the value of d
′
(to
determine any missing/dummy tags). The server S finally decrypts the EGV Cj
sent by reader Rh to check whether GV Cj is correct:
if DSKhj (RV Ch) == rj then
Rh is legitimate,
Check:
if d
′
== d then
All tags have been read,
Check:
if DSKhj (EGV Cj) == GV Cj then
Gj is successfully authenticated,
Send ACK = Pass to Rh.
end if
else
GV has failed,
Send ACK = Fail to Rh.
end if
else
Rh is not legitimate,
Abandon the protocol.
end if
If the final ACK = Pass, this shows that group Gj has passed the GV phase suc-
cessfully. A corresponding entry is made in the database for the group Gj scanned by
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reader Rh, which also helps in future transactions with this particular reader in terms
of trust level. The construction of the GV layer is as shown in the example given in
Figure 6.4, where the group G1 consisting of four tags is being scanned by the reader
R5.
EPC1 EPC2 EPC3 EPC4
G1
+ + + +Fkt1 (r1+1) Fkt1 (r1+2) Fkt1 (r1+3) Fkt1 (r1+4)
Tag side
+TV C1
T
V
C
2 T
V
C
3
TV C4
ESK51 (GV C1)
G
V
C
1
EGV C1, RV C5, 4
Reader
side
Figure 6.4: Construction of the GV Layer.
Product Verification Phase.
When ACK = Fail is sent to reader Rh, this shows that the GV layer has not verified
the authenticity of the group. In this case the PV phase is initiated as shown in
Figure 6.5. PV is carried out as follows:
1. The reader Rh sends the tag identifiers HV T s to the server.
2. The server S generates a random nonce r for each tag as a challenge.
3. The reader Rh forwards this challenge to the corresponding tag, receives the TV C
and forwards it back to the server S.
4. The server S verifies the legitimacy of an individual tag as follows:
if TV Ci == EPCi ⊕ FKStj (ri) then
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ReaderServer Tag
ACK = Fail
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16
HV T1, Gj
HV T1, Gj
r1
r1
TV C1
TV C1
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16
HV Td, Gj
HV Td, Gj
rd
rd
TV Cd
TV Cd
tout
tout
Figure 6.5: Product Verification Protocol.
Tag with identifier HV Ti is a genuine tag,
else
Tag with identifier HV Ti is a counterfeit tag.
end if
5. At the end of this protocol, the server S is able to identify the counterfeit tags
as well as missing/dummy tags.
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Track and Trace Phase.
In the EPCC1G2 standard, the unique and secret identifier EPC is used to track
and trace the tag’s movement throughout the supply chain. We give an example in
Figure 6.6 to explain the TT phase. Suppose that a particular item travels in a group
EPC5, t1, 1 EPC5, t2, 1 EPC5, t3, 2 EPC5, t4, 2 EPC5, t5, 3 EPC5, t6, 3
Receive Ship Receive Ship Receive Ship
Time
EPC5, t1, 1 EPC5, t2, 1 EPC5, t3, 2 EPC5, t4, 2 EPC5, t5, 3
EPC5, t1, 1 EPC5, t2, 1 EPC5, t3, 2 EPC5, t4, 2
EPC5, t1, 1 EPC5, t2, 1 EPC5, t3, 2 EPC5, t4, 2 EPC5, t5, 3 r, t6, 3
EPC5, t1, 1 EPC5, t2, 1 EPC5, t3, 2 EPC5, t4, 2 r, t5, 3
Figure 6.6: Track and Trace Example.
through three different companies (Company 1, 2 and 3) before reaching its retailer.
The server S maintains its receiving and shipping record at each company. The entry
EPC5, t1, 1 shows that the item with tag identifier EPC5 was received at time t1 by
Company 1. A track and trace operation results in one of the following:
• Case 1: No anomaly. The first record in Figure 6.6 shows an ideal case where
a particular item EPC5 is successfully shipped to the retailer.
• Case 2: Missing item within company. The second record shows that Com-
pany 3 received the item at t5 but never shipped it to the retailer.
• Case 3: Missing item en-route. The third record shows that the item was
shipped by Company 2 but was never received by Company 3.
• Case 4: Counterfeit item within company. The fourth record shows that
Company 3 received the original authentic item at t5 but shipped a suspected
counterfeit to the retailer.
• Case 5: Counterfeit item en-route. The last record shows that Company 2
shipped the original authentic item at t4 but the item received by Company 3 is
a suspected counterfeit.
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6.4 Analysis
We now carry out an analysis of our proposed anti-counterfeiting mechanism as to
whether it achieves the desired goals of Section 6.3.1. A formal analysis of our proposed
scheme is also presented in Appendix D.
6.4.1 Anti-cloning
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, if a tag transmits its static secret identity EPC in the
clear then it can easily be copied. This unique identity of the tag is linked with
its associated information, which potentially includes value, composition and other
useful supplier-related data. In the proposed mechanism the tag hides this secret static
identity in its verification code. The tag thus transmits its verification code which
appears to be random data. Thus an adversary cannot make a copy of the secret static
identity from a genuine tag. However the adversary can copy the public identifier HV T
of a tag to a counterfeit tag, but this counterfeit tag will not be able to reproduce the
correct verification code and thus will fail the legitimacy verification. We discuss the
following scenarios:
• Adversary learns EPC. If an adversary learns about the static secret identity
EPC of a genuine tag and wants to clone it, the former still has to generate a
correct product verification code to go undetected. The TV C is calculated as
follows:
TV C = EPC ⊕ FKS(r). (6.6)
From (6.6), a cloned tag has to calculate the correct FKS(r) after receiving r
from a reader. This requires a complexity of O(2128), since Hummingbird-2 uses
128-bit key [34].
• Adversary learns KS. If an adversary learns about the secret key KS of a
group of tags and wants to clone its tags, the former has to generate a correct
product verification code to go undetected. From (6.6), a cloned tag has to know
the EPC of the genuine tag. This requires a complexity of O(296), since a tag
uses a 96-bit EPC [48].
We therefore suggest storing these values of EPC and KS in a secure memory
location (assuming the tag is tamper-resistant).
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6.4.2 Anti-spoofing
As discussed in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4, static secret identities can be replayed by a
counterfeit tag in order to spoof as a genuine tag. In the proposed mechanism, the secret
information which is transmitted for verification changes in every transaction because
of the use of a fresh random nonce that is generated by the server. An adversary can
thus not replay this secret information during a later transaction because the use of
a new nonce will result in verification failure. The only possibility for an adversary is
to steal a genuine tag and then relay its verification code. However, our scheme also
provides protection against missing/stolen item as explained subsequently.
6.4.3 Anti-theft
The proposed mechanism employs a layered approach in order to detect stolen/missing
products. As described in Section 6.3.2, this layered approach can be used to identify
the exact cause and location of any anomaly since the final Track and Trace layer
provides the complete shipping and receiving record of the identified stolen/missing
item. After tracing the root cause of the anomaly, suitable processes can be undertaken
to hold the responsible parties accountable. Appropriate countermeasures can then be
applied in order to prevent this anomaly from occurring during future transactions.
We note that a smart adversary can prevent this detection by relaying the genuine
verification code from a stolen/missing item that is not physically present in the vicinity
of the scan range. To counter such an adversary, we have employed a time-out clock
within our scheme. The server pre-computes this time, depending on the number of
tags involved in the scheme. The server then expects the reader to answer back within
that specified time. If the reader delays its response, this is an indication of a potential
relay attack. The server can thus ask the respective reader for a physical check for the
completeness of this group and makes a corresponding entry for this anomaly in its
database.
6.4.4 Scalability
In supply chain environments, tags travel for most of their journey in groups. These
groups can be large, medium or even consist of a single item, depending on their
size, value, and application. Sometime these groups change in their size en-route from
manufacturer to end-user. Our proposed group verification layer can verify any group
irrespective of its size and, during the product verification layer, the legitimacy of a
single tagged item is checked. Therefore, our scheme scales well from large groups,
through to medium and small groups, and even to standalone items.
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6.4.5 Conformance to Standard
Our mechanism is proposed for EPCC1G2 compliant tags. The conformance with the
standard’s operation is as follows:
• Select. There is no change in the standard select operation which is used for
selecting a tag population.
• Inventory. We suggest a two way challenge-response protocol to verify the
authenticity of the tag in addition to the standard inventory round.
• Access. We do not suggest any change in the access operation which is used to
read from/write to and other operations related to tag’s memory.
The following are the additional requirements to be incorporated in the standard’s
functionality:
• Storage. The tags need to store a secret key KS, a public identifier HV T (both
require 3 GE/bit for long term storage) and a group identifier G (8 GE/bit for
temporary storage) in addition to data specified in the standard.
• Computation. The tags have to perform encryption to generate TV C. The
designers of the standard have already proposed an encryption alogrithm [34] to
be incorporated into EPCC1G2 compliant tags [28].
• Communication. The proposed mechanism uses the standard UHF Air In-
terface Protocol as specified in [48]. The two additional messages are sent to
carry out a challenge-response protocol to verify the authenticity of the tag. If a
tag is not employing hierarchical verification, it can be read as per the existing
standard.
6.4.6 Efficient Key Management
The proposed mechanism avoids some of the scalability problems of using symmetric
cryptography by providing all tags belonging to a specific group with a unique key.
Since the number of groups is much smaller than the number of tags, it is comparatively
easy to manage the keys in the database. Additionally, all readers involved in the supply
chain management system are only given one master key. By reducing the overall
number of keys in the system, the key management is considerably more efficient than
schemes with a unique key for each tag as mentioned in [2].
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6.4.7 Good Throughput
The layered approach deployed by the proposed mechanism is partly designed to reduce
the likelihood of potential bottlenecks arising from readers having to stay online with
the server during authentication and verification, and having to regularly interact with
the database. By first deploying relatively lightweight group-level checks we avoid
bottlenecks in the top layer of the hierarchical verification process. Overall performance
decreases in the lower layers, but these are only activated if anomalies are detected
during the group-level checking. In this way a reasonable throughput can be expected
for the system.
6.4.8 Economic Analysis
Please note that this analysis is informal and based on assumptions and rough estimates
and may not be taken as a basis for making business decisions. As discussed earlier in
Section 6.1, around 5-7% of world trade is composed of counterfeit goods according to
estimates by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) [58]. We carry out a rough estimate of the economic impact of our
proposed scheme in this section. We make the following assumptions:
• The additional cost of key generation, writing into respective tags, cryptographic
operations in the tag, etc. is included in the cost of an EPCC1G2 compliant tag.
• The 5-7% counterfeit items only cause losses to the sales revenue. Other losses
including decline in sales due to reputation loss and associated impacts are not
considered for simplicity.
We now use notation as shown in Table 6.2. We want to figure out what will be the
ideal value of ∆ which shall provide us with a break even price of using RFID tags.
n · (∆− c) = n ·∆ · (1− p),
c = ∆ · p.
c for an EPCC1G2 varies from different vendors. SmartCode offers it at a price of
$0.05 apiece in volume of 100 million or more [122]. Suppose including all associated
cost as earlier discussed, c is assumed to be $0.1. p is assumed to be 0.07 in worst case
scenario. Therefore if our ∆ > $1.43 we shall gain profit per item using our suggested
scheme.
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Table 6.2: Notation used in Economic Analysis of Hierarchical Verification Scheme
Notation Description
x The production cost per unit.
y The sale price per unit.
∆ = y − x The profit per unit.
n The market demand over some fixed period.
n ·∆ Ideal profit for original manufacturer.
p The percentage of counterfeits in the market.
n(1− p) Products sold by original manufacturer.
np Counterfeit items from other suppliers in the market.
n ·∆ · (1− p) Actual profit by the manufacturer.
c Unit cost of RFID tag usage on a product.
n · (∆− c) Profit by manufacturer considering counterfeits are eliminated.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a hierarchical anti-counterfeiting mechanism which
uses three layers of verification to determine the legitimacy of a tagged item. This
mechanism is designed for EPCC1G2 compliant tags used in supply chain management,
where counterfeit items present a very serious threat. This threat is countered using
dynamic verification codes generated using symmetric cryptography. Our model detects
the stolen/missing items, provides efficient key management, avoids bottlenecks, and
is scalable to the complete lifecycle of tags in the supply chain. The layered approach
also potentially lends itself to deployment in schemes based on other standards.
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Chapter 7
A Customer Level Counterfeit
Detection Scheme
In this chapter, a counterfeit detection scheme for tagged products is pro-
posed at customer level. Types of counterfeits which reach to individual
customers is introduced in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 introduces NFC tech-
nology and the different types of NFC tags. This is followed by an overview
of the EPC network and its application in supply chain management. Sec-
tion 7.3 analyzes existing work with a detailed description of the scheme
proposed by Alex Arbit et al [2]. Section 7.4 describes the proposed scheme,
which overcomes the weaknesses in the existing work. A detailed analysis
of suggested proposal is presented in Section 7.5.
7.1 Introduction
As previously explained in Section 6.1, counterfeit products are one of the major threats
to modern commerce. We have proposed a hierarchical anti-counterfeit mechanism in
Chapter 6 which caters for counterfeits in supply chain management. Whereas in this
chapter, we propose a scheme to detect counterfeit products by individual customers
using electronic product code (EPC) and near field communication (NFC) tags. Coun-
terfeit products reaching individual customers can be classified into four categories [8].
1. The first category consists of those products that are inexpensive, lower quality
and may lack original packaging. This category is often called ‘knockoff’. These
products are being sold as counterfeits and the customer is aware of it.
2. In the second category of counterfeit, a genuine product is reverse engineered
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and identical copies are sold as the genuine product. It is hard for a customer
to differentiate between a genuine and a counterfeit product. This category is
meant to deceive the customer.
3. These are the products that are produced by an outsourced manufacturer with-
out knowledge of the original owner. For example, an outsourced manufacturer
manufactures further products after termination of its contract with the original
owner without notifying the original owner.
4. These are genuine products that do not meet the manufacturer’s standards but
are not labeled as faulty.
One of the major outlets for counterfeit products is Internet e-commerce, where the
customer has no means of authenticating a product before delivery. Even after delivery,
the customer has very limited resources to determine the legitimacy of a product. Auc-
tion websites, such as eBay, have further expanded the market of counterfeit products.
For example, test purchases from 300,000 Dior products and 150,000 Vuitton items
offered on eBay during 2006 found 90% conterfeits [95]. Tiffany & Co. purchased 186
random items from eBay and found only 5% to be genuine [19].
These circumstances call for mechanisms to fight counterfeiting at customer level.
Analysis shows that money spent in this way prevents a much greater loss from coun-
terfeit goods. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, $5 is gained for every $1
invested in this battle [137].
7.1.1 Our Contribution
We focus our work on detecting counterfeits that fall into the categories 2 and 3 men-
tioned in Section 7.1. Category 1 counterfeits are not a major concern as customers
are aware of the fact that the products they are buying are counterfeits. The loss in
sales of the original product is also negligible as very few genuine goods purchasers
would purchase a knock off [8]. Category 4 counterfeits can be restricted by enforcing
an efficient quality control measure by the genuine product owner. Categories 2 and 3
are most critical as not only is the customer unaware of the illegitimacy of the product,
but also the genuine owner has no, or minimal, control over the production, marketing
and selling of such products. Our scheme helps to detect counterfeit products at the
customer level pertaining to category 2 and 3 products, thus providing an efficient tool
to detect counterfeits.
In this chapter, we analyze the anti-counterfeiting scheme which Alex Arbit et
al. proposed in [2] and highlight a few of its short-comings. The main drawback of
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their scheme is its semi-oﬄine structure, which render it incapable of authenticating a
product at customer level despite using public key cryptography.
We revise and extend their work in two main ways. Firstly, we restore the EPC
tag to the original standard rather than using the modified EPC tag in the Alex Arbit
et al. scheme. This resolves any modification-related problems in the existing EPC
framework. Secondly, we supplement the EPC tag with an NFC tag which can perform
the necessary computations that were not within the capability of the EPC tag. The
main advantage of being oﬄine is that a customer can authenticate a product without
any online communication with the supplier’s database. We believe that our oﬄine
product authentication at customer level is an efficient anti-counterfeiting tool. This
scheme not only helps customers authenticate a product, but any verifier such as a law
enforcement agency can also use this scheme to detect counterfeit products.
We resolve the problem of provisioning of a UHF RFID reader for product authen-
tication to every customer by using an NFC tag for the EPC tag. Such NFC technology
is now available on mobile phones and so a customer’s mobile phone can act like an
RFID reader to read the EPC. Since our scheme is completely oﬄine, the customer is
able to distinguish between a legitimate and a counterfeit product by using his mobile
phone without accessing the supplier’s database.
We also resolve the issue of trust in the reader for an oﬄine framework. In the
work of Alex Arbit et al [2], the reader is a secure module storing a verification key
and a decryption key, as noted earlier in this section. These keys cannot be stored on
any reader that is not trusted by the supplier. Although the customer’s mobile phone
is not trusted by the supplier, this issue can be addressed by using certificate-based
public key cryptography, thereby all but eliminating any key storage requirement on
the reader side. In many cases, the NFC tag can also be accessed and authenticated
during product distribution without having to resort to the greater read range of the
EPC tag.
This work is published in [125] and conducted jointly with Qasim Saeed and Colin
Walter (ISG-RHUL).
7.2 RFID Technologies
In this section we introduce the two different classes of RFID technology that are
related to our scheme.
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7.2.1 Near Field Communication
NFC is a wireless technology that operates at a distance of less than about 4 cm. This
technology is compatible with contactless smart cards based on the ISO/IEC 14443
standard [151]. The frequency of operation falls in the HF band operating at 13.56
MHz. The limited 4cm range means that their use in supply chain management can
be problematic. Access to tags embedded in products which are packaged in rigid
expanded polystyrene foam requires precise location markers printed on the boxes, and
the ability to place a reader on that location. This may not be possible in a warehouse.
An NFC link is established between a tag and a reader on a single touch. This
makes it a user friendly technology, where no input is required from a user apart from
touching the tag to the reader. NFC has three modes of operation enabling a variety
of applications: peer-to-peer mode, read/write mode and emulation mode [91]. The
latest mobile phones are equipped with NFC technology [101].
We only focus on the read/write mode of operation as only this mode is applica-
ble to our proposed scheme. In read/write mode, an NFC device acts as an RFID
reader/writer to read or write an NFC tag. In order to maintain the interoperability
of NFC devices and tags, the NFC Forum (a forum to standardize the applications
related to NFC) [148] has specified four different types of tags [99]: Type-1, Type-2,
Type-3 and Type4. Type-1 has the least resources in terms of computational power
and memory, whereas Type-4 is much more powerful and contains a cryptographic
processor.
7.2.2 EPC in the Supply Chain
We have previously explained EPC tags in Section 2.3.1 and its deployment in supply
chain management system in Section 5.1. We present the following brief summary of
EPC tags in supply chain. The EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 standard [48] specifies low-
cost UHF tags which operate in the frequency range of 860-960 MHz and have a read
range of 2-10 metres. This longer range makes UHF tags more easily read in containers
and warehouses than is the case with NFC tags. Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags
are typically deployed in supply chain management systems for automated inventory
checks. The EPC is a 96-bit identifier stored in the EPC tag which helps to identify
each tagged product uniquely.
In this work, EPC tags are used in conjunction with NFC tags to cover the complete
journey of a tagged product from manufacturer to end-user/customer. A hierarchical
anti-counterfeit mechanism using EPC tags is discussed in Chapter 6 while this proposal
provides counterfeit detection at customer level.
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7.3 Existing Work
EPC tags can be used as a tool for anti-counterfeiting [130] as already discussed in
detail in Section 6.2. Using unique serial numbers (refer to Section 6.2.1), these numbers
should be distributed to individual customers to counter counterfeiting. However, there
are many overhead and also some privacy concerns associated with this approach.
Therefore this approach is not suitable for customer-level anti-counterfeit mechanism.
Another anti-counterfeiting approach is based on cryptography (refer to Section 6.2.2).
In this approach, each tag contains a secret value, knowledge of which is established
by the reader in an authentication proof. This approach may be based on symmet-
ric key or asymmetric key cryptography. The BRIDGE project [83] analyzed various
anti-counterfeiting approaches based on RFID tags. This work analyzed the secure dis-
tribution and management of secret keys in a symmetric key anti-counterfeiting frame-
work, and showed that it results in ten times more communication and computational
overheads than in a track-and-trace anti-counterfeiting system. Anti-counterfeiting
approach based on cryptography can be categorized into two main categories as also
described in Section 5.1; Off-line and On-line. In a supply chain, it is very unlikely
that the login credentials are provided to a customer to access the database in order
to verify the authenticity a product. This makes former approach more suitable for
product authentication at the customer level.
As observed earlier, one of the major factors in the upsurge in counterfeit products
is online shopping. With the advancement in Internet technology, the volume of online
shopping is growing rapidly. It is not feasible at present to tailor any symmetric key
approach for product authentication to online shopping. The reason is obvious: a cus-
tomer receiving a product through online shopping does not possess an RFID reader to
communicate with the tag attached to the product. Even in the very unlikely scenario
where a customer possesses an RFID compatible reader, the supplier will have to pro-
vide login credentials to access the database. This situation is far from practical. Thus,
product authentication at the customer level remains an open challenge, especially for
the Internet shopping framework.
In contrast to the symmetric key approach, public key cryptography can also be
used to authenticate a product. Considering the limitations of the symmetric key ap-
proach described above, the case for public key cryptography in product authentication
is thus very strong. The main restriction in using on RFID tags, such as EPC tags,
is the limited computational and storage capabilities of these tags. Work to reduce
the computational overheads in public key cryptography is also in progress and var-
ious lightweight public key cryptosystems are being designed. The CRYPTOGPS is
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a light-weight public-key cryptosystem and can be implemented in around 2800 GE
(Gate Equivalent) with a processing time of around 720 cycles [15, 116]. The Rabin
cryptosystem is the first to be implemented in a wireless sensor network in [46]. It takes
about 16,700 GEs to implement 512-bit encryption. This cryptosystem is considered
unsuitable for resource-constrained RFID tags.
Recently, Alex Arbit et al. presented a working implementation of a PKC-based
anti-counterfeiting scheme [2]. They selected WIPR, an ultra-low-power public key
cryptosystem developed by Oren and Feldhofer [104]. WIPR is a lightweight version
of 1024-bit Rabin encryption [46], with a minimal hardware footprint of under 4700
gates. The scheme presented by Alex Arbit et al. is semi-oﬄine, where the verification
and decryption keys are dispatched to the reader using a smart card and the reader is
considered as a secure module for storing these keys.
7.3.1 Alex Arbit et al Anti-Counterfeiting Scheme
Alex Arbit et al proposed an anti-counterfeit scheme based on EPC tags and public
key cryptography [2]. Their scheme is described in Figure 7.1. The figure represents
the various entities involved in the anti-counterfeiting scheme. The scheme consists of
the following sequence of operations.
• Step 1: The scheme is initiated by the tag integrator (TI), who wishes to deploy
anti-counterfeiting technology in EPC tags. It creates two public-private key
pairs: 1) a private signing key KS , together with its pubic verification key KV , 2)
and a public encryption key KE with its private decryption key KD. The signing
key KS is never disclosed to any entity of the scheme. The TI generates a list of
tag identifiers (TIDs) and signs each TID with the key KS . He then sends the
list of signed TIDs to the tag manufacturer along with the encryption key KE .
Since the tag manufacturer lacks KS , he is unable to generate arbitrary signed
TIDs, thus ensuring the integrity of the TIDs.
• Step 2: The tag manufacturer produces and deploys the tags, each with an
individually signed TID from the list along with the public key KE .
• Step 3: The reader receives KD and KV from the TI. Once these keys are
delivered to the reader, the system can operate in an oﬄine mode. The reader
then carries out a challenge-response protocol to determine that the tag possesses
a valid, signed TID.
This is a semi-oﬄine scheme as it requires an initial key distribution mechanism
to distribute keys to readers through some secure channel. The authors suggests dis-
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tributing keys through a secure module such as a smart card.
Figure 7.1: Alex et al Anti-Counterfeiting Scheme
7.3.2 Analysis of Existing Scheme
There are several weaknesses highlighted in this scheme.
• The scheme is semi-oﬄine where the reader stores KV and KD. This puts a limit
on its utility for product authentication at customer level, as it is infeasible to
communicate KD to each customer.
• KV and KD have to be delivered to a reader through some secure channel such as
a smart card. Since the same set of keys are distributed to each reader, this results
in a single point of failure where the loss of a single smart card will compromise
the entire system. Moreover, if a single retailer is dishonest, he can break the
entire system as all the readers use the same set of keys KV and KD.
• The authors have not discussed the storage location and accessibility of KE inside
an EPC tag. If KE is stored at an accessible location, an attacker can make a
successful counterfeit tag by simply copying all the content of the EPC tag,
including KE , to a counterfeit tag. If KE is stored at some inaccessible location
inside the EPC tag, it can prevent tag cloning, but still the scheme is prone to
single point of failure. Since KE is identical in each tag, it only needs an adversary
to attack a single tag to compromise the entire system.
• Bypass Attack. The scheme is prone to a “Bypass” attack where the anti-
counterfeiting protocol is circumvented in a counterfeit tag in the following way.
The scheme is designed to handle both WIPR-modified and standard EPC tags.
During the handshake protocol between a reader and an EPC tag, the tag re-
sponds with an indication of being WIPR modified or not. This is achieved by
the modified tag sending a special WIPR EPC message to the reader instead
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of the actual EPC value according to the standard (see Figure 4 in [2]). The
special WIPR message acts as a flag to the reader to execute the anti-counterfeit
protocol.
The scheme does not provide integrity protection to the special WIPR EPC mes-
sage contents and so alterations to this message may not be detected. An attacker
just needs to replace the message with the actual EPC value in the counterfeit
tag, thereby making the tag claim to follow standard EPC protocol. On receipt
of the actual EPC value from a counterfeit tag, the reader does not execute the
anti-counterfeiting protocol, instead assuming the tag to be unmodified as the
flag (the special WIPR message) is not received from the tag. Thus, the anti-
counterfeit protocol is bypassed and the counterfeit tag remains undetected. Of
course, if the reader knows the TID belongs to a tag which follows the WIPR
modified protocol, then the counterfeit should be detected.
7.4 Proposed scheme
In this section, we propose our counterfeit detection scheme that uses RFID technology.
This scheme is a modified version of the Alex Arbit et al. [2] scheme. We use an NFC
tag in addition to EPC tag, thereby providing a product authentication mechanism at
the customer level.
NFC technology is used mainly for two reasons. Firstly, this technology can support
public key cryptography on tags and, secondly, it is available on mobile phones enabling
them to act as RFID readers. The former supports our scheme in an oﬄine mode where
a connection to the supplier’s database is no longer required. The latter helps extend
the authentication scheme to the customer, where a customer uses his mobile phone to
authenticate a product.
7.4.1 Initialization Phase
Our proposed anti-counterfeit scheme is executed in two phases; the first, namely ini-
tialization, being illustrated in Figure 7.2. This phase is initiated from the production
line where a serial number and an EPC are allocated to the product. The serial number,
EPC and the product specification are communicated to TI. Meanwhile, the product
is dispatched to the tag embedding department.
On receipt of the information from the production line, the TI generates a pub-
lic/private key pair (Kp,Ks). This pair is unique for each tagged product item. The
TI must be a secure platform as it is responsible for the generation of anti-counterfeit
keys. It stores the EPC in an EPC tag and forms a string S1 defined by
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Figure 7.2: Initialization Phase of Proposed Scheme.
S1=EPC‖Product Specs‖S/N‖Kp.
The TI digitally signs this string S1 with its signing key Ksign and stores the string
along with its signature on the NFC tag. The signature on the tag is stored as a ‘Sig-
nature Record’ according to the NFC Forum’s Signature Record Type Definition [100].
According to this specification, the signature record consists of a digital signature along
with a digital certificate containing the corresponding verification key Kver. S1 and its
signature are stored at a memory location accessible to any NFC reader. However, the
TI also stores the secret key Ks inside the tag but at a secure location. This location
of Ks is only accessible to the tag’s processor and is therefore inaccessible to a reader.
The corresponding public key Kp is part of S1, and therefore accessible to any NFC
reader. After storing the relevant information on both tags, the TI configures both
tags as write protected and dispatches them to the Tag Embedding department.
On receipt of the tags from the TI, the tag embedding department embeds both
tags on the product. Since the tags are physically embedded we shall assume that any
attempt to remove the tags will destroy them. After embedding the tags, the products
are shipped to the supply line, from whence they may be delivered to a department
store or direct to a customer through online shopping.
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7.4.2 Verification Phase
This phase is executed by the verifier on receipt of the product. Since this is an of-
fline scheme, the verifier does not require any connection to the supplier’s database.
Therefore the verifier may be a customer, a warehouse employee, a member of law
enforcement or, indeed, any individual wishing to authenticate the product. The veri-
fication phase is executed in two phases as shown in Figure 7.3. The first is visual and
the second is cryptographic. The visual verification process is executed as follows:
• The customer checks the claimed identity of the product itself and the integrity of
the tag which should be bound to the product item in a tamper-evident manner.
• The verifier places his mobile phone on the NFC tag to read its contents. The
accessible data on the NFC tag (string S1 and corresponding signature) is com-
municated to the mobile phone.
• The mobile phone verifies the signature. A successful verification is an indication
that the string S1 is legitimate.
• The mobile phone displays the product specification and its serial number to the
customer.
• The customer checks the two product descriptions match each other.
In the case of a successful visual verification, the customer should initiate the second
phase of product verification, which is a cryptographic challenge-response protocol:
• The mobile phone sends a random challenge r to the NFC tag.
• The tag signs r with the secret key Ks and returns the result sign(r) to the mobile
phone.
• The mobile phone verifies the signature using the corresponding verification key
Kp which it knows from S1.
A successful verification is a strong indication of a genuine product, as a counterfeit
tag lacks the signing key Ks and so cannot compute a valid signature on r.
7.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the proposed scheme from various angles. Our scheme
addresses category 2 and 3 of counterfeits as mentioned in Section 7.1.1. Categories
1 and 4 are not a focus of our work since, in the former case, the products are being
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Figure 7.3: Product Verification Phase at Customer Level.
identified by the customers as counterfeits and, in the latter, can be countered with an
appropriate quality control. Categories 2 and 3 are critical as the customer is not aware
of the legitimacy of the product. Since our scheme is designed to detect counterfeits
at the customer level, it provides a tool for customers to determine the legitimacy of
a product. We also carried out a formal analysis of suggested scheme as shown in
Appendix E.
7.5.1 Detection of Cat 2 Counterfeits
In the case of category 2 counterfeits where the original product is reverse engineered,
the NFC tag attached to the original product cannot be reverse engineered, i.e., the
secret data on the NFC tag cannot be copied as explained in Section 7.5.4. A cus-
tomer can therefore determine the illegitimacy of a reverse-engineered product by the
unsuccessful verification of the data on the NFC tag.
7.5.2 Detection of Cat 3 Counterfeits
In our scheme, the TI is responsible for generating and storing the secret keys on the
NFC tags. The tags are then embedded on the product by another department termed
the ‘Tag Embedding Department’. In the case of out-sourced manufacturers, the prod-
uct manufacturing and tag embedding are done by the out-sourced manufacturer. The
TI remains a part of the genuine owner. The genuine owner provides NFC and EPC
tags to the out-sourced manufacturer only in same quantity as specified in the contract.
If an out-sourced manufacturer is dishonest and produces more than the quantity men-
tioned in the contract (category 3 counterfeits), he will have to produce the product
either without the NFC tag or with a fake NFC tag. This counterfeit product is then
detected by the customer because making a fake NFC tag is not feasible (explained in
Section 7.5.4). Thus, our scheme helps in the detection of category 3 counterfeits at
customer level.
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7.5.3 Justification for Two RFID Tags
We use two types of tags in our scheme, an EPC tag and an NFC tag. Although both are
RFID tags, they have very different characteristics. The main difference is the operating
frequency: EPC tags operate at 860-960 MHz whereas NFC tags operate at 13.56 MHz
frequency band. The range is consequently different in the two tags. EPC tags can be
read from 2 to 10 meters whereas NFC tags have a very short communication range of no
more than approximately 4 centimeters. This property makes only the EPC tag suitable
for countering counterfeits in the supply chain management as explained in Chapter 6.
Since EPC tags are already deployed in the market for supply chain management,
we use EPC tags in our scheme in order to maintain the backward compatibility and
normal supply chain needs.
NFC tags are used because of two main requirements that cannot be fulfilled by
EPC tags. Firstly, EPC tags are very resource constrained when compared to NFC tags:
EPC tags have very limited computational power and much less memory, whereas NFC
tags, specially NFC Type-4 tags, are much more powerful. Since our scheme is based
on public key cryptography, where the tag has to perform extensive computation, we
need a reasonably resourced tag. Secondly, our scheme needs to provide authentication
at the customer level. Without an NFC tag, this would require every customer to be
equipped with a UHF EPC tag reader, which is far from practical. The issue is resolved
with the inclusion of the NFC tag, as the customer’s mobile phone can act as a reader
for the tag.
7.5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze our scheme from the security perspective. The goal of an
attacker is to develop a cloned tag or a tag with a valid signature. To develop a cloned
tag, the attacker must know the private key Ks of the original tag. This key is stored
at an inaccessible location in the tag’s memory and so it is normally secure from the
attacker. The alternative solution open to an attacker with a cloned tag is to replace
the legitimate public key Kp with the attacker’s public key K
′
p in S1 and store the
corresponding private key K ′s in the tag. However, this is not possible as the legitimate
Kp is digitally signed (it is in a digital certificate) so that any alteration will invalidate
the signature. Of course, the verifier must have a trusted source for the certificate’s
public key in order not to be duped.
In case an attacker spends time and money to reverse engineer a single tag and
recover its private key Ks, it will not affect the entire system as the pair Ks,Kp is
unique to each tag. The tags will have few counter-measures to side channel analysis,
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which will be a significant threat in some markets. However, this will avoid a single
point of failure as experienced in the Alex et al scheme.
Our scheme is resistant to the bypass attack. The existence of Kp in S1 is an
indication that the tag is equipped with the anti-cloning feature. This key can neither
be removed nor altered as it is digitally signed. The user’s application on the mobile
phone, once it has detected Kp, will execute the anti-counterfeiting protocol, thereby
resisting the bypass attack.
In addition to cryptographic authentication, our scheme also provides visual prod-
uct authentication. After scanning the NFC tag, the product specification and product
serial number is visually displayed on the user’s mobile phone display. The user can
visually check and verify the information from the product or product packaging. Need-
less to say, there are many other sources of compromise. For example, the NFC tag
could just return a QR code which connects the customer’s phone to the attacker’s
website and displays the expected protocol output and the verification data for the
counterfeit product. Alternatively, the merchant may direct customers who lack the
verification app to the attacker’s website to download a compromised app that confirms
the authenticity of any product.
The tags have to be tamper-evident. This is to ensure that they cannot be re-
used on counterfeit products. If the tag were to contain the URL for registering the
product under the manufacturer’s guarantee, customers could be encouraged by their
app to register, the manufacturer could check its database for duplicate registrations
that would flag a clone, and the manufacturer could advise the customer if there were
such a problem.
One critical factor in securing the system is the physical location of the NFC tag in
the product. This is an industry specific decision and requires careful consideration. It
is assumed that the tags are physically embedded on the main assembly of the product
and not on casing/packing or on any easily replaceable component of the product, very
much in the same way as a watermark or hologram is an integral part of the item it
is protecting. As in the latter case, an attacker just needs to place the tag embedded
component from a legitimate product into the counterfeit product.
7.5.5 Economic Analysis
We use our existing analysis as discussed in Section 6.4.8 to determine the profit per
unit which provides us with benefits of using this scheme. The percentage p of coun-
terfeit products depends on various factors like brand, geographical location, in-store
or on-line, etc. It is difficult to find an exact value of p for a specific brand as the
counterfeit products of categories 2, 3 and 4 are indistinguishable. Fortunately, the
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surveys mentioned in Section 7.1 regarding counterfeit products on eBay are only mea-
suring a fraction of the total market for the goods in question – although this may
change. Assuming the price of implementing RFID tags with the required infrastruc-
ture is $2/unit, and assuming p as 7% in worst case scenario, (which is an estimate
by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC)) [58]), our scheme is suitable for those businesses where the profit/unit ∆
is greater than $28.50, i.e., around $30. This is a very rough estimate as it is based on
very simple assumptions. Of course, with higher values of p, the profit/unit threshold
at which the NFC RFID scheme becomes cost effective decreases. This means that it
becomes suitable for more businesses.
7.6 Summary
This chapter presents an RFID based anti-counterfeiting scheme at the customer level.
There are two main constraints related to this authentication level. Firstly, the indi-
vidual customer cannot afford to keep an RFID reader to authenticate a product; and
secondly, customers cannot be provided with access to the supplier’s database because
of intellectual property rights and communication overheads. We addressed both these
constraints by using NFC technology: an NFC tag is used along with an EPC tag
for customer level authentication on the reasonable assumption that most individuals
will carry an NFC-enabled mobile phone in the near future. We provided a dual layer
verification mechanism to a customer. In the first phase of verification, the product
specifications are displayed to the customer on his mobile phone for visual verification
of the actual product. After successful verification, a cryptographic challenge-response
protocol is executed to authenticate the product. Our proposal is based on certificate-
based public key cryptography and successfully detects the counterfeit products.
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Chapter 8
A Robust Ownership Transfer
Scheme
This chapter provides a robust scheme of transferring ownership of a tag
in RFID systems. The requirement of ownership and associated terminol-
ogy are presented in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 carries out a literature survey
of existing ownership transfer schemes, and highlights their weaknesses and
limitations. Section 8.3 elaborates our proposed scheme for ownership trans-
fer. Section 8.4 analyzes our proposed scheme with respect to the necessary
properties.
8.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.1 and 2.1, RFID tags are small microchips attached to physi-
cal objects such as medicine bottles, car keys or smart home appliances, etc. Tags bears
a unique serial number linked to useful information related to the object, such as iden-
tification, manufacturer, ingredients, expiry date, lot numbers, location, environment
and other sensitive data such as medical history, credit card numbers and biometric
information.
The purpose of using an RFID system is to enable a user to interact with a tagged
object remotely using a compatible reader. The interaction between a user and a tag
normally involves reading the tag content. When an RFID tag is queried by a reader,
the tag transmits a unique serial number which is linked to the information about the
tagged product. If a tag transmits this serial number in the clear, anyone can eavesdrop
this as the communication between a reader and a tag uses radio waves. This raises
serious risks such as cloning a tag, impersonation, and tracking a tag holder, etc.
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Therefore this information should be sent encrypted using a secret key shared with a
tag-reading entity.
There are many scenarios where tagged objects are physically transferred between
different users who require access to the tag content. Examples include transfer of
a tagged file of a patient’s medical history between hospitals and supply of products
across different geographic locations, etc. This process requires an old user to transfer
the shared secret key to a new user in order to enable interaction with the tag attached
to the transferred object. However there are some security and privacy concerns associ-
ated with transfer of a secret key between different users. If this transfer only involves
transferring the shared secret key, the old user could retain a copy of the secret key
and thus jeopardize the new user’s security and privacy by, for example, tracking loca-
tion, tracing transactions, changing content, cloning or blocking the tag’s functionality.
Similarly a new user, while tracing back transactions of the tag with an old user, might
learn the latter’s previous location information. Therefore, there is a need for a secure
process for such transfer.
8.1.1 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we propose a robust scheme for transferring a secret key between old
and new users. We call this scheme robust because it is not only secure but also provides
additional properties, as will be explained in Section 8.3.1. We also overcome flaws and
limitations in existing proposals. We first define the following important terminology:
• Owner. An owner of a tag (tagged product) is an entity who is able to interact
with the tag using a shared secret key.
• Ownership Transfer. The process of transferring the shared secret key to a
new owner in order to enable the new owner to interact with the transferred tag.
• Secure Ownership Transfer. A secure ownership transfer scheme is a process
of transferring the shared secret key of a physically transferred tag to a new owner
so that only the new owner can interact, identify and modify the tag’s content,
and also transfer the ownership to the next owner if required. This process should
meet the following requirements:
1. Old Owner’s Security. The new owner (and the adversary) do not learn
the old owner’s secret key.
2. New Owner’s Security. The old owner (and the adversary) do not learn
the new owner’s secret key.
124
8.2. Existing Work 8. A Robust Ownership Transfer Scheme
8.2 Existing Work
There are several ownership transfer schemes proposed in the previous literature. How-
ever existing schemes have a number of drawbacks and limitations, as we shall now
discuss.
8.2.1 Ownership Transfer without Old Owner’s Security
In this section, we discuss proposed schemes where the secret key of the old owner
is revealed. Ownership transfer is first discussed explicitly in [98]. In this work, a
trusted center controls the owner(s) who can interact with the tag based on an access
policy which uses a counter value in the tag. With each access by some owner, the
counter value increments until it reaches a maximum value. After that the owner’s
access expires and it can no longer interact with the tag. However, once temporary
access has already been delegated to some owner, the ownership cannot be transferred
as this access cannot be revoked until the access expires (the tag’s counter reaches its
maximum value).
To deal with such a scenario, two methods are proposed. In the first method, the
new owner increments the tag’s counter by continuously querying it until the ownership
of the previous owner has expired. This method does not meet the requirements of
secure ownership transfer as the new owner is given the same pseudonym as the old
owner to interact with the tag while the old owner can still interact with the tag until
the expiry of its own access. In the second method, the new owner establishes mutual
authentication with the tag to send it a counter value which eventually expires the
validity of the old owner. The details of how this mutual authentication is established
and how the new owner can write into the tag’s memory are not clearly explained.
Similarly, two schemes are presented in [126] for ownership transfer. The first
scheme involves a trusted third party (TTP). The old owner transmits its key Kold
to the new owner. The new owner generates a new key Knew and sends both keys
(Kold and Knew) to the TTP. The TTP shares a key KTTP with the tag and uses it
to encrypt both the old and the new keys (EKTTP (Kold||Knew)). The TTP then sends
this ciphertext to the new owner which forwards it to the tag. The tag decrypts this
ciphertext, checks the validity of Kold and if successful updates from Kold to Knew.
This scheme has significant drawbacks because the old owner sends its private key
Kold directly to the new owner. The author suggests that the old owner could change
its key Kold to some temporary key before ownership transfer. This raises another
problem where there is no other mechanism to recognize which tag needs ownership
transfer apart from Kold. This requires that the key KTTP shared between the tag
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and the TTP is the same for all tags. This also causes a single point of failure, where
compromise of a single tag breaks down the whole system. Therefore, if the tag has to
validate, and is to be identified by, the old key Kold, then the old owner cannot change
this key by itself prior to ownership transfer without involving the TTP and the tag.
The scheme presented in [42, 43] suggests ownership transfer scheme based on two
keys Kp (shared between the owner and the tag) and Ku (shared between the server
and the tag for update only). The new owner receives NT , NR, fKp(NT ⊕NR), where
NT and NR are random numbers generated by the tag and the old owner respectively
and f is some encryption function, from the tag and forwards it to the server with
an ownership transfer request. The shared secret keys with the tag have already been
transferred to the new owner’s server. The server sends the credentials of the tag to
the new owner along with NT , fKu(NT |δ), which is forwarded to the tag. The tag and
the server then update their keys as Kpnew = Kp⊕NT ⊕ δ, and Kunew = Ku⊕NT ⊕ δ.
The author suggests that this new owner’s server can recover the old credentials for
warranty claims. This reveals the old owner’s secret key to the new owner.
8.2.2 Ownership Transfer without New Owner’s Security
In the scheme proposed in [105], the old owner changes its key to a temporary key
before ownership transfer. It then transmits its temporary key Ktemp and the tag’s
credentials ID to the new owner. The new owner calculates an XOR of the encryption
of the tag’s identifier with the temporary old key and its own new key and sends to
the tag (e = EKtemp(ID) ⊕ EKnew(ID)). The tag thus recovers the encryption of
the tag’s identifier with the new key by again using XOR of this received message
with the identifier encrypted using the temporary key (EKnew(ID) = EKtemp(ID)⊕ e).
However, this scheme has a major drawback because the old owner has knowledge of
the encrypted identifier and can thus recover this new encrypted identifier easily from
the eavesdropped message between the new owner and the tag. Furthermore, this
scheme is vulnerable to attacks, including traceability and de-synchronization (details
in [69,129,141]).
The de-synchronization and traceability attacks on this scheme [105] are also given
in [85], where the author presents a countermeasure by adding another message for
integrity checking the message sent by the new owner for key update. Moreover, the
author proposed that the database server generates a new key for the new owner. The
encrypted identifier with the old key is hashed, XOR-ed with the encrypted identifier
with the new key and sent to the tag (e = H(EKold(ID))⊕EKnew(ID)). Another mes-
sage is sent with this message to determine the legitimacy of the key update message
(m = H(EKold(ID)||e||s), where s is a random number earlier generated and transmit-
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ted by the tag). This additional message avoids de-synchronization. Similarly, hashing
the value of the identifier which is encrypted using the old key (H(EKold(ID))), pro-
vides security to the old owner’s secret key. However, the new owner’s security is still
compromised as previously. Since hashing is public, the old owner can determine the
credentials of the new owner (EKnew(ID) = H(EKold(ID))⊕ e).
In the second proposal [70] without the TTP, the old owner can easily eavesdrop
the nonce NT generated and communicated in clear by the tag. The old owner can
thus calculate N = NR1 ⊕NT . Therefore, this scheme can result in knowledge of the
new key and the new owner’s security is thus compromised.
8.2.3 Ownership Transfer without both Old and New Owner’s Secu-
rity
In a scheme presented in [59], the authors propose sending two messages (m1 =
EKold(ID) ⊕ EKnew(ID) and m2 = H(EKnew(ID) ⊕ r), r). The old owner’s security
is compromised because the new owner can calculate EKold(ID) = m1 ⊕ EKnew(ID),
and the new owner’s security is also compromised because the old owner can calculate
EKnew(ID) = m1 ⊕ EKold(ID). A de-synchronization attack has also been described
against this scheme in [69]. Moreover, the schemes mentioned in [129, 156] have vul-
nerabilities that lead to their compromise (details in [113,141]).
8.2.4 Ownership Transfer with Limitation
There are some ownership transfer schemes which work with some limitations. Such
schemes, and the reasons why these limitations are undesirable, are explained as follows:
• Tag should be in vicinity of a trusted third party (TTP). The scheme mentioned
in [70] suggests two solutions. The first requires the TTP to directly communicate
with the tag, which is not feasible considering the diversity of a tag’s potential
geographic location (similar schemes are mentioned in [158,159]). The tag, whose
ownership is required to be transferred, has to be in physical proximity of the
TTP for this protocol to succeed.
• New owner should update the tag’s secret key in private. In the second scheme
suggested in [126], not involving a TTP, the old owner changes its shared key to
some temporary key Ktemp before ownership transfer and transmits this tempo-
rary key to the new owner. The new owner then sends a query to the tag, the tag
generates a random key Kr in response, and transmits it back to the new owner.
The new owner then encrypts the temporary key sent by the old owner and its
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own new key using the random key generated by the tag (EKr(Ktemp||Knew)).
The tag finally decrypts this to update its key to Knew. The success of this
scheme is based on the assumption that Kr will not be eavesdropped because of
the small range of the backward channel (tag to reader). However, this range can
vary significantly depending on the power of the adversary and the environment.
If Kr is eavesdropped, it can easily compromise the secret keys of both the old
and the new owner (these vulnerabilities are also mentioned in [70]). Similarly,
schemes presented in [20,29,33,39,42,43,88,102,129] suggest that the new owner
should update its secrets on the tag during private communication (outside the
range of the old owner).
8.3 Proposed Ownership Transfer Scheme
In this section, we propose a robust ownership transfer scheme that resolves the fun-
damental flaws and limitations discovered during the review of existing work.
8.3.1 Properties
Our proposed ownership transfer scheme should have the following properties:
• Old and New Owner’s Security. The proposed scheme should ensure that
during and after an ownership transfer is carried out, the secret keys of both
the old and the new owner should not be revealed. After ownership has been
transferred, only the new owner should be able to interact with the tag and
ownership of the old owner should be revoked. Similarly, the new owner should
not be able to trace back any past transaction of the tag with the old owner.
• Old and New Owner’s Proximity. Ownership transfer scheme using a TTP
requires the tag to be read by the TTP for transferring ownership. This results
in limitations to ownership transfer since the tag and the TTP may be at distant
geographic locations. We thus specify that only the old and the new owners are
required to read the tag in its proximity in order to conduct ownership transfer.
• Public Credential Update. Another limitation of many existing schemes is
that update of the tag’s credentials needs to be done in private to achieve se-
curity for the new owner’s secret key. Considering that wireless communication
between reader and tag can easily be eavesdropped, the use of private update is
undesirable. Therefore, we propose that the tag’s credentials can be updated in
public whilst still preserving the secrecy of the new owner’s secret key.
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Additional Properties
In addition to the above properties, we suggest that an ownership transfer scheme
should also offer the following properties:
• Authorization Recovery. This ensures that only the server (a trusted entity)
can temporarily recover ownership (authorization to access the tag) on behalf of
the old owner in order to facilitate after-sales/warranty-claim services without
compromising the security of the old owner’s secret key.
• Tag Assurance. This ensures that the new owner can determine the authenticity
of a tag, i.e., the tag’s credentials are the same as those claimed by the old owner.
• Non-repudiation of Ownership. The old owner is not able to deny its own-
ership of a tag before ownership transfer. Similarly the new owner is not able to
deny that it owns this tag after ownership transfer.
• Conformance to Standard. The ownership transfer scheme designed for a
particular RFID standard should conform with the standard’s operations and
functionality as much as possible.
An ownership transfer scheme offering all of these properties will hereafter be referred
to as being robust.
8.3.2 Overview of Scheme Design
Suppose an old Ownero connected to Servero is transferring ownership of a particular
(item with) Tagk to a new Ownern connected to Servern. The relationship between
different entities involved in setup of an ownership transfer is shown in Figure 8.1.
Servero
Ownero
R1
Rm
Servern
Ownern
R1
Rn
Tagk
Figure 8.1: Relationship between Entities in Ownership Transfer.
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If Servero is the same as Servern then a simplified version of the ownership transfer
scheme can be run. We now give an overview of the proposed ownership transfer scheme
which is illustrated in Figure 8.2:
OwneroServero Tagk Ownern Servern
1
2
3 3
4
5 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1212
13 13
14
Figure 8.2: Ownership Transfer Overview.
1. Ownership Transfer Agreement. Both owners exchange the necessary details
in order to facilitate ownership transfer.
2. Establish Ownership. We confirm that the entity transferring the ownership
is the rightful owner of the tag. This step can be carried out earlier while an
owner is communicating with a tag.
3. Release and Acquire Credentials. Ownero presents the release credentials to
Servero, which shows that it is willing to release its ownership of Tagk. Similarly,
Ownern presents the acquire credentials which indicates that it wants to acquire
the ownership of Tagk.
4. Establish Transfer Credentials. Both Servero and Servern establish transfer
credentials, which are used to carry out the ownership transfer from Ownero to
Ownern.
5. Transfer Credentials. Servero sends the transfer credentials to Ownero, who
presents them to Tagk.
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6. Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. Tagk updates its credentials for trans-
fer and sends an acknowledgment to Ownero.
7. Released Ownership Acknowledgment. Ownero forwards Tagk’s readiness
to transfer along with its own acknowledgment of releasing the ownership to
Servero.
8. Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. Servero sends an acknowledgment to
Servern that Tagk is ready for ownership transfer.
9. Transfer Credentials. Servern sends the transfer credentials to Ownern.
10. Establish Ownership. Since Tagk has already updated its transfer credentials,
Ownern establishes ownership of Tagk using these credentials.
11. Acquired Ownership Acknowledgment. Ownern sends Servern an acknowl-
edgment that it has acquired ownership of Tagk using the transfer credentials.
12. Key Update Credentials. Servern sends key update credentials to Ownern
who forwards it to Tagk for updating the key from transfer to a new private key
known only to Ownern.
13. Key Update Acknowledgment. Tagk updates its ownership credentials to
the new private key and sends an acknowledgment to Ownern, who also forwards
it to Servern.
14. Ownership Transfer Complete Acknowledgment. Finally Servern sends
an acknowledgment to Servero that ownership transfer has been completed suc-
cessfully.
8.3.3 Detailed Design
We now explain the detailed design and operation of our proposed scheme. We make
the following assumptions before explaining our scheme:
• The manufacturer writes a unique secret seed into each tag.
• Each owner of a tag uses a compatible reader to interact with the tag.
• Each owner shares a secret key with its server.
• Each server is a trusted entity which shares a secret key with each corresponding
tag owned by its owners. This key is delegated to the tag’s current owner for
oﬄine authentication.
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• The tag is capable of performing encryption and hashing (EPCC1G2 compliant
tags will support on-tag encryption using the HB-2 algorithm [28]).
The notation used is summarized in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Notation
Notation Description
KSold A shared secret key between the old owner and the tag.
KSnew A shared secret key between the new owner and the tag.
KSso A shared secret key between the old owner and its server.
KSsn A shared secret key between the new owner and its server.
SK A secret session key agreed between both old and new owner’s
servers.
EK(M) Encryption of a message M with key K.
EPCk A tag’s (with index k) static and unique identity.
O An owner’s identifier.
S A server’s identifier.
Access A built-in 32-bit unique access password in each tag.
r A random number generated as a challenge by the server.
RTO A release tag ownership signal.
ATO An acquire tag ownership signal.
ts A current time stamp.
SETOT Set ownership transfer flag in the tag.
RSTOT Reset ownership transfer flag in the tag.
Released A signal to acknowledge that ownership of a tag has been released.
Acquired A signal to acknowledge that ownership of a tag has been acquired.
Updated A signal to acknowledge that the secret key of a tag has been
updated.
s A seed written in the tag by the manufacturer.
Hi(s) The hash value after the ith hashing of seed s.
8.3.4 Tag Ownership Release Phase.
In this phase, Ownero releases ownership of a particular Tagk (with EPCk) so that
Ownern can take over its ownership. Referring to Section 8.3.2, release of tag ownership
is carried out as shown in Figure 8.3 and proceeds as follows:
• Step 1 : Ownership Transfer Agreement. Both Ownero and Ownern ex-
change necessary details in order to facilitate ownership transfer.
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OwneroServero Tagk
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16, Oo
OC
Step 2
RTO,Oo
r, So
RC
Step 3
Servero establishes transfer credentials with Servern. Step 4
TC
r, So, OTC
Step 5
Enters into Access round.
Tag and server update values of Access and KSold to KSTx.
KU
Step 6
KU,ROStep 7
Servero informs Servern to acquire ownership of Tagk. Step 8
Figure 8.3: Tag Ownership Release Phase.
• Step 2 : Establish Ownership. Ownero initiates an EPCC1G2 communi-
cation protocol (see [48]) with Tagk whose ownership needs to be transferred
using shared secret key KSold. This is concluded when Tagk sends OC which has
ownership credentials for Ownero. OC is calculated as follows:
OC = EKSold(RN16, EPCk, Oo). (8.1)
The correct decryption of this message determines that Ownero is an owner of
this tag and can initiate an ownership transfer.
• Step 3 : Release Credentials. Ownero now contacts Servero for releasing
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Tagk’s ownership. This is concluded when Ownero sends RC using its shared
secret key KSso which has release credentials as follows:
RC = EKSso(r||EPCk||Oo||On||So||Sn||ts). (8.2)
The correct decryption of RC determines that a rightful Ownero wants to release
Tagk’s ownership and to transfer it to Ownern connected with Servern.
• Step 4 : Establish Transfer Credentials. After obtaining the details, Servero
then contacts Servern. After establishing a shared key SK, Servero transfers
necessary details to Servern (see Section 8.3.5).
• Step 5 : Transfer Credentials. This ownership transfer key SK is sent to
Ownero by Servero along with details of Tagk (EPCk and its Access password)
as TC which is generated as follows:
TC = EKSso(EPCk||Oo||So||SK||Access||ts). (8.3)
When Ownero obtains the Access password for Tagk, it now can write new
values into the Tagk’s memory by presenting a correct Access password (see [48]).
Ownero now forwards the Servero’s random challenge and identifier (r and So)
along with the transfer credentials as OTC as follows:
OTC = EKSold(EPCk||Oo||Access||SK||SETOT ||ts). (8.4)
• Step 6 : Updates and Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. Tagk, after
checking the correctness of the Access and freshness of ts, sets its ownership flag
and updates its values (assuming the new owner is the (i+ 1)th owner of the tag)
of KSold and Access password as follows:
KSTx = SK ⊕H i+1(s),
Access = Access⊕H i+1(s).
Tagk finally sends an acknowledgment of key update as KU to the Ownero as
follows:
KU = EKSTx(r||EPCk||Oo||So||ts). (8.5)
• Step 7 : Released Ownership Acknowledgment. Since Ownero cannot
decrypt KU (as it cannot calculate KSTx since s is a secret known only to the
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tag and the server), it forwards this acknowledgment KU along with its own
acknowledgment of releasing the tag as RO to Servero, where RO is generated
as follows:
RO = EKSso(Released||Oo||On||ts). (8.6)
• Step 8 : Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. Servero on receiving this
acknowledgment and checking its authenticity informs Servern to take over own-
ership of the Tagk (see Section 8.3.5).
8.3.5 Tag Ownership Transfer Phase.
When Ownero sends the information about Servern (in RC) to its Servero as explained
in Section 8.3.4, the transfer phase starts as shown in Figure 8.4 and the details are as
follows (see Section 8.3.2):
Servero Servern
Key Agreement Protocol to establish SK.
r, STC
SACK
Step 4
Servero awaits acknowledgment of release ownership from Ownero.
Servern calculates KSTx and updates Access.
AACK
Step 8
Servern awaits acknowledgment of acquiring ownership from Ownern.
ACACK
Step 14
Figure 8.4: Tag Ownership Transfer Phase.
• Step 4: Establish Transfer Credentials. Servero contacts Servern. Both
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these servers use a secure key agreement protocol to establish a shared key SK
between them. A new key SK is established between the two servers to achieve
two goals:
– Preserve privacy of Ownero’s private key KSold.
– Facilitate ownership transfer using a shared secret key SK.
Servero then sends a random challenge r and transfers the details required for
ownership transfer to Servern as STC which is calculated as follows:
STC = ESK(EPCk||Access||H i(s)||Oo||ts). (8.7)
Servern responds to the challenge acknowledging that it has received the infor-
mation correctly by sending SACK as follows:
SACK = ESK(r||ts). (8.8)
• Step 8 : Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. Servero now waits for the
acknowledgment (KU , RO) from Ownero (see Section 8.3.4) with regards to the
release of Tagk ownership. Meanwhile, Servern calculates KSTx and updates
the value of Access password as follows:
KSTx = SK ⊕H i+1(s),
Access = Access⊕H i+1(s).
After receiving this release acknowledgment fromOwnero, Servero informs Servern
that the latter can now acquire ownership of Tagk. This acquire acknowledgment
AACK is calculated as follows:
AACK = ESK(ATO||EPCk||Oo||ts). (8.9)
• Step 14 : Ownership Transfer Complete Acknowledgment. Servern
waits until Ownern acquires ownership and update credentials (UACK) of Tagk
(see Section 8.3.6). Servern informs Servero that its Ownern has successfully ac-
quired ownership of Tagk and ownership of Ownero has been revoked by sending
acquire complete acknowledgment as ACACK which is calculated as follows:
ACACK = ESK(Acquired||EPCk||On||ts). (8.10)
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8.3.6 Tag Ownership Acquire Phase.
In this phase, Ownern acquires ownership of a particular Tagk (with EPCK) and
ownership of Ownero is revoked. Servern updates its records by adding the details of
Ownern (On), Tagk whose ownership is acquired (EPCk) and the timing information
(ts). The acquire phase is as shown in Figure 8.5 and the details are as follows:
OwnernServern Tagk
ATO,On
r, Sn
AC
Step 3
Servern establishes transfer credentials with Servero.
Servern awaits ready to transfer acknowledgment from Servero.
Step 4,8
TCStep 9
Query
RN16
ACK = RN16, On
NC
Step 10
AOStep 11
KUC
r, Sn, NKU
Step 12
Enters into Access round.
Tag and server update values of Access and KSold to KSnew.
KU
KU,UACK
Step 13
Servern informs Servero that Ownern has acquired the ownership. Step 14
Figure 8.5: Tag Ownership Acquire Phase.
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• Step 1 : Ownership Transfer Agreement. Ownero is transferring ownership
of a particular item tagged with Tagk to a new Ownern. Both owners exchange
necessary information in order to facilitate ownership transfer.
• Step 3 : Acquire Credentials. Ownern contacts its Servern for acquiring
Tagk’s ownership using its shared secret key KSsn. This is concluded by sending
AC as follows:
AC = EKSsn(r||Tagk||On||Oo||Sn||So||ts). (8.11)
The correct decryption of AC determines that a legitimate Ownern wants to
acquire Tagk’s ownership from Ownero connected with Servero (Tagk used in
the message is the public information about tagged item).
• Step 4 : Establish Transfer Credentials. After receiving the public details
of Tagk and Ownero (Oo), Servern approaches (if it has not already been ap-
proached as explained in Section 8.3.4) Servero for acquiring the necessary details
(see Section 8.3.5) for ownership transfer.
• Step 8 : Ready to Transfer Acknowledgment. After Servero receives
acknowledgment from Ownero that ownership of Tagk has been release (see
Section 8.3.4), it informs Servern that the tag can now be acquired (see Sec-
tion 8.3.5).
• Step 9 : Transfer Credentials. After receiving acknowledgment from Servero
and getting necessary details of Tagk (EPCk), Servern forwards the transfer key
KSTx toOwnern in transfer credentials message TC which is generated as follows:
TC = EKSsn(EPCk||On||Sn||KSTx||ts). (8.12)
• Step 10 : Establish Ownership. Ownern now initiates a standard commu-
nication protocol (see [48]) with Tagk. This is concluded when Tagk sends its
EPCk encrypted using the transfer key KSTx as follows:
NC = EKSTx(RN16||EPCk||On). (8.13)
Correct decryption of this message ensures tag assurance to Ownern and its
ownership.
• Step 11 : Acquired Ownership Acknowledgment. Ownern sends the ac-
knowledgment to its Servern that it has acquired ownership of Tagk from pre-
vious Ownero by sending an acquired ownership acknowledgment message AO
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generated as follows:
AO = EKSsn(Acquired||EPCk||On||Oo||Sn||ts). (8.14)
• Step 12 : Key Update Credentials. Servern now transfers Access password
and new private key KSnew to Ownern in message KUC which is calculated as
follows:
KUC = EKSsn(EPCk||On||Sn||KSnew||Access||ts). (8.15)
After obtaining the Access password for Tagk, Ownern forwards KSnew to Tagk
and resets the ownership transfer flag (RSTOT ) by sending a message NKU as
follows:
NKU = EKSTx(EPCk||On||Access||KSnew||RSTOT ||ts). (8.16)
• Step 13 : Update and Key Update Acknowledgment. After receiving the
correct credentials, Tagk resets its ownership flag, replaces the value of KSTx
with KSnew and updates its Access password as follows:
Access = Access⊕H i+2(s).
An acknowledgment of key update (KU) is finally sent to Ownern as follows:
KU = EKSnew(r||EPCk||On||Sn||ts). (8.17)
KSnew is written into the tag’s memory for two reasons:
– The ownership of Ownero is revoked.
– Ownern’s private key KSnew is unknown to Ownero.
Ownern acknowledges Servern about the update by sending KU and its own
acknowledgment UACK as follows:
UACK = EKSsn(Updated||On||Oo||ts). (8.18)
• Step 14 : Ownership Transfer Complete Acknowledgment. Finally
Servern informs Servero that Ownern has taken over the ownership of the Tagk
and Ownero’s ownership has been revoked (see Section 8.3.5).
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8.4 Analysis
We now carry out an analysis of our proposed robust ownership transfer scheme with
respect to the desired properties mentioned in Section 8.3.1. A formal analysis of
release and acquire phases for any possible attacks is carried out using CasperFDR in
Appendix F.
8.4.1 Old and New Owner’s Security
An ownership transfer scheme should be able to change the ownership of a particular
tag. It is important that ownership is only transferred by an old owner. In our proposed
scheme Ownero therefore runs a standard protocol (see [48]) with Tagk to determine its
ownership with respect to KSold. Servero also determines whether Ownero, requesting
the ownership transfer, has ownership or not. Once ownership is determined, Servero
sends the shared secret key SK. This provides privacy to Ownero’s own private key
KSold delegated by Servero. Similarly, Servern finally delegates KSnew to Ownern to
ensure the new ownership of Tagk. During ownership transfer, Tagk updates its shared
secret key as follows:
• Secret key from KSold to KSTx during release and transfer.
• Secret key from KSTx to KSnew during transfer and acquire.
This ensures secure ownership to both Ownero and Ownern.
Old Owner’s Security
Ownero has its own private shared key KSold with Tagk. To achieve old owner’s
security, this private key should not be exposed to Ownern. A temporary key KSTx
derived from SK and secret seed s is used for ownership transfer. If this transfer key
is compromised during ownership transfer, it cannot relate to KSold. Thus our scheme
provides security for the previous Ownero’s transactions.
New Owner’s Security
Since only a trusted server and a genuine tag can calculate H i+1(s) and hence KSTx,
therefore KSnew is never exposed to either Ownero or the adversary eavesdropping
communication. So even if KSTx is compromised at some point, it is independent of
KSnew. Moreover, it is only used during ownership transfer and then discarded.
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8.4.2 Old and New Owner’s Proximity
As discussed in Section 8.2.4, some of the existing schemes based on a TTP require a
tag to communicate directly with a TTP in order to carry out ownership transfer. This
approach is not feasible as a tag and a TTP can be at distant geographic locations. In
our suggested scheme, we use back-end servers as trusted entities. Our scheme transfers
the ownership using compatible readers held by Ownero and Ownern in close proximity
with Tagk and does not require this tag to communicate directly with a server.
8.4.3 Public Credential Update.
Another limitation of some of the existing schemes (see Section 8.2.4) is to update a new
owner’s key in private, i.e., outside the read range of the old owner (and adversary).
We consider this as a limitation since the communication is wireless and can easily
be eavesdropped either outside the range using non-standard equipment, or within
range using stealthy equipment, by an adversary. In our scheme, we suggest that key
update should be secure irrespective of whether an adversary is eavesdropping this
communication. KSnew is transmitted to Tagk in an encrypted message with KSTx
which is unknown to Ownero and transmitted to Ownern securely only after Ownero
has released its ownership of Tagk.
8.4.4 Authorization Recovery
Since the update of a tag’s credentials is only possible by using an Access password
(see [48]), in our scheme Access is transferred to both Ownero and Ownern during
ownership transfer. Once Tagk updates its credentials with respect to Ownero, both
Tagk and Servern update as Access = Access ⊕ H i+1(s) (unknown to Ownero) and
then to Access = Access⊕H i+2(s) (unknown to Ownern). The server thus can revoke
or recover ownership of any owner using this Access password.
8.4.5 Tag Assurance
Since Ownern runs a protocol with Tagk using KSTx before updating the tag’s secret
key to its own private key KSnew, Ownern can determine whether Tagk is the same
as that claimed by Ownero (checked by the correctness of EPCk).
8.4.6 Non-Repudiation of Ownership
During the tag ownership transfer phase as explained in Section 8.3.5, Servero also
transfers the credentials of Ownero and the time when Tagk’s ownership was released,
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and Servern transfers the details of Ownern and the time when ownership of Tagk
was acquired. This data can later be reproduced by servers to ensure non-repudiation
of ownership by any owner.
8.4.7 Conformance to Standard
Our scheme is designed for EPCC1G2 standard compliant RFID system. This standard
uses three basic operations for tag identification [48]. The proposed scheme conforms
with the standard operations as follows:
• Select. This operation is used to select a tag population for inventory and
access operations. A select command can be used a number of times to select a
particular tag population using user-specified criteria. We preserve the standard
select operation.
• Inventory. This operation is carried out for identifying the tags in the selected
tag population. We preserve the standard functionality except that the EPC is
sent encrypted in our suggested scheme (this feature is already in the process of
being incorporated into the EPCC1G2 standard [28]).
• Access. This operation involves reading from/writing to a particular tag’s mem-
ory. Access is granted using the standard Access password unique to each tag.
The following are the additional requirements to be incorporated in the stan-
dard [48]:
• Storage. EPC tags need to store an additional secret key (8 GE/bit for tempo-
rary storage) and a hash value of the seed (3 GE/bit for long term storage). The
new version of this standard [49] also supports storage of secret keys.
• Computation. The computation involves an encryption and a hash function
which is already in the process of incorporation in the standard [28].
• Communication. The proposed scheme uses the standard UHF Air Interface
Protocol as specified in [48]. If a tag is not employing encryption, it can be read
as per the existing standard.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an ownership transfer scheme for RFID systems. A
tag may be required to change its ownership several times during its life time. Our
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proposed scheme overcomes limitations of existing ownership transfer schemes, since the
tag is not required to be physically moved to a different location in order to be read and
we do not need to update the tag’s credentials in private. Finally our scheme is designed
for EPCC1G2 tags but can be customized to fit into other similar environments.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we shall summarize the main contributions of our research.
We shall also discuss the future course of action to further ideas in this
thesis.
9.1 Contributions Summary
In this thesis we have focused our work on addressing security and privacy issues in
low-cost RFID systems. The contributions are summarized as follows:
• Chapter 3. Ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocols (UMAPs) are
designed to provide security and privacy properties to low-cost RFID systems.
These systems consist of cheap tags which have constraints on their resources
(computation, communication and storage). This chapter carries out security
analysis of two such ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocols (SIDR-
FID and DIDRFID) presented in [80]. In SIDRFID (RFID protocol with static
identity), both reader and tag use their respective static identities as shared se-
crets. In DIDRFID (RFID protocol with dynamic identity), reader and tag share
a secret key which is updated along with tag’s identity after every authentica-
tion round. Both these protocols use lightweight and efficient functions such as
XOR and left rotation of bits. However our security analysis helps in highlighting
weaknesses present in both protocols and launching multiple attacks. The salient
features of this work include:
– A passive attack on SIDRFID reveals the hamming weight of secret identi-
ties.
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– A full disclosure active attack on SIDRFID reveals the secret identities used
to provide mutual authentication.
– Traceability and reader impersonation attack are carried out on SIDRFID.
– A passive secret disclosure attack to uniquely determine the shared secret
key is carried out against DIDRFID.
– A traceability attack is launched on DIDRFID.
This work appears in [12].
• Chapter 4. In this chapter, we further carry out analysis of several existing
ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocols (UMAPs). We contribute by
generalizing weaknesses in a number of existing UMAPs and proposing a new
one. The main points of this work include:
– The weaknesses of using triangular functions only to design a UMAP can
result in weaknesses which can be exploited to launch disclosure attacks.
– The use of random nonces for update causes de-synchronization.
– The suggested countermeasures use unreasonable overheads for low-cost
tags.
– Proposal of a new UMAP which addresses the weaknesses highlighted in
earlier schemes.
– A comparative security and performance analysis with other schemes of the
same family.
This work was published in [9].
• Chapter 5. RFID systems are widely used in supply chain management, how-
ever there are many outstanding security and privacy issues which need to be
addressed. This includes preserving privacy of tagged items throughout the
supply chain life-cycle, where a tagged item travels from manufacturer to end-
user/customer. The tag starts its journey in large groups in a supply chain process
and the group size reduces as it reaches the end-user. During this journey, the
tag is read by online readers with known locations inside a secure zone, as well as
oﬄine readers with unknown locations in a potentially insecure zone. When the
tags are in the secure zone in large numbers, the main requirement is fast read
speed. This requirement changes to a need to provide security and privacy once
a tag enters an insecure zone. We present an EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 standard
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compliant [48] online/oﬄine adaptive approach to tag security. This contribution
includes:
– A scheme that achieves high tag read speed when the number of tags is large
and the area is secure (online authentication scheme).
– When the number of tags reduces in size and the area becomes insecure,
the scheme provides the necessary security and privacy properties (oﬄine
authentication scheme).
– This scheme switches between online and oﬄine without user-intervention.
This work was published in [11].
• Chapter 6. Counterfeit items account for around 5-7% of world trade according
to the International Chamber of Commerce [58]. RFID systems automate and
speed up the process of item identification. However these systems can fall victim
to counterfeits if appropriate measures are not taken. A counterfeit item is very
difficult to detect in a supply chain management system. We propose an EPC-
global Class-1 Gen-2 standard compliant [48] hierarchical anti-counterfeit mech-
anism that helps in not only detecting a counterfeit, but also a missing/stolen
item. Features of this contribution include:
– The proposed mechanism uses three layers to verify the legitimacy of a
tagged product.
– Each layer provides a mean for anomaly detection.
– The mechanism is scalable, implementable and also uses efficient key man-
agement.
– It detects not only the counterfeit/stolen items but also identifies the re-
sponsible party for such an anomaly.
– The layered approach grows in complexity only in the event that an anomaly
is detected.
This work was published in [10].
• Chapter 7. E-commerce and online shopping has become widespread. However,
there is also increasing fraud, where counterfeit items are sold to individual cus-
tomers. End-users cannot carry UHF readers to read UHF supply chain tags and
also have no access to a back-end database to verify the authenticity of a product
bought online. We therefore design a customer-level anti-counterfeit framework
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that uses near field communication (NFC) technology in smart phones to detect
counterfeits in a supply chain. The main points of this work are:
– The proposed framework suggests using two tags: one EPC tag for detection
in the supply chain, and one NFC tag for online shopping and customer
verification.
– The customer can then run an authentication protocol with the product
using NFC technology to ascertain the legitimacy of the product.
– The additional cost of using an NFC tag is justified using an economic
analysis.
This work was published in [125].
• Chapter 8. A tagged product travels to different locations, is read by different
readers, and owned by different entities. When a tag is transferred/sold to another
entity, the relevant secret key should also be transferred in order to facilitate
interaction of the tag with the new owner. However, if this transfer does not
involve updating the key when it reaches a new owner, some concerns arise. An
old owner can still retain a copy of this key or a new owner can have access to
past transactions with the old owner. We propose a robust ownership transfer
process which is not only secure but also achieves additional properties. The
salient points of this contribution include:
– Security is provided to both the old and the new owner’s ownership creden-
tials.
– The proposed scheme overcomes limitations of previous schemes such as use
of a trusted third party and the need to update in private.
9.2 Future Work
There is potential for further research into topics discussed in the thesis.
• Implementation Results. The contributions given in this thesis are theoretical
and formally analyzed on paper. Future work could involve practical implementa-
tion of suggested schemes. Conventional RFID tags perform simple, hard-coded
computations using the harvested power from readers. It is possible to use com-
putational RFID (CRFID) tags to carry out experimental work. CRFIDs have
microcontrollers, power buffers to store the harvested power, sensors, actuators
and non-volatile memory. The following are well-known examples of CRFID tags:
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– WISP. The wireless identification and sensing platform [118] acts as an
emulator for passive EPC tags. It incorporates a microcontroller which can
be programmed to carry out cryptographic computations. This platform is
an open source project developed by Intel Research Seattle.
– UMass Moo. This is developed by the Computer Science Department at
the University of Massachussets, Amherst [157]. It is an improvement to
existing WISP in terms of computation, storage and other related features.
It also emulates a UHF passive RFID tag which can interact with a standard
UHF reader.
Another open source project known as Rifidi [117] is also a good source to simulate
different business processes using RFIDs. It is a complete software simulation
test bed to check the effects of different environments and thus helps in design
decisions.
• Proposing Lightweight Cryptographic Primitives. Parts 3 and 4 of the the-
sis have looked into RFID applications using existing lightweight cryptographic
primitives. Further research could analyze these lightweight primitives. This may
also include proposing new lightweight ciphers and other cryptographic primitives
for low-cost RFID systems. The list of existing lightweight encryption algorithms
considered fit for use in RFIDs is shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1: Lightweight Encryption Algorithms Comparison
Algorithm Key Size (bits) Area (GE) Throughput
(clocks/bit)
HB2 [34] 128 2159 0.25
Grain-128 [53] 128 1857 1
Trivium [25] 128 2599 1
Present-80 [14] 80 1561 0.5
Present-128 [14] 128 2681 0.5
Katan32 [26] 80 462 8
Katan48 [26] 80 588 5.31
Katan64 [26] 80 1054 3.98
Iceberg [131] 128 7732 0.25
AES-128 [37] 128 3400 1.25
• Issues in High-Cost Tags. As discussed in Section 1.2 and shown in Table 1.1,
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high-cost tags can support standard cryptographic primitives including public
key cryptography. The well-known standard for high-cost tags is ISO/IEC 14443.
Applications include e-passports, oyster card and NFC technology, to name a few.
Though high-cost tags have lesser resource constraints, there is still potential for
weaknesses in their implementation. Security and privacy issues in e-passports
have been discussed in [64]. Similarly, the evolution of transportation ticket
systems and fraud controls have been discussed at length in [96] and NFC security
and privacy issues are still evolving. Therefore, analysis of the protocols suggested
for high-cost tags can be carried out in future, since these tags are used in sensitive
applications.
• Other Attacks. Some attacks are mostly assumed to be out of scope of this
research, such as physical tampering and relay attacks. These attacks may be con-
sidered in more detail in future work. Relay attack [97] is a powerful adversarial
attack which uses the ghost-leech model [71]. The ghost device impersonates as
a genuine tag and leech as a genuine reader. The information exchanged between
a legitimate tag and a legitimate reader is thus relayed using ghost-leech model.
Both the communicating parties are duped to think that they are communicating
within each other’s vicinity. A lot of research material can be found on practi-
cal relay attacks [44, 51]. There are some countermeasures to resist such attacks
including distance bounding protocols [35, 73, 78], time-out assumptions, on/off
button on cards [150], metallic sleeves [145], multi-factor authentication [147] and
context-aware communication [23].
• EPC Class-1 Gen-2 Version 2.2.0. Recently a new version of the standard [49]
has been released in November, 2013. In this new standard, a tag may support
one or more cryptographic suites. The two security commands Challenge and
Authenticate include a cryptographic suite indicator (CSI) field. The four most
significant bits represent the suite assigning authority and the four least signifi-
cant bits represent one of the sixteen cryptographic suite assigned. For example,
CSI = 000000002 is the first and CSI = 000000012 is the second suite that
ISO/IEC 29167 may assign. The new security commands include Challenge dur-
ing Select and Authenticate, AuthComm, SecureComm, KeyUpdate, Untraceable
as Access commands. Since the UHF air interface protocol is the same as before
and all these security commands are also optional, our work (on the previous
Version 1.2.0) has not been affected by the new standard. A detailed security
analysis of this new standard and its features can also be a related part of future
work.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 A short History of RFID Systems
This section presents a historical perspective of the development of RFID systems in
use today.
• 1846-1930. RFID history dates back to 1846, when Michael Faraday, an English
experimentalist, proposed electromagnetic energy using light and radio waves.
James Clerk Maxwell, a Scottish physicist, published his electromagnetic theory
in 1864. Heinrich Rudolf Hertz, a German physicist, experimentally proved that
radio waves can be transmitted and received in 1887. In the experiment he
generated a spark using energy and saw a similar spark a little distance away
with no wires or connections. This experiment was quickly followed by Aleksander
Popov in Russia. It was Marconi who actually shaped this energy and transferred
data over it. Guglielmo Marconi transmitted radio signals across the Atlantic in
1901. Morse code were sent using these radio waves and the first voice broadcast
was carried out in 1906 by Ernst F.W. Alexanderson. This marks the beginning
of modern radio communications [76].
• 1930-1950. The general belief is that first application of RFID technology can
be traced back to World War II. In 1935, Sir Robert Alexander Watson Watt, a
Scottish physicist, discovered the use of radar to signal approaching aircraft. The
British, Germans, Japanese and Americans were using this radar, however there
was no information that could accurately identify whether an approaching aircraft
is a friend or foe. The first passive RFID system was when the Germans devised
a method of changing radio signals by rolling their aircraft and thus identifying
themselves to the radar. The first active RFID system was when the British
invented the first identify friend or foe (IFF) system which, on receiving a signal
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from the radar, broadcast a signal back to identify itself [123]. The first public
appearance of RFID systems can be traced back to Harry Stockman’s famous
paper Communications by means of Reflected Power in 1948 [133].
• 1950-1970. Famous work [52, 119, 143] carried out during this period was a
prelude to RFID explosion in industry. Research and experimentation started
to use RFID technology into different applications. As a result electronic article
surveillance (EAS) was developed to identify electronic articles using 1-bit tags.
• 1970-1990. The first US patent for an active RFID tag was claimed by Mario W.
Cardullo on January 23, 1973 and first patent for a passive RFID tag was claimed
by Charles Walton, a California entrepreneur, in the same year, who developed a
passive transponder used to unlock a door without a key [123]. More applications
were developed including nuclear material and cows tracking, and access token
using low frequency (LF 125 kHz) and high frequency (HF 13.56MHz).
• 1990-2003. Ultra high frequency (UHF 860-960MHz) tags were developed. Stan-
dardization of RFID system started during this period and most notable achieve-
ment of this technology was its use in supply chain management systems.
• 2003-till date. RFID system’s rapid development is being challenged by security
and privacy issues. Tag supporting cryptography are being developed.
A.2 RFID Standards
Following is the comprehensive list of standards to best of knowledge:
• ISO 11784 : Radio frequency identification of animals (code structure)
• ISO 11785 : Radio frequency identification of animals (technical concept)
• ISO 14223 : Specifies the air interface between the transceiver and the advanced
transponder used in the radio frequency identification of animals under the con-
dition of full upward compatibility according to ISO 11784 and ISO 11785.
• ISO/IEC 14443 : Identification cards – Contact-less integrated circuit(s) cards –
Proximity cards
– Part 1 : Physical characteristics
– Part 2 : Radio frequency power and signal interface
– Part 3 : Initialization and anti-collision
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– Part 4 : Transmission protocol
• ISO/IEC 15434 : Transfer Syntax for High Capacity ADC Media
• ISO/IEC 15459 : Unique identifier for transport units
– Part 1 : Unique identification of transport units
– Part 2 : Registration procedures
– Part 3 : Common rules for unique identification
– Part 4 : Unique item identification for supply chain management
– Part 5 : Unique Identification of Returnable Transport Items (RTIs)
– Part 6 : Unique identification for product groupings in material life cycle
management
• ISO/IEC 15961 : Information technology – Radio frequency identification (RFID)
for item management (Data protocol: application interface)
– Part 1 : Application interface
– Part 2 : Registration of RFID data constructs
– Part 3 : RFID data constructs
• ISO/IEC 15962 : Information technology – Radio frequency identification (RFID)
for item management (Data protocol: data encoding rules and logical memory
functions JTC 1/SC 31)
• ISO/IEC 15693 : Identification cards – Contact-less integrated circuit(s) cards –
Vicinity cards
– Part 1 : Physical characteristics
– Part 2 : Air interface and initialization
– Part 3 : Anti-collision and transmission protocol
• ISO/IEC 18000 : RFID for Item Management
– Part 1 : Defines the foundation for all air interface definitions in the ISO/IEC
18000 series.
– Part 2 : Parameters for air interface communications below 135 kHz (Type
A (FDX): 125 kHz and Type B (HDX): 134.2 kHz)
– Part 3 : Parameters for air interface communications at 13.56 MHz
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– Part 4 : Parameters for air interface communications at 2.45 GHz
– Part 6 : Parameters for air interface communications at 860 MHz to 960
MHz– Type A and type B with the primary difference being the anti-collision
algorithm used. Type C - also know as EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2.
– Part 7 : Parameters for active air interface communications at 433 MHz
• ISO/IEC 18001 : RFID for Item Management - Application Requirements Profiles
(ARP)
• ISO/IEC TR 18046 : Radio frequency identification device performance test
methods
• ISO/IEC TR 18047 : Information technology – Radio frequency identification
device conformance test methods
– Part 1 : Not available
– Part 2 : Parameters for Air Interface Communications below 135 kHz
– Part 3 : Parameters for Air Interface Communications at 13.56 MHz
– Part 4 : Parameters for Air Interface Communications at 2.45 GHz
– Part 5 : Not available
– Part 6 : Parameters for Air Interface Communications at 860 to 960 MHz
– Part 7 : Parameters for Air Interface Communications at 433 MHz
• ISO 18185 : RFID for electronic seal tags (ISO TC 104 - Freight Containers)
• ISO/IEC 19762 : Information technology – Automatic identification and data
capture (AIDC) techniques – Harmonized vocabulary
– Part 3: Radio frequency identification (RFID)
• ISO 23389 : Freight Containers - Read-Write Radio-frequency identifications
(RFID) (ISO TC 104)
• ISO/IEC 24710 : Information technology, automatic identification and data cap-
ture techniques Radio frequency identification for item management Elementary
tag license plate functionality for ISO/IEC 18000 air interface definitions
• ISO/IEC 24729 : Information technology Radio frequency identification for item
management Implementation guidelines
– Part 1 : RFID-enabled labels
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– Part 2 : Recyclability of RF tags
– Part 3 : RFID interrogator/ antenna installation
• ISO/IEC 24730 : Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS)
– Part 1 : Application programming interface(API)
– Part 2 : 2.4 GHz
– Part 3 : 433 MHz
– Part 4 : Global Locating Systems (GLS)
• ISO/IEC 24752 : Information technology - Automatic Identification and Data
Capture Techniques- Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for Item Manage-
ment - System Management Protocol
• ISO/IEC 24753 : Information Technology - Automatic Identification and Data
Capture Techniques - Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for Item Manage-
ment - Air Interface Commands for Battery Assist and Sensor Functionality
• ISO/IEC 24769 : Information Technology, Automatic Identification and Data
Capture Techniques - Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS) - RTLS Device Con-
formance Test Methods
• ISO/IEC 24770 : Information Technology, Automatic Identification and Data
Capture Techniques - Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS) - RTLS Device Per-
formance Test Methods
• ASTM D7434 : Standard Test Method for Determining the Performance of Pas-
sive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Transponders on Palletized or Uni-
tized Loads
• ASTM D7435 : Standard Test Method for Determining the Performance of Pas-
sive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Transponders on Loaded Containers
• ASTM D7580 : Standard Test Method for Rotary Stretch Wrapper Method for
Determining the Readability of Passive RFID Transponders on Homogeneous
Palletized or Unitized Loads
• DASH7 Alliance : An international industry group formed in 2009 to promote
standards and interoperability among extensions to ISO/IEC 18000-7 technolo-
gies.
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• EPCglobal : this is the standardization framework that is most likely to undergo
international standardization according to ISO rules as with all sound standards
in the world, unless residing with limited scope, as customs regulations, air-
traffic regulations and others. Currently the big distributors and governmental
customers are pushing EPC heavily as a standard well-accepted in their commu-
nity, but not yet regarded as for salvation to the rest of the world (Class 0, Class
1 and Class 1 Gen 2 standard compliant tags).
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Formal Analysis of SIDRFID
We carry out formal analysis of SIDRFID using Casper-FDR tools as explained earlier
in Section 2.6 for possible attacks. We describe SIDRFID in Casper as follows:
Protocol with Static Identity SIDRFID
#Free variables
T,R : Agent
ri : Nonce
idr,idt : IdenKeys
InverseKeys = (idr,idr),(idt,idt)
#Processes
INITIATOR(R,ri,idr)
RESPONDER(T,idr,idt)
#Protocol description
0. → R : T
[R! = T ]
1. R→ T : {ri}{idr}
2a. T → R : {ri, idt}{idr}
2b. T → R : {ri}{idt}
3a. R→ T : {idr, ri}{idt}
3b. R→ T : {idt, ri}{idr}
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#Specification
Secret(R,idr,[T])
Secret(T,idt,[R])
Agreement(T,R,[idr,idt])
Agreement(R,T,[idr,idt])
#Actual variables
Tag,Reader,Mallory : Agent
Ri,Rm : Nonce
IDR,IDT,IDM : IdenKeys
InverseKeys = (IDR,IDR),(IDT,IDT),(IDM,IDM)
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(Reader,Ri,IDR)
RESPONDER(Tag,IDR,IDT)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,Reader,Mallory,Rm,IDM}
Note here that we have not calculated actual values as in the protocol and used idr
and idt as shared secrets since this analysis does not involve any cryptographic attack.
The testing is carried out for desired specifications as follows:
1. Secret(R,idr,[T]) and Secret(T,idt,[R]) : The tag and the reader share idr
and idt as secrets. We have already carried out a full disclosure attack to reveal
these secret values as shown in Section 3.3.2.
2. Agreement(T,R,[idr,idt]) : The tag should be authenticated to the reader and
both agree on the values of idr and idt. However FDR discovers following attack:
0. → Reader : Tag
1. Reader → I {Tag} : {Ri}{IDR}
1. I {Mallory} → Tag : {Ri}{IDR}
2a. Tag → I {Mallory} : {Ri, IDT}{IDR}
2a. I {Tag} → Reader : {Ri, IDT}{IDR}
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2b. Tag → I {Mallory} : {Ri}{IDT}
Tag believes (s)he is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Mal-
lory, using data items IDR, IDT .
2b. I {Tag} → Reader : {Ri}{IDT}
3a. Reader → I {Tag} : {IDR,Ri}{IDT}
3b. Reader → I {Tag} : {IDT,Ri}{IDR}
Reader believes (s)he has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIA-
TOR, with Tag, using data items IDR, IDT .
3. Agreement(R,T,[idr,idt]) : The reader should be successfully authenticated
to the tag with both parties agreeing on the values of idr and idt. When this
specification is checked using FDR, following attack is discovered:
0. → Reader : Mallory
1. Reader → I {Mallory} : {Ri}{IDR}
1. I {Tag} → Tag : {Ri}{IDR}
2a. Tag → I {Tag} : {Ri, IDT}{IDR}
2a. I {Mallory} → Reader : {Ri, IDT}{IDR}
2b. Tag → I {Tag} : {Ri}{IDT}
2b. I {Mallory} → Reader : {Ri}{IDT}
3a. Reader → I {Mallory} : {IDR,Ri}{IDT}
3a. I {Tag} → Tag : {IDR,Ri}{IDT}
3b. Reader → I {Mallory} : {IDT,Ri}{IDR}
3b. I {Tag} → Tag : {IDT,Ri}{IDR}
Reader believes (s)he is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Mal-
lory, using data items IDR, IDT. Tag believes (s)he has completed a run of the
protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with Tag, using data items IDR, IDT.
Since these specifications are failed with attacks discovered on SIDRFID, we thus for-
mally verify that this is a weak protocol.
B.2 Formal Analysis of DIDRFID
We now analze DIDRFID using Casper-FDR to discover any attacks on the protocol.
DIDRFID in Casper is described as follows:
Protocol with Dynamic Identity DIDRFID
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#Free variables
T,R : Agent
ri : Nonce
idt : SessionIdenTag
ki : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (ki,ki)
#Processes
INITIATOR(T,idt,ki)
RESPONDER(R,idt,ki,ri)
#Protocol description
0. → T : R
[T ! = R]
1. T → R : idt
2a. R→ T : {ri}{ki}
2b. R→ T : {ri, ki}{ki}
3. T → R : {ki, ri}{ki}
#Specification
Secret(R,ki,[T])
Secret(T,ki,[R])
Agreement(R,T,[ri,ki])
Agreement(T,R,[ri,ki])
#Actual variables
Tag,Reader,Mallory : Agent
Ri,Rm : Nonce
IDT,IDM : SessionIdenTag
Ki,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Ki,Ki),(Km,Km)
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(Tag,IDT,Ki)
RESPONDER(Reader,IDT,Ki,Ri)
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#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,Reader,Mallory,Rm,IDM,Km}
The messages are constructed based on the values of ri and ki to simulate the ac-
tual protocol. The desired specifications are tested as follows:
1. Secret(R,ki,[T]) and Secret(T,ki,[R]) : The tag and the reader share ki as a
secret key. As shown in Section 3.4.1, this secret key can be compromised.
2. Agreement(R,T,[ri,ki]) : The reader should be authenticated to the tag suc-
cessfully and both use the values of ri and ki. Following attack is discovered on
this specification:
0. → Tag : Reader
1. Tag → I {Reader} : IDT
1. I {Mallory} → Reader : IDT
2a. Reader → I {Mallory} : {Ri}{Ki}
2a. I {Reader} → Tag : {Ri}{Ki}
2b. Reader → I {Mallory} : {Ri,Ki}{Ki}
Reader believes (s)he is running the protocol, taking role RESPONDER, with
Mallory, using data items Ri, Ki.
2b. I {Reader} → Tag : {Ri,Ki}{Ki}
3. Tag → I {Reader} : {Ki,Ri}{Ki}
Tag believes (s)he has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR,
with Reader, using data items Ri, Ki.
3. Agreement(T,R,[ri,ki]) : The tag should be authenticated to the reader and
both agree on the values of ri and ki. Testing shows that following attack exists
on this specification:
0. → Tag : Mallory
1. Tag → I {Mallory} : IDT
1. I {Tag} → Reader : IDT
2a. Reader → I {Tag} : {Ri}{Ki}
2a. I {Mallory} → Tag : {Ri}{Ki}
2b. Reader → I {Tag} : {Ri,Ki}{Ki}
2b. I {Mallory} → Tag : {Ri,Ki}{Ki}
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Tag believes (s)he is running the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with Mallory,
using data items Ri, Ki.
3. Tag → I {Mallory} : {Ki,Ri}{Ki}
3. I {Tag} → Reader : {Ki,Ri}{Ki}
Reader believes (s)he has completed a run of the protocol, taking role RESPON-
DER, with Tag, using data items Ri, Ki.
Attacks are discovered on DIDRFID, we thus formally verify that this is also a weak
protocol.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Formal Analysis of Proposed UMAP
As explained in Section 2.6, we use Casper-FDR tools to carry out formal analysis of our
suggested scheme for any possible attacks. We describe our UMAP in Casper as follows:
Ultra-lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol
#Free variables
T,R : Agent
S : Server
hello,rn : Nonce
secretID : TagSecretId
ks : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (ks,ks)
#Processes
INITIATOR(R,S,hello)
RESPONDER(T,S,secretID,ks)
SERVER(S,rn,secretID,ks)
#Protocol description
0. → R : T
[R! = T ]
1. R→ T : hello
2. T → R : T
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3. R→ S : T
——————————————-
4a. S → R : rn
4b. S → R : {rn, T, secretID}{ks}%A
5a. R→ T : rn
5b. R→ T : A%{rn, T, secretID}{ks}
6. T → R : {T, secretID, rn}{ks}%B
7. R→ S : B%{T, secretID, rn}{ks}
#Specification
Secret(T,ks,[S])
Agreement(S,T,[secretID,ks])
Agreement(T,S,[rn,ks])
#Actual variables
Tag,Reader,Mallory : Agent
Sam : Server
Hello,Hellom,Rn,Rm : Nonce
SecretID,IDm : TagSecretId
Ks,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Ks, Ks),(Km, Km)
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(Reader,Sam,Hello)
RESPONDER(Tag,Sam,SecretID,Ks)
SERVER(Sam,Rn,SecretID,Ks)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,Reader,Sam,Mallory,Rm,IDm,Km}
Note here that we have not calculated internal secrets and used rn as it is easy for
implementation. Similarly the generation of messages A and B is carried out by en-
cryption of variables using shared secret key ks. The Index of the tag is replaced by T
which is a public value. The testing is carried out for desired specification as follows:
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1. Secret(T,ks,[S]) : The tag and the server share a secret key as ks.
2. Agreement(S,T,[secretID,ks]) : The server is successfully authenticated to
the tag after message A is successfully verified and both parties agree on the
values of secretID and ks.
3. Agreement(T,S,[rn,ks]) : The tag is successfully authenticated to the server
after message B is successfully verified and both parties agree on the values of
rn and ks.
Since these specifications are passed without any attack using FDR2, our suggested
scheme is verified to achieve desired functionality.
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Appendix D
Appendix of Chapter 6
D.1 Formal Analysis of Hierarchical Anti-counterfeit Mech-
anism
The Casper-FDR tools as explained in Section 2.6 are used to carry out the formal
analysis of our suggested scheme. We shall analyze the product verification phase only.
This analysis will also verify that if no attacks exist on product verification phase then
group verification phase does not encounter any attacks. The code compiled by Casper
is as follows:
Product Verification Phase : Anti-Counterfeit Mechanism
#Free variables
T,R : Agent
S : Server
q,rn16,rand : Nonce
gid : GroupId
secID : TagSecretId
kt,kr : SessionKey
ts,ts1 : TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (kt,kt),(kr,kr)
#Processes
INITIATOR(R,S,q,kr)
RESPONDER(T,S,secID,rn16,gid,kt)
SERVER(S,rand,secID,gid,kt,kr)
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#Protocol description
0. → R : T
[R! = T ]
1. R→ T : q
2. T → R : rn16
3. R→ T : rn16
4. T → R : T, gid
——————————————-
5. R→ S : T, gid
6. S → R : rand
——————————————-
7. R→ T : rand
8. T → R : {rand, secID, T, ts}{kt}%tvc
——————————————-
9a. R→ S : tvc%{rand, secID, T, ts}{kt}
9b. R→ S : {rand,R, ts1}{kr}
[ts+ 1 == now or ts+ 2 == now and
ts1 == now or ts1 + 1 == now]
#Specification
Secret(T,kt,[S])
Secret(R,kr,[S])
TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[secID,kt])
TimedAgreement(R,S,2,[rand,kr])
#Actual variables
Tag,Reader,Mallory : Agent
Sam : Server
Q,Rn16,Rand,Rm : Nonce
GID, Gm : GroupId
SecretID,IDm : TagSecretId
Kt,Kr,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kt,Kt),(Kr,Kr),(Km,Km)
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
MaxRunTime = 0
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#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(Reader,Sam,Q,Kr)
RESPONDER(Tag,Sam,SecretID,Rn16,GID,Kt)
SERVER(Sam,Rand,SecretID,GID,Kt,Kr)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,Reader,Sam,Mallory,Rm,Gm,IDm,Km}
Product verification code involves all the variables as in the original scheme. How-
ever the construction is different for ease of implementation and considering that this
analysis does not involve cryptographic attacks. The desired specification are tested as
follows:
1. Secret(T,kt,[S]) : The tag and the server share a secret key as kt.
2. Secret(R,kr,[S]) : The reader and the server share a secret key as kr.
3. TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[secID,kt]) : The tag is successfully authenticated
to the server after tvc is successfully verified and both parties agree on the values
of secID and kt. Moreover, this authentication should be completed in three
time units to avoid relay attack (simulating tout assumption in our scheme).
4. TimedAgreement(R,S,2,[rand,kr]) : The reader is successfully authenticated
to the server after rand is correctly decrypted and both parties agree on the values
of rand and kr. This authentication should be completed in two time units to
avoid any relay attack (simulating tout assumption in our scheme).
When CSP file is loaded in FDR2, no attack is detected.
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Appendix E
Appendix of Chapter 7
E.1 Formal Analysis of Customer Level Counterfeit De-
tection Scheme
We carry out the formal analysis of the suggested scheme. The tools used are as ex-
plained in Section 2.6. This analysis will determine whether the suggested scheme
achieves its goal without encountering any attacks. The Casper code is as follows:
Customer Level Counterfeit Detection Scheme
#Free variables
T,R : Agent
rand,hello : Nonce
secID : TagSecretId
pkt : TagPublicKey
skt : TagSecretKey
ksign : SignatureKey
kverify : VerificationKey
InverseKeys = (pkt,skt),(ksign,kverify)
#Processes
INITIATOR(R,kverify,rand,hello)
RESPONDER(T,secID,pkt,skt,ksign)
#Protocol description
0. → R : T
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[R! = T ]
1. R→ T : hello
2. T → R : secID, T, pkt, {secID, T, pkt}{ksign}
3. R→ T : rand,R
4. T → R : {rand,R}{skt}
#Specification
Agreement(T,R,[rand,pkt])
#Actual variables
Tag,Reader,Mallory : Agent
Rand,Rm,Hello : Nonce
SecretID,IDm : TagSecretId
PKt,PKm : TagPublicKey
SKt,SKm : TagSecretKey
Ksign,Ksignm : SignatureKey
Kverify,Kverifym : VerificationKey
InverseKeys = (PKt,SKt),(Ksign,Kverify),(PKm,SKm),(Ksignm,Kverifym)
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(Reader,Kverify,Rand,Hello)
RESPONDER(Tag,SecretID,PKt,SKt,Ksign)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,Reader,Mallory,Rm,IDm,PKm,SKm,Ksignm,Kverifym}
We have included the identity of the reader in messages 3 and 4 considering that the
verification process is being carried out by a party who does not need to authenticate
itself first. Visual verification can be replayed by the adversary, however cryptographic
verification cannot be replayed because of the random challenge generated by a legiti-
mate user. The desired specification is tested as follows:
1. Agreement(T,R,[rand,pkt]) : The tag is successfully authenticated to the
reader after a successful challenge-response protocol and both parties agree on
the values of rand and pkt.
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The above mentioned Casper code is compiled to generate a CSP file which is further
loaded in FDR2. The specification passes successfully without any attack.
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Appendix F
Appendix of Chapter 8
F.1 Formal Analysis of Tag Ownership Release Phase
We use CasperFDR as explained in Section 2.6 to formally analyze our ownership trans-
fer scheme. We analyze our tag ownership release phase for any possible attacks. The
following complete Casper code is compiled to generate a CSP and loaded into FDR2:
Tag Ownership Release Phase
#Free variables
T,O : Agent
S : Server
q,rn,rands : Nonce
rto,setot : Flag
access : InitialSeq
kold,ks,kso,ktx : SessionKey
ts,ts1,ts2,ts3,ts4 : TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (kold,kold),(ks,ks),(kso,kso),(ktx,ktx)
#Processes
INITIATOR(O,S,q,kold,setot,rto,kso)
RESPONDER(T,rn,kold,access,setot,ktx)
SERVER(S,rands,kso,access,ks,ktx)
#Protocol description
0. → O : T
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[O! = T ]
1. O → T : q
2. T → O : rn
3. O → T : rn,O
4. T → O : {rn, T,O}{kold}
——————————————-
5. O → S : rto,O
6. S → O : rands, S
7. O → S : {rands, T,O, S, ts}{kso}
[ts == now or ts+ 1 == now]
8. S → O : {T,O, S, ks, access, ts1}{kso}
[ts1 == now or ts1 + 1 == now]
——————————————-
9a. O → T : rands, S
9b. O → T : {T,O, access, ks, setot, ts2}{kold}
[ts2 == now or ts2 + 1 == now]
——————————————-
10. T → O : {rands, T,O, S, ts3}{ktx}%ku
11a. O → S : ku%{rands, T,O, S, ts3}{ktx}
11b. O → S : {O, ts4}{kso}
[ts4 == now or ts4 + 1 == now and
ts3 + 1 == now or ts3 + 2 == now]
#Specification
Secret(O,kold,[T])
Secret(O,kso,[S])
Secret(T,ktx,[S])
Agreement(T,O,[rn,kold])
TimedAgreement(O,T,2,[access,ks,kold])
TimedAgreement(O,S,2,[rands,kso])
TimedAgreement(S,O,2,[kso])
TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[rands,ktx])
#Actual variables
Tag,OldOwner,Mallory : Agent
Sam : Server
Query,RN16,Rands,Nm : Nonce
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RTO,SETOT : Flag
Access,Accessm : InitialSeq
Kold,Ks,Kso,Ktx,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kold, Kold),(Ks, Ks),(Kso, Kso),(Ktx, Ktx),(Km, Km)
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
MaxRunTime = 0
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(OldOwner,Sam,Query,Kold,SETOT,RTO,Kso)
RESPONDER(Tag,RN16,Kold,Access,SETOT,Ktx)
SERVER(Sam,Rands,Kso,Access,Ks,Ktx)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag,OldOwner,Sam,Mallory,Nm,Accessm,Km,RTO,SETOT}
We divide the complete phase into following stages for testing purposes.
F.1.1 First Stage
The old owner communicates with the tag using standard protocol as follows:
1. O → T : q
2. T → O : rn
3. O → T : rn,O
4. T → O : {rn, T,O}{kold}
This achieves two goals:
• To determine that the tag and the old owner share a secret key as kold.
• The tag is authenticated successfully to the old owner.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these two goals are achieved successfully as following
two specifications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(O,kold,[T]) : The old owner thinks that kold is a secret that can be
known to only himself and the tag.
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• Agreement(T,O,[rn,kold]) : The tag is correctly authenticated to the old
owner, and the two agents agree on the data values rn and kold.
F.1.2 Second Stage
The old owner communicates with the server as follows:
1. O → S : rto,O
2. S → O : rands, S
3. O → S : {rands, T,O, S, ts}{kso}
[ts == now or ts+ 1 == now]
4. S → O : {T,O, S, ks, access, ts1}{kso}
[ts1 == now or ts1 + 1 == now]
This achieves two goals:
• To determine that the server and the old owner share a secret key as kso.
• The old owner and the server are successfully mutually authenticated.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these two goals are achieved successfully as following
specifications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(O,kso,[S]) : The old owner thinks that kso is a secret that can be known
to only himself and the server.
• TimedAgreement(O,S,2,[rands,kso]) : The old owner is correctly authenti-
cated to the server within two time units (one for processing and one for checking),
and the two agents agree on the data values rands and kso.
• TimedAgreement(S,O,2,[kso]) : The server is correctly authenticated to the
old owner within two time units (one for processing and one for checking), and
the two agents agree on the data value kso.
F.1.3 Third Stage
The old owner communicates with the tag as follows:
1a. O → T : rands, S
1b. O → T : {T,O, access, ks, setot, ts2}{kold}
[ts2 == now or ts2 + 1 == now]
This achieves following goal:
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• The old owner is successfully authenticated to the tag.
Using CasperFDR analysis, this goal is achieved successfully as following specifica-
tion is passed without any attack:
• TimedAgreement(O,T,2,[access,ks,kold]) : The old owner is correctly au-
thenticated to the tag within two time units (one for processing and one for
checking), and the two agents agree on the data values access, ks and kold.
F.1.4 Fourth Stage
The tag sends its update message to old owner which forwards it to the server along
with its own acknowledgment message as follows:
1. T → O : {rands, T,O, S, ts3}{ktx}%ku
2a. O → S : ku%{rands, T,O, S, ts3}{ktx}
2b. O → S : {O, ts4}{kso}
[ts4 == now or ts4 + 1 == now and
ts3 + 1 == now or ts3 + 2 == now]
This stage achieves following goals:
• To determine that the tag and the server share a secret key as ktx.
• The tag is successfully authenticated to the server.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these goal are achieved successfully as following speci-
fications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(T,ktx,[S]) : The tag thinks that ktx is a secret that can be known to
only himself and the server.
• TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[rands,ktx]) : The tag is correctly authenticated to
the server within three time units (one for forwarding by the old owner, one for
processing and one for checking), and the two agents agree on the data values of
rands and ktx.
F.2 Formal Analysis of Tag Ownership Acquire Phase
We now formally analyze tag ownership acquire phase using CasperFDR for any pos-
sible attacks. Following Casper code is compiled to generate a CSP and loaded into
FDR2:
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Tag Ownership Acquire Phase
#Free variables
T,O : Agent
S : Server
q,rn,rands : Nonce
ato,rstot : Flag
access : InitialSeq
kso,ktx,knew : SessionKey
ts,ts1,ts2,ts3,ts4,ts5,ts6 : TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (kso,kso),(ktx,ktx),(knew,knew)
#Processes
INITIATOR(O,S,q,rstot,ato,kso)
RESPONDER(T,rn,access,rstot,ktx)
SERVER(S,rands,kso,access,ktx,knew)
#Protocol description
0. → O : T
[O! = T ]
1. O → S : ato,O
2. S → O : rands, S
3. O → S : {rands, T,O, S, ts}{kso}
[ts == now or ts+ 1 == now]
4. S → O : {T,O, S, ktx, ts1}{kso}
[ts1 == now or ts1 + 1 == now]
——————————————-
5. O → T : q
6. T → O : rn
7. O → T : rn,O
8. T → O : {rn, T,O}{ktx}
——————————————-
9. O → S : {T,O, S, ts2}{kso}
[ts2 == now or ts2 + 1 == now]
10. S → O : {T,O, S, knew, access, ts3}{kso}
[ts3 == now or ts3 + 1 == now]
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——————————————-
11a. O → T : rands, S
11b. O → T : {T,O, access, knew, rstot, ts4}{ktx}
[ts4 == now or ts4 + 1 == now]
——————————————-
12. T → O : {rands, T,O, S, ts5}{knew}%ku
13a. O → S : ku%{rands, T,O, S, ts5}{knew}
13b. O → S : {O, ts6}{kso}
[ts5 + 1 == now or ts5 + 2 == now and
ts6 == now or ts6 + 1 == now]
#Specification
Secret(O,ktx,[T])
Secret(O,kso,[S])
Secret(T,knew,[S])
Secret(T,knew,[O])
Agreement(T,O,[rn,ktx])
TimedAgreement(O,T,2,[access,knew,ktx])
TimedAgreement(O,S,2,[rands,kso])
TimedAgreement(S,O,2,[kso])
TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[rands,knew])
#Actual variables
Tag,NewOwner,Mallory : Agent
Sam : Server
Query,RN16,Rands,Nm : Nonce
ATO,RSTOT : Flag
Access,Accessm : InitialSeq
Kso,Ktx,Knew,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kso,Kso),(Ktx,Ktx),(Knew,Knew),(Km,Km)
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
MaxRunTime = 0
#Functions
#System
INITIATOR(NewOwner,Sam,Query,RSTOT,ATO,Kso)
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RESPONDER(Tag,RN16,Access,RSTOT,Ktx)
SERVER(Sam,Rands,Kso,Access,Ktx,Knew)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag, NewOwner, Sam, Mallory, Nm, Accessm, Km, ATO,
RSTOT}
The acquire phase is divided into following stages for testing purposes.
F.2.1 First Stage
The new owner starts tag ownership acquire phase by communicating with the server
as follows:
1. O → S : ato,O
2. S → O : rands, S
3. O → S : {rands, T,O, S, ts}{kso}
[ts == now or ts+ 1 == now]
4. S → O : {T,O, S, ktx, ts1}{kso}
[ts1 == now or ts1 + 1 == now]
Concluding this achieves two goals:
• A secret key as kso is shared between the server and the new owner.
• Both the new owner and the server are mutually authenticated successfully.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these two goals are achieved successfully as following
specifications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(O,kso,[S]) : The new owner thinks that kso is a secret that can be known
to only himself and the server.
• TimedAgreement(O,S,2,[rands,kso]) : The new owner is correctly authenti-
cated to the server within two time units (one for processing and one for checking),
and the two agents agree on the data values rands and kso.
• TimedAgreement(S,O,2,[kso]) : The server is correctly authenticated to the
new owner within two time units (one for processing and one for checking), and
the two agents agree on the data value kso.
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F.2.2 Second Stage
The new owner uses standard protocol to communicate with the tag:
1. O → T : q
2. T → O : rn
3. O → T : rn,O
4. T → O : {rn, T,O}{ktx}
This is carried out to achieve following goals:
• To determine a secret key ktx is shared between the tag and the new owner.
• The tag is authenticated successfully to the new owner.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these two goals are achieved successfully as following
two specifications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(O,ktx,[T]) : The new owner thinks that ktx is a secret that can be
known to only himself and the tag.
• Agreement(T,O,[rn,ktx]) : The tag is correctly authenticated to the new
owner, and the two agents agree on the data values rn and ktx.
F.2.3 Third Stage
After achieving the values of knew and access, the new owner now communicates with
the tag as follows:
1. O → T : rands, S
2. O → T : {T,O, access, knew, rstot, ts4}{ktx}
[ts4 == now or ts4 + 1 == now]
This achieves following goal:
• The new owner and tag now shares a secret key as knew.
• The new owner is successfully authenticated to the tag.
Using CasperFDR analysis, this goal is achieved successfully as following specifica-
tion is passed without any attack:
• Secret(T,knew,[O]) : The tag thinks that knew is a secret that is known to
both himself and the new owner.
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• TimedAgreement(O,T,2,[access,knew,ktx]) : The new owner is correctly
authenticated to the tag within two time units (one for processing and one for
checking), and the two agents agree on the data values access, knew and ktx.
F.2.4 Fourth Stage
The tag sends its update message to old owner which forwards it to the server along
with its owner acknowledgment message.
1. T → O : {rands, T,O, S, ts5}{knew}%ku
2a. O → S : ku%{rands, T,O, S, ts5}{knew}
2b. O → S : {O, ts6}{kso}
[ts5 + 1 == now or ts5 + 2 == now and
ts6 == now or ts6 + 1 == now]
This stage achieves following goals:
• To determine that the tag and the server share a secret key as knew.
• The tag is successfully authenticated to the server.
Using CasperFDR analysis, these goal are achieved successfully as following speci-
fications are passed without any attack:
• Secret(T,knew,[S]) : The tag thinks that knew is a secret that can be known
to only himself and the server.
• TimedAgreement(T,S,3,[rands,knew]) : The tag is correctly authenticated
to the server within three time units (one for forwarding by the new owner, one
for processing and one for checking), and the two agents agree on the data values
of rands and knew.
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